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Abstract
Public and private investment in education plays an important role in a nation’s social 
and economic development as well as influencing the life-time earnings and 
opportunities of individuals. When demand for education increases, governments must 
make policy decisions about the nature and purpose of public investment in all levels of 
education. As school education is the most important foundation for investment in 
human capital, public investment in schooling is justified in order to maximise the 
distribution of educational attainment. Although State and Territory governments are 
responsible for the management and delivery of schooling in Australia, the Federal 
government has a responsibility to pursue national policy objectives in school 
education. Since 1973, Commonwealth involvement in schooling has increased 
significantly but the effectiveness of Federal funding has been undermined by poor 
definition of policy objectives, inadequate monitoring of program performance and the 
split in funding responsibilities between two levels of government. Commonwealth 
involvement in the recurrent funding of schools has influenced the structure of 
education provision and compromises the capacity of State and Territory governments 
to develop consistent schools funding policies for both public and private providers. 
These anomalies in schools funding policy could be addressed if responsibility for 
funding both government and non-government schools were returned to one level of 
government. The Federal government should therefore withdraw from the recurrent 
funding of government and non-government schools. The three billion dollars of 
specific purpose payments currently allocated under the Commonwealth’s General 
Recurrent Grants (GRG) Program should be transferred to untied Financial Assistance 
Grants administered by the Commonwealth Grants Commission. The Federal 
government could continue to pursue its national policy objectives through specific 
purpose payments of targeted and capital assistance. Although such a reform would 
meet with resistance from non-government schools and some Education Ministers, the 
Commonwealth’s withdrawal from recurrent schools funding would improve public 
accountability for school education expenditure in Australia.
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Introduction
Although the federal system in Australia has been a perennial source of debate and 
discussion, little attention has been paid to the way in which the division of 
responsibility affects either the formulation of public policy or the delivery of 
particular kinds of government-provided goods and services.
Galligan, B., Hughes, O. and Walsh, C. (1991). Intergovernmental relations and 
public policy. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, p. 8.
This thesis is a study of the impact of the Australian Federal government’s involvement 
in school education. It describes the origins of Federal government intervention and 
examines the outcomes of that involvement. On the basis of this analysis, the thesis 
argues for a radical change to Commonwealth financial arrangements for schools.
The author recognises that “public policy is different in a federation” (Davis et al. 1993: 
67), and that characteristics of the Australian Federal system have influenced the 
Commonwealth’s role in schooling. Australian Federalism has evolved in such a way 
that the Federal government raises more revenue than it can spend, and this has 
increased its capacity to intervene in public policy. As Galligan et al. point out, “the 
orthodox view is that the commonwealth has been the leading federal player because of 
its fiscal dominance” (1991: 5). But although the Federal government’s involvement in 
school education has been characterised by high levels of expenditure rather than inter­
governmental co-operation, Federal intervention in schooling did not arise simply 
because the Commonwealth had the financial capacity to become involved. While it is 
widely assumed that “the development of the fiscal power of the Federal government at 
the expense of the States was a powerful factor precipitating it into a direct role in 
Australian education” (Tannock 1969: 8), the balance in Federal/State financial relations 
was secondary to the political events which led to Commonwealth intervention in 
schooling. This thesis also challenges the conventional view that financial hardship 
impelled the States to request financial assistance from the Commonwealth for schools 
(see Mathews 1983, Smart 1978, Tannock 1969).
Although I examine the policy rationale for the current levels of Federal involvement in 
schooling, the research was not driven by a desire to reform Federal/State financial 
relations. This issue has attracted academic debate and disagreement (Maddox 1991, 
Sharman 1990, Walsh 1991), and the case for reform is not sustainable on theoretical 
grounds alone. The Australian Constitution appears to be deliberately vague about the 
Commonwealth’s role in distributing its financial surplus (Galligan 1995: 221) and a 
degree of vertical fiscal imbalance in Federal financial relations may be defended on 
efficiency and equity grounds (Breton 1996: 198-227). The primary goal of this 
research is to evaluate Commonwealth involvement in school education from a public 
policy perspective. This involves an exploration of the policy rationale for government 
involvement in schooling, a judgement about the effectiveness of Federal government 
involvement and an assessment of the impact of Federal funding on Australian schools.
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Public policy is characterised by policy areas or fields of study within which detailed 
policy analysis takes place (Parsons 1995: 31). Within these specialisations, analysts try 
to understand “how, why, and to what effect. . . governments pursue particular courses 
of action and inaction” (Heidenheimer et al. 1990: 3). I aim to answer this question with 
reference to the Australian Federal government’s involvement in schooling.
In discussing “how” the Federal government chose to act in regard to schools, I 
acknowledge the Constitutional limitations on Commonwealth involvement and the way 
in which this influenced the development of a Federal schools policy. Birch (1975) 
provides a definitive account of the statutory limitations on Federal involvement in 
education, and of events which have undermined the legal barriers to Commonwealth 
intervention in education during this century. However, the history of Commonwealth 
intervention in schooling is not simply about overcoming legal obstacles to Federal 
involvement. As illustrated in Chapter Two, the Commonwealth became involved in 
school education decades before the “benefits to students” power was included in the 
Constitution and, since 1946, the Federal government has not used its “benefits to 
students” power as a pretext for direct funding of schools. Commonwealth schools 
funding continues to be paid to and through the States under Section 96 of the 
Constitution.
I address the question of “why” the Federal government became involved in schooling 
through an historical account of the growth of Commonwealth programs and policies 
and the factors that precipitated Commonwealth intervention (Chapter Two). Prior to 
the 1960s, Federal schools programs were of an ad hoc nature, targeted to achieve 
limited policy objectives, and carried out by State Education Departments on behalf of 
Federal agencies. The Federal government showed no interest in funding schools until 
the Catholic campaign for state aid provided Prime Minister Menzies with an irresistible 
opportunity to gain political advantage in 1963. Previous studies have found that 
political considerations were the major determinant of the nature and scope of 
Commonwealth intervention in schools (Albinski 1966, Anderson 1993, Hogan 1978, 
Marginson 1993, Praetz 1982, Smart 1977, Tannock 1969).
In considering “to what effect” the Federal government has pursued its course of action 
(and inaction) in regard to schooling, this thesis departs from previous analyses of 
Commonwealth involvement. It moves beyond an historical account of Federal 
involvement to examine the policy rationale for the Commonwealth schools funding. 
The first chapter of the thesis approaches the policy basis for Federal intervention by 
asking why governments initially became involved in school education provision. The 
commencement of government intervention in schooling last century was part of a 
general trend towards “collectivisation in the public domain (which) took place at 
different times in various industrial nations, but always for the reason that certain kinds 
of problems were no longer seen as purely private” (Parsons 1995: 5). This “revolution 
in government” was characterised by an increase in government interest in many areas 
of social policy (Sutherland 1972). In Australia, whereas colonial governments were 
well placed to achieve the social policy objectives which precipitated government 
involvement in schooling, the subsequent development of economic policy goals 
implied a role for the Federal government.
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Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of government service provision in school 
education has been a major concern of Western governments during the past decade 
(OECD 1993, 1995, Scales 1993, Steering Committee for the Review of 
Commonwealth/State Service Provision 1995). In both the United States of America 
and in Australia, there has been mounting scepticism about the benefits of increased 
levels of expenditure on schools (Clare and Johnston 1993, Hanushek 1986, National 
Education Summit 1996). In Chapter Three, I discuss the impact of Commonwealth 
involvement in terms of school performance. I examine the Commonwealth’s attempts 
to monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of its own expenditure and its efforts to 
improve public accountability for the educational outcomes of schooling.
The most significant policy impact of Federal involvement in schooling has been to 
increase the size of the non-government schools sector (Anderson 1992, Hogan 1984, 
Marginson 1993). Chapter Four discusses this effect of Commonwealth intervention in 
terms of fiscal policy goals and the quality of school education outcomes. I illustrate the 
impact of Federal funding on private schools and highlight the anomalies created by the 
Commonwealth’s arrangements for distributing resources between schools. Although 
some studies of private schooling in Australia have discussed the Commonwealth’s 
involvement in terms of school quality (Anderson 1992, Williams 1985, Williams and 
Carpenter 1990), none has examined the links between school inputs and the production 
of education outcomes. My discussion of the educational outcomes of public and 
private schools in the context of patterns of Federal government expenditure provides 
the basis for an objective evaluation of the impact of Commonwealth involvement.
The fundamental question of the future of Federal government involvement in schooling 
is discussed in Chapter Five, in the context of reforming Federal/State financial relations 
(Noon 1991, Officer 1996). While there are strong arguments for changing the existing 
funding arrangements, several obstacles stand in the way of the reform of 
Commonwealth funding for schools. Although governments have an electoral mandate 
to implement their policies, they also have a responsibility to be accountable for their 
decisions in allocating public resources. It is more difficult to monitor public 
accountability for outlays when funding is transferred between levels of government. In 
the concluding Chapter Six, I argue that public accountability for education expenditure 
would improve if the Commonwealth withdrew from the recurrent funding of 
government and non-government schools.
Wildavsky describes policy analysis as “an applied sub-field whose contents cannot be 
determined by disciplinary boundaries but by whatever appears appropriate to the 
circumstances of the time and the nature of the problem” (1979: 15). In undertaking this 
research, I have drawn on the disciplines of economics, politics and history as well as 
education and policy analysis. Whereas the history of Federal involvement in schooling 
is primarily a political story, the legitimacy of Federal intervention is discussed in terms 
of social and economic policy goals. Educational research from Australia and overseas 
was useful in developing a model for measuring school performance and for assessing 
the impact of Federal intervention on school quality. The public policy literature 
provided a framework for understanding the provision of school education within 
Australia’s federal system. Reviewing the project from a policy perspective enabled me
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to envision a future for Commonwealth involvement in school education which was free 
of the limitations of traditional discipline-based research.
The guiding principle of this work has been E.H. Carr’s description of political science 
as a discipline that has been created to serve a purpose, within which the purpose 
inevitably becomes part of the analytical process (Carr 1939: 7). Although ideas are a 
prerequisite for analysis, Carr emphasises that purposive investigations are fruitless 
unless ideals are balanced with a realistic appreciation of the facts, and an understanding 
of the causes and consequences of historical events. I hope this thesis lives up to Carr’s 
definition of the academic project.
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Chapter One
Why governments invest in school education
The education of the common people requires, perhaps, in a civilised and 
commercial society, the attention of the public more than that of people of 
some rank and fortune.
Adam Smith (1776) The Wealth of Nations, Vol 2 p.269.
Introduction
In this chapter, I will examine patterns of government expenditure on school education 
in the context of the broad but fundamental policy objectives of social stability and 
economic growth. The chapter charts the major developments precipitating government 
involvement in an activity that was once privately funded and explores the policy 
rationale underlying those developments. However, the actions -  and inaction -  of 
government can never be explained in terms of public policy goals alone. Economic 
and political conditions are a major influence on government decision-making in 
Western democratic societies. In Australia, governments are also constrained by the 
division of powers within the Federal system. The Commonwealth government is 
primarily responsible for economic policy whereas State governments are largely 
responsible for social policy. As the Federal government does not manage any school 
systems, it cannot pursue its schooling policies without the cooperation of State 
governments. This split in policy and management responsibilities has influenced 
patterns of government expenditure on schooling in Australia.
1 Social policy goals
When the Australian colonies federated in 1901, it was unquestioned that the State 
governments should remain responsible for education policy. At the time, government 
interest in education was confined to the achievement of social rather than economic 
policy goals. The economic significance of school education was not recognised as a 
policy issue until the 1960s when human capital theory highlighted the relationship 
between educational achievement and economic development.
1.1 Social stability
Two hundred years ago, governments played no role in education provision. Education 
was a private activity and the few “charity” schools run by non-government 
organisations were treated with suspicion (Silver and Silver, 1974). The public 
provision of education for children in pre-industrial England was considered 
unnecessary. As industrialisation took hold, however, some people suggested that the 
government should provide mass education to deliver basic skills and practical 
knowledge to the working classes. In 1776, the philosopher Adam Smith argued that
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the division of labour in industrial societies resulted in the minds of labourers being so 
dulled by repetitive tasks that they were no longer able to participate fully in society. A 
lifetime of repetitive work produced a “torpor of mind” that rendered an industrial 
labourer “not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, 
but of conceiving any generous, noble or tender sentiment, and consequently of forming 
any just judgment concerning many of the ordinary duties of private life” (Smith 1776, 
Vol. 2: 267). Smith advocated the establishment of a system of parish schools which, if 
not free, were cheap enough so that “children may be taught for a reward so moderate 
that even a common labourer may afford it” (270). Adam Smith did not argue that 
education had any economic purpose. He was primarily concerned to remedy the effect 
of industrialisation on social life. He predicted that existing social structures would 
break down and that education was needed to preserve social stability, in the belief that 
“an instructed and intelligent people . . .  are always more decent and orderly than an 
ignorant and stupid one” (Smith 1776, Vol 2: 273).
Adam Smith’s views on the need for public education were vindicated during the early 
decades of the 19th Century when the economic upheaval caused by the industrial 
revolution began to threaten the stability of social life. In 1819, a parish priest in 
Manchester summed up the social consequences of economic change:
. .. within the space of the last half century, the whole frame and mechanism of 
society, in every large and commercial district, has undergone a thorough and 
most material change . . . The population of the town was no longer confined to 
the number of its native inhabitants, but large multitudes of strangers were 
drawn together from distant places, for the purpose of traffic, or in search of 
employment and subsistence . . .  In a large and crowded manufactory, it was 
impossible for the master to exercise the same patriarchal influence and 
authority over the moral character and conduct of those who were in his 
employ . . . (Reverend Allen, 1819 quoted in Silver and Silver 1974: 4).
The original policy rationale for government involvement in school education was to 
inculcate consistent standards of behaviour among the general population. The 
government found allies for this task among established churches, particularly the 
Church of England which feared a diminution of its influence as a result of changes in 
the social order. Mass education was seen as a means of maintaining social order and 
restoring the moral authority of the church. When the Church of England established its 
system of primary schools throughout the United Kingdom in the 1830s, its policy goals 
were to restore respect for social and religious institutions (Silver and Silver 1974).
The Object in forming Establishments of this nature . . .  is, to train the Infant 
Poor to good and orderly habits, -  to instil into their minds an early knowledge 
of their civil and religious duties, -  to guard them, as far as possible, from the 
seductions of vice, -  and to afford them the means of becoming good 
Christians, as well as useful and industrious Members of Society (The Church 
of England’s National Society for Promoting the Education of the Poor in the 
Principles of the Established Church, 1828 in Silver and Silver 1974: xi).
By the 1830s the established churches in England and its Australian colonies had begun 
to provide mass education systems in an attempt to reach all families, particularly the 
working poor (Austin 1961, Silver and Silver 1974, Sturt 1967). As governments began
6
to develop their own policies for schooling, they supported the efforts of the Churches, 
who, for their part, lobbied hard to retain control over school education provision. By 
1833, the Church of England was receiving government financial assistance for its 
schools and the system of providing government subsidies to church and private schools 
was replicated in the Australian colonies1. Eventually, concern about the effectiveness 
of the subsidies to the Churches led to government involvement in the management of 
school education. Government-run school systems have now existed in England and 
Australia for over one hundred years (Austin 1961, Sutherland 1973, Sturt 1967).
While governments supported the churches as education service providers, government 
interests went beyond a concern about public morality. Politicians who supported the 
principle of universal education in the 19th Century also saw it as a means of reducing 
crime, quelling potential social unrest and creating popular support for the system of 
government. As the century passed, the level of bi-partisan political support for 
universal schooling grew, based on its potential to solve a range of social problems of 
concern to all classes of society2.
As the United Kingdom and its Australian colonies moved towards more democratic 
systems of government, the appropriate exercise of democratic rights and 
responsibilities assumed priority as a policy rationale for government involvement in 
education. Although being literate and numerate is not a pre-requisite for democratic 
participation, elected politicians have always believed that higher rates of literacy and 
numeracy make democracy work more effectively. Prior to 1880, the emphasis of this 
policy goal was a “negative or regulatory reaction to democracy -  the endeavour to curb 
any tendency to employ democratic powers to the detriment of the existing social order” 
(Ling 1984: 102).
During the 20th Century, advocates of participatory democracy championed the cause of 
universal education to enhance individuals’ capacity to exercise their political rights 
(Callan 1997, Dewey 1929, Russell 1942). John Dewey’s “progressive movement” 
argued that the school should be a microcosm of democratic society (Tyack 1967). The 
link between education and democratic forms of government remained important up to 
and during the Second World War. The threat posed by the rise of communist and 
fascist political regimes in Europe strengthened the view that mass education could be a 
bulwark against totalitarianism. In 1939, an American scholar warned,
If American schools fail democracy in the great crisis that now confronts it, all 
will be lost. For the second time in our history, education must be re-directed 
and re-fashioned in order that it may effectively serve democracy in the new 
social order. . .(Newlon 1939: 230).
1 In Australia, the Protestant and Catholic churches fought hard to secure a role as education providers, 
and undermined successive government attempts to provide education services during the first hundred 
years of English occupation (Austin 1961).
2 Austin observed of the colonial parliaments that “Crime . . . was a matter of great moment to these 
respectable middle-class men, and by an interminable quoting of statistics designed to show the connexion 
between ignorance and crime, they succeeded in making one another’s flesh creep at the thought of the 
lawlessness which lay all around them” (Austin 1961: 178).
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In sum, the idea of using education to prepare people for citizenship has existed for well 
over a century. The advent of universal suffrage in democratic political systems has 
served to strengthen bi-partisan political support for universal schooling. Educating 
people for “citizenship” remains a major policy rationale for government involvement in 
schooling. In 1973, the OECD recognised that the development of an interest in the 
political process, and a willingness or desire to participate in a political system were 
policy goals of all educational systems. (OECD 1973: 39). In Australia, the 
Commonwealth Schools Commission stated in 1987,
. . .  the health of our democracy depends on all citizens, through education, 
having the best possible understanding of how society functions, and how, 
individually and collectively, citizens can participate in and contribute to its 
future (Commonwealth Schools Commission 1987: 1).
The seventh goal of the Common and Agreed National Goals for Schooling in Australia 
is “to develop knowledge, skills, attitudes and values which will enable students to 
participate as active and informed citizens in our democratic Australian society within 
an international context” (AEC 1989). The fundamental policy objective of Australian 
governments is to enhance social stability through education provision. However the 
concept of “citizenship education” is now more complex than the simple goal of 
universal literacy that prompted government involvement one hundred years ago.
In 1989, a Senate report in Australia raised alarm in political circles about the perceived 
failure of schools to prepare young people for their responsibilities in a democratic 
society. (Senate Standing Committee on Employment, Education and Training 1989). 
The Senate report questioned the extent to which students are adequately prepared for 
political participation in terms of their understanding of the machinery of government.
In response, a Federal government initiated an inquiry into the role of schools in 
educating young people for “citizenship” (Civics Expert Group 1994). In response to 
this report, a Commonwealth Civics and Citizenship Education Program was introduced 
to promote understanding of the political institutions among students at all stages of 
schooling (Kemp 1997b: 7).
While the concept of civics and citizenship education is based on improving students’ 
awareness of the political system, the fundamental role of school education in promoting 
social stability is achieved through the universal achievement of literacy. Literacy 
remains the primary policy objective of mass education provision. The social costs of 
inadequate literacy levels are high, according to a report commissioned by the Federal 
government during UNESCO’s International Literacy Year.
. . . inadequate literacy skills restrict the ability of individuals to exercise 
informed citizenship, participate in their local communities and use their 
abilities and talents. Low levels of literacy shut people out from important 
areas of human experience and thought, tend to make them dependent rather 
than independent, reduce confidence and may contribute to keeping them in 
poverty (Hartley 1989: xi).
The Australian Federal government places great emphasis on the fundamental role of 
schools in promoting universal literacy and numeracy. In 1994, the Commonwealth
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government commissioned a national survey of Australian Literacy skills 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1994: 195). The Commonwealth National School English 
Literacy survey has since provided national benchmarks of literacy achievement among 
students at several stages of schooling (Kemp 1997c, Management Committee for the 
National School English Literacy Survey 1997).
The achievement of basic literacy skills remains a high priority of governments 
throughout the world. Following the Education for All Declaration by member 
countries in 1990, UNESCO set up a set of specific activities to promote basic skills for 
all people. The priority of most nations and international agencies supporting the 
program was to focus on the provision of primary school education. Universal literacy 
remains the fundamental educational outcome aiming by any government seeking to 
promote social stability through mass education provision.
1.2 The government’s role
For the first hundred years of Australia’s occupation by Europeans, schooling was 
provided by non-govemment agencies. The government’s role was limited to the 
provision of subsidies to the Churches and various community groups that established 
and managed the schools3. The provision of subsidies led to increased government 
involvement in monitoring the schools that were receiving support, and the development 
of regulations governing their conduct. By the second half of the 19th Century, most 
colonial governments vested control of all types of schools that drew on public funds in 
a central Board or Commission4.
In the 1860s when colonial governments wanted to fund an expansion of schools, the 
non-govemment providers were unable to deliver education to the majority of the 
school-aged population. The effect of rapid population growth and the dispersal of 
settlers into the interior following the Selection Acts made it impossible for the 
Churches and private interests to carry out their task of providing universally accessible 
schools. Of the system in New South Wales, where boards of Commissioners were 
responsible for allocating government funding, Austin concluded,
despite the brave (and equivocal) statements in their annual reports, it was 
obvious that they were, at best, educating half the children of school age, and 
that the denominational schools to whom they were distributing aid were 
diminishing in number and contracting upon the cities almost as rapidly as the 
population was increasing and moving into the interior (Austin 1961: 184-185).
As colonial governments lost confidence in the capacity of the private sector to deliver 
adequate education services, they assumed control over school education provision. 
Between 1872 and 1893, each of Australia’s six colonial governments legislated to take 
control over public education and government-run school systems were established in
3 While colonial governments encouraged the establishment of government-funded schools, these schools 
were usually managed by community-based committees, and dependent on locally raised resources as well 
as government assistance (see Austin 1961 Ch. 1-5).
4This trend in administration of non-government schools prompted the Catholic Church to denounce 
public schooling and to prepare to maintain its own system of schools independent of government 
assistance (Austin 202-213).
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every colony5. With a few exceptions, public funding for current purposes was 
withdrawn from private schools, and the government specified conditions for the 
registration of private schools6.
By the turn of the century, State governments appeared diligent in performing their 
legislated duty to provide school education that was “free, secular and compulsory”.
The commitment to universal access was carried out by funding schools with as few as 
six children in outlying areas, providing subsidies for privately employed teachers for 
smaller groups, as well as providing correspondence schools (Cunningham et al. 1939: 
19). While some education authorities charged nominal fees for their State schools, by 
the time of Federation, free primary school education was generally available throughout 
Australia. In 1898, the Victorian education system was 75 per cent larger than in 1872, 
catering to almost a quarter of a million students (.Report of the Minister of Public 
Instruction, 1898-1899). At Federation, colonial governments were spending an 
average of ten per cent of total outlays on their education systems (Ratchford 1959)7.
The government’s policy objectives remained modest -  given the high levels of current 
and capital outlays required to provide universal public education. In the 19th Century, 
Adam Smith’s definition of the extent of the government’s policy interest remained apt:
. .. though the common people cannot, in any civilised society, be so well 
instructed as people of some rank and fortune, the most essential parts of 
education, however, to read, write and account, can be acquired at so early a 
period of life, that the greater part even of those who are to be bred to the 
lowest occupations, have time to acquire them (Smith 1776).
The primary aim of government investment in universal school education was to teach 
basic literacy and numeracy. In the Census of 1881, 26 per cent of the New South 
Wales population had been unable to read. By 1901, only 8 per cent of the population 
over five years of age was unable to read. Government statisticians monitored literacy 
levels by the proportion of people who signed marriage registers with a mark. In 1857, 
28.4 per cent of the people who married in New South Wales were unable to sign the 
marriage register. By 1880, this had dropped to 6.7 per cent, and by 1904 to less than 1 
per cent. This “marvellous” progress was attributed to the efficacy of the government’s 
educational system, leading the Government Statistician in New South Wales to 
proclaim, “Great as has been the material progress of the State, its intellectual 
advancement has been much more rapid” (NSW Government Statistician 1906: 547).
5 The “free, secular and compulsory ” Education Acts were instituted in the following order: Victoria 
1872; Queensland 1875; South Australia 1875; New South Wales 1880 ; Tasmania 1893; and Western 
Australia 1893 (Austin 1961). In the United Kingdom, government intervention came in the form of the 
Elementary Education Act 1870.
6 The exception was public support for six grammar schools in Queensland. The registration 
requirements for private schools usually related to minimum accommodation standards (Austin 1961).
7 Austin (1961: Ch. 7) details many shortcomings of the colonial system of education administration in its 
early years, particularly in the area of teacher training and remuneration, He also states that there was 
strong community opposition to compulsory schooling, particularly in country areas and the governments’ 
machinery of enforcement was so weak that that no colony had an effective system of compulsory 
schooling until the 20th Century.
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In Victoria, the proportion of people signing the marriage register with marks in 1902 
was only 0.6 per cent, a source of some pride to the Victorian Government Statistician.
Compared with England and Wales, Scotland and Ireland, where the 
proportions signing with marks were 2.70, 2.37 and 11.94 respectively, the 
elementary education standard is very high in this State, which in this respect 
occupies the highest position in Australasia. (Office of the Government Statist,
1902: 128).
Today, the definition of literacy is more sophisticated than the ability to sign one’s 
name. Although UNESCO defines literacy as the ability to “read and write and 
understand simple messages” (UNESCO 1993: 47), Western definitions of literacy are 
more complex, requiring people to interpret, create and respond to a range of print 
materials (Christie 1990: 21). Even by contemporary standards, Australian primary 
schools are still successful in achieving universal standards of literacy and numeracy, 
thereby fulfilling the policy goal for which they were established. In cases where 
students cannot read, write and count by the end of primary schooling, close 
examination usually reveals the cause to be disrupted schooling or attendance at many 
different schools (Wickert 1989). In other words, absence from continuous schooling 
results in poor literacy and numeracy achievement, whereas regular attendance at an 
Australian primary school is a strong predictor of literacy and numeracy competence. 
The State governments’ establishment of large primary school systems, their control 
over curriculum, their regulation of non-government schools, and the legal framework 
of compulsory school attendance have been effective instruments for achieving the 
social policy objectives for schools.
The success of State governments in achieving the social objectives for schooling may 
also be due to the clarity of their policy goals. The role of primary schools as agents of 
literacy and numeracy development has been clearly defined from the beginning. 
Primary school education remains focused on this goal and the outcomes are relatively 
easily measured -  both by teachers and by system management. Management of 
primary schooling in Australia has also remained the policy responsibility of one level 
of government.
1.3 The neglect of secondary schooling
In the 19th Century, because the social policy goals of education could be met through 
the provision of primary schooling, governments never sought to create a 
comprehensive system of secondary education.
In England, on the whole, the firmly held theory was that the state . . . had no 
concern with secondary education, and that it should certainly not be paid for 
from public funds . . . (Sturt 1967: 385)8.
When the Australian colonies federated in 1901, only a few State secondary schools 
existed, and the bulk of government resources was spent on primary schools9. State
8 Sturt points out that technical education was given a higher priority than secondary education - for
economic reasons.
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governments’ financial commitment to secondary schools fluctuated with economic 
conditions. In response to the 1929 economic depression, when the Commonwealth 
reduced general purpose grants, States cut their recurrent expenditure on education, 
particularly at the secondary level.
The hardest hit of all the branches of State education were the secondary 
school systems. Secondary school scholarships -  a principal source of high 
school graduates -  were reduced by as much as twenty per cent, and as a 
further discouragement to young people to stay on a school past the age of 
fourteen, tuition fees were introduced in most States. The depression then, had 
the effect of reducing the numbers of students in State secondary schools -  at a 
time when they should have been increasing rapidly -  thus encouraging the 
development of a system of education which made secondary schooling a 
domain of the economically privileged or intellectually extraordinary (Tannock 
1969: 184).
Until the mid-1940s, fees were levied for secondary education in all State schools 
(Waddington et al. 1950: 55-56). Yet even after secondary school fees had been 
abolished, a student’s likelihood of completing secondary school was determined more 
by financial circumstances than intellectual merit. In 1944, the Universities 
Commission noted “many who could benefit by completing the full secondary school 
course were prevented from doing so by financial circumstances” (Tannock 1969: 340). 
In 1957, the Murray report on the financial needs of universities stated that “the number 
of children lost to secondary education through leaving school early is very large and . . . 
among these there must be large numbers of intellectually able pupils” (Murray 1957: 
par 230).
Within Australia’s federal system, States had no financial incentive to encourage 
participation in secondary schooling. When students left the State school system to find 
jobs or to attend private secondary schools, they ceased to be a burden on State budgets. 
If early school leavers became unemployed, the provision of social security benefits was 
a responsibility of the Federal government. Although the legislated terms of compulsory 
education fell within the range of four to fourteen years of age, until the 1950s 
completion of primary school was usually sufficient grounds to gain exemption from 
further years of schooling (Ling 1984: 48). In the 1940s, States spent only 21 per cent 
of their school education budgets on secondary education compared to 79 per cent on 
primary schools (Mathews 1972: 80). By the early 1960s, the proportion of States’ 
recurrent expenditure going to secondary schools had risen to 39 per cent, and by 1973, 
almost 50 per cent of school spending was allocated to secondary schools (Karmel 1972, 
Table 4 .10)9 10.
9 In Austin’s opinion, the absence of State systems of secondary education, “starved the universities of 
talent, and condemned any effective system of technical education to failure” as well as depriving schools 
of educated teachers (Austin 1961: 243).
^Technical education also remained predominantly a private investment. Although there were economic 
arguments for the provision of technical education, it was not generally accepted that the costs of work- 
related training should be borne by government until the Second World War, when the Commonwealth 
invested heavily in technical education in a belated attempt to develop skilled manpower for war-time 
industries (Ling 1984, Tannock 1969: 209).
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For the first half of the twentieth century, the completion rate for secondary education in 
Australia was very low. In 1944 less than 6.5 per cent of Australian children passed the 
leaving-level examination (Tannock 1969: 340). However in the following decades, 
final year retention rates began to rise, in response to increased standards of living and 
changing economic conditions (Connell 1962: 3). By the late 1950s, the final year 
school retention rate had risen to around 11 per cent in most States (Murray 1957: par 
297, Report o f the Victorian Minister o f Education fo r  the Year 1965-66). Demand for 
senior secondary education increased in the 1960s, as rising living standards enabled 
more families to forego the incomes of children completing secondary school. By 1968, 
the national final year retention rate had increased to 26 per cent. Final year school 
retention then increased steadily between 1968 and 1992, as illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1 Year 12 retention rate, Australia 1967 to 1997
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Australia, various years.
In common with most OECD countries, Australia’s educational systems were placed 
under pressure by the influx of students resulting from the post-war baby boom (OECD 
1976: 22). Demand for secondary schooling increased dramatically in the late 1950s 
when the baby boom generation entered secondary school. State secondary education 
systems were ill-prepared for the combined impact of the baby boom, higher rates of 
secondary retention, and post-war migration. In a frank admission of the “formidable 
material problems” confronting the Victorian Secondary Education system, the Chief 
Inspector of Secondary Schools informed Parliament,
For the past ten years, the year 1959 has been looked to with foreboding, since 
the birth rate statistics for the post-war years indicated that the first great wave 
of post-war babies would descend on the secondary schools in this year. Even 
then, it was difficult to foresee the effects of migration and, in particular, the 
concentration of so many new Australians in Victoria . . . (J.W. Mills, Chief 
Inspector of Secondary Schools, in Report of the Minister for Education for 
1958-59).
During the four years between 1956 and 1960, the secondary student intake in Victoria 
increased by 44 per cent. To meet the demand for places, over one hundred new high 
schools were built in Victoria between 1954 and 1960, bringing the total number to 167
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secondary schools in 1960. The pressure on existing capital facilities led to the creation 
of a technical school system so that Trade schools could offer tuition to full-time 
students at the secondary level. While Mills noted this development with regret, he 
admitted it was necessary to alleviate the accommodation shortages in the State high 
school system (Report of the Minister of Education for 1958-59).
In 1957, the State Directors of Education, concerned about “securing additional funds 
for the growing secondary school population” proposed the introduction of scholarships 
for students in senior secondary schools and technical education (Spaull 1987: 105).
The suggestion was endorsed by State Education Ministers at the Australian Education 
Council meeting in 1958 who resolved,
That it be suggested to the Commonwealth Government that in order to 
implement the intention of the Murray report to the fullest extent the 
Commonwealth consider the establishment of a bursary scheme along the lines 
of the Commonwealth Scholarship Scheme to provide financial assistance to 
enable secondary students to complete the last two years of secondary 
education (Spaull 1987: 105).
In 1961, State Education Ministers, through the Premier’s conference asked the Federal 
government for direct financial assistance to help meet the costs of education provision. 
Their manifesto, A Statement on some aspects of Australian education cited the 
economic importance of education as a reason for Commonwealth involvement and said 
that schools needed between 20 and 35 million pounds a year to overcome deficiencies 
between immediate needs and available funds11. Although the Prime Minister’s initial 
response had been to reject the idea of Commonwealth assistance to schools, in a pre­
election policy speech in November 1963, Prime Minister Menzies promised to 
introduce 10,000 scholarships for senior secondary students and a capital grants program 
for school science facilities. Following its election victory, the Federal government 
provided some 12 million pounds in direct assistance to students and schools in its 
1964-65 Budget. A senior secondary scholarship scheme provided an annual grant of 
100 pounds towards fees and books and 100 pounds for living expenses, without a 
means-test, to students at both private and State schools. An allocation of 10 million 
pounds for science facilities included 5 million pounds for secondary schools (both 
private and State) and 5 million pounds for technical schools.
The provision of Commonwealth assistance had little impact on senior secondary 
retention. The rate of participation in senior secondary education remained low. Three 
quarters of Australian students did not complete secondary school in 1967, and most of 
those who did were supported by private resources. The Commonwealth secondary 
scholarships scheme covered less than 15 per cent of senior secondary school students, 
and the remaining 85 percent of students relied upon private resources or State 
government teaching bursaries. As Commonwealth scholarships were not means-tested, 
the scholarships were “won overwhelmingly by students who would have continued
11 As State Education Ministers wavered in their resolution to make direct demands upon the 
Commonwealth, the estimate was scaled down from 35 million pounds in 1961 to 20 million pounds in 
1963 (Spaull 1987: 115).
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their education anyway. . (Karmel 1973: par 3.15)12. In the public school system, 
students from high socio-economic backgrounds were five times more likely to 
complete Year 12 than students of low socio-economic backgrounds (Moore 1973). A 
disproportionate number of senior secondary students attended fee-paying private 
schools. In 1967, private schools enrolled more than 35 per cent of students in the final 
two years of secondary school while they enrolled only 23 per cent of the total school 
population (ABS Cat. No. 4221.0).
All OECD countries experienced a rapid growth in public outlays on education during 
the 1960s (OECD 1976). In Australia, State governments carried the major burden of 
providing increased public funding for schools. States’ expenditure on education as a 
proportion of their consolidated revenue increased from 18 per cent in 1960 to 23 per 
cent in 1968 (Fitzgerald 1970: 35). Between 1963 and 1971, States increased their 
outlays on secondary education by 152 per cent in real terms (Karmel 1973: Table 4.10).
While State systems found the resources to build and staff new secondary schools in the 
1960s, they were unable to pursue the principle of “free, secular and compulsory” 
education at the senior secondary level. In the absence of a legislative mandate 
requiring students to attend school beyond the age of fifteen years, State education 
systems accepted that for most students, the completion of senior secondary education 
required private resources. A disproportionate number -  over one third of final year 
secondary students -  completed their secondary education in private schools. The role of 
private providers was supported by the State governments’ reintroduction of recurrent 
subsidies funding for private schools in the late 1960s. Although the decision to fund 
private schools was primarily the outcome of a successful political campaign, it was 
justified in terms of alleviating accommodation pressure on State education systems. At 
the second reading speech of the Educational Grants Bill in 1967 -  the first Act to 
restore state aid to private schools -  the Victorian Minister for Labour and Industry, Mr 
Rossiter announced that funding for private schools was needed “to prevent the State 
system from being overburdened to the point of possible embarrassment” (Victorian 
Parliamentary Debates 1967-68, Vol 287: 306)13.
As the major policy goal of public education was to promote social stability through 
universal literacy and numeracy, the first priority of State governments was to deliver 
education services during the compulsory years. The financial burden of carrying out 
this responsibility was so great during the post-war years that State education systems 
were ill-equipped to expand senior secondary provision. The completion of secondary 
school therefore remained a private investment undertaken by students with sufficient 
private resources to meet the cost of tuition, living expenses and income foregone by 
staying on at school. The Commonwealth’s contribution made little difference to the 
capacity of States to accommodate senior secondary students. While Commonwealth 
capital grants assisted in the provision of science facilities, Commonwealth scholarships 
reached less than 15 per cent of total eligible students and many of the recipients already
12 Fensham (1972) demonstrated that private school students obtained a disproportionate share of 
Commonwealth scholarships.
12 While the pressure of student enrolments was the policy rationale given in parliamentary debates for 
this move, there were strong political forces behind the introduction of funding for private schools at both 
the State and the Commonwealth level (discussed in Chapters Two and Five).
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had the private means to continue their education (Wilkes and Noble 1971). Although 
an economic rationale for increased participation in post-compulsory education emerged 
in the 1960s, the Commonwealth government was slow to take responsibility for the 
economic policy goals of Australian schooling.
2 Economic policy goals
While the social benefits of education are significant, schooling also contributes to the 
achievement of economic policy goals.
Industrial societies place considerable emphasis on the contribution which
education is able to make to economic development (OECD 1973: 48).
To some observers, emphasising the economic purposes of education implies a narrow 
instrumentalism that seeks to make schools the vehicles -  and the victims -  of micro- 
economic reform (Lingard, O’Brien and Knight 1993, Pusey 1991). However this thesis 
will argue that the most powerful policy rationale for government funding of education 
has come from the work of 20th Century economists, particularly those who formulated 
human capital theory. There is a tendency in the literature to confuse the policy 
implications of human capital theory with the policies and programs subsequently 
established by governments. This has led to a “human capital orthodoxy”14 which does 
not necessarily reflect the principles of human capital theory. Below I set out the 
original propositions of human capital theory (Section 2.1) as well as the policy 
implications of the theory (Sections 2.2 and 2.3). This is necessary to differentiate 
human capital theory from the policies which have been subsequently implemented in 
its name. In the final section, I discuss the policy response to human capital theory in 
Australia.
2.1 Human capital theory
In the late 1950s, a group of American economists studying the sources of economic 
growth found a substantial unexplained growth in the national income of many countries 
after accounting for the growth in physical capital and labour. They concluded that 
rising levels of education made a direct contribution to economic growth through the 
higher productivity generated by workers. In other words, economic growth could be 
attributed in part to an increase in the stock of human capital in addition to physical 
capital. They assumed that the higher wages paid to people with more education was 
evidence of the higher productivity generated by educated workers. It was calculated 
that the monetary return to individuals from spending time and money in the pursuit of 
education was far greater than the costs (in terms of tuition fees and foregone income) of 
their original investment. The economists therefore argued that education should cease 
to be viewed purely as a consumption good, but rather be viewed as an investment in 
human capital (Becker 1960, Schultz 1961, Denison 1962).
14 The “human capital orthodoxy” is “the belief that economic growth and development requires the 
continued expansion of education, especially at the higher levels and in the technical and vocational 
areas” (Magien 1990: 282).
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Human capital theory spawned an explosion of economic research. In the early days, 
many economists constructed “growth accounting” models to attempt to replicate 
Denison’s claim that 23 per cent of the growth in output in the United States over a 30 
year period could be explained by increased average levels of schooling15. According to 
Magien (1990), the results of the growth accounting studies have been mixed. Few 
theorists have been able to replicate Denison’s original estimates, while others have 
found flaws in the methodology of growth accounting models (Magien 1990: 283).
In the mid-1980s, “New Growth theories” argued that human capital could push 
economies onto faster growth paths, meaning that education was endogenous to 
economic growth (Römer 1986, 1987, 1990, Lucas 1988, Solow 1991). Trying to 
account for differences in the growth rates between developing countries, the New 
Growth theories observed that educated parents produce better educated children, and 
educated workers raise the productivity of the less educated members of their team, as 
well as being more responsive to new technology. Thus an educated work force could 
be expected to exhibit increasing marginal productivity and small differences in starting 
conditions would cause divergences in the economic performance of countries over 
time. While the “New Growth theories” are in their infancy and are not short on critics, 
their effect has been to “revive the cause of human capital, by giving it one of the key 
endogenous roles in the economic growth process” (Magien 1995: 145).
The largest body of research arising from human capital theory has been studies on rates 
of return to investment in education and training. Research on rates of return has 
continued to support the original observation of high rates of return to individuals from 
educational qualifications. The private return to education consistently outweighs the 
costs (in terms of fees and foregone income) of the initial investment16. In spite of 
increasing levels of education participation, the rate of return to education has remained 
high. In 1989, Murphy and Welch summarised the returns in wages for levels of 
education in the USA over a twenty-five year period, as shown in Table 1.1.
The data in Table 1.1 indicate the increase in earnings for each level of education 
beyond compulsory schooling. In 1986 the earnings of those completing graduate 
school were 85 per cent higher than the earnings of high school graduates, and higher 
than at any previous time. While the returns to college-educated workers fell 
temporarily in the late 1970s, by the mid-1980s, the rates of return to college degrees 
had resumed their previously high levels. The temporary decline in the rate of return in 
the 1970s, is now considered “the predictable consequence of a phenomenal increase in 
numbers of college graduates that coincided with the entry of the baby boomers into the 
job market” (Murphy and Welch 1989: 18). The rise in returns to college education 
during the 1980s implies that the 1970s were only a temporary break in the general trend 
of increasing returns to education over a long period.
15 For literature on the relationship between educational investment and economic growth see Bowman 
1964, 1980, Denison 1962, Psacharopoulos 1984, Schultz 1960, 1961.
16A selection of the hundreds of published studies on rates of return include Becker 1964; Hanoch 1967; 
Hansen 1963; Mincer 1974, Psacharopoulos 1973, Murphy and Welch 1989, Vella and Gregory 1992.
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Table 1.1 Rates of return to education (years of schooling) USA, 1963-1986
1 2 3 4 5 6
Years High 
school 
(12 years)
Some college 
(13-15 years)
College 
(16 years)
Graduate
school
College over High 
school
(Sum Columns 3,4,)
1963-1968 10.7 16.7 31.4 13.6 38.1
1969-1974 9.5 17.1 34.2 14.2 51.3
1975-1980 11.0 12.6 33.8 16.9 46.4
1981-1986 14.2 14.8 37.6 17.7 52.4
Notes: The data indicate the percentage by which the average wage for each level of schooling exceeds 
that of the previous group, except for column 6. The returns to High school (Column 2) are compared to 
the returns to individuals with 8-11 years of schooling.
Source: Murphy, K. and Welch, F. (1989). “Wage Premiums for College Graduates: Recent Growth and 
Possible Explanations”. Educational Researcher 18(4): 17-26.
Australian data collected during the 1980s in Table 1.2 show a similar pattern to the 
United States. While not directly comparable, the rates of return to schooling in 
Australia are generally lower than in the USA, however the trend of higher returns to 
higher levels of education is the same. The Australian data also reveal a steep increase 
in earnings for those who complete Year 12 compared to students who drop out of 
school in earlier years. A Year 12 graduate can expect to earn 27 per cent more than 
someone who left school at the end of Year 10, and 48 per cent more than someone who 
left school at the end of Year 9.
Table 1. 2 Rates of return to education (years of schooling) Australia, 1988
1 2 3 4 5 6
Year Year 10 
(11 years)
Year 12 
(13 years)
Diploma 
(15 years)
Bachelors 
Degree 
(16 years)
Degree over High school 
(Sum Columns 4,5)
1988 21 27 23 14 37
Notes: The data indicate the percentage by which the average wage for each level of schooling exceeds 
that of the previous group, except for column 6. The returns to Year 10 (Column 2) are compared to the 
returns to individuals who left school in Year 9.
Source: Vella, F. and Gregory, R.G. (1996). “Selection bias and human capital investment: Estimating the 
rates of return to education for young males”. Labour Economics 3: 197-219: 214.
Although there are differences in the rates of return to levels of education in countries 
around the world, the broad observations are the same. Regardless of a country’s 
economic development, education delivers substantial returns to individuals in terms of 
relative earnings. Observing the rates of return to schooling in over sixty countries, 
Psacharopoulos (1985) found that the returns to education were common to all countries 
and highest in countries with the lowest per capita income.
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With the exception of the 1970s, when college-educated baby boomers flooded the job 
market, the rapid increase in education participation since the 1960s has had no effect on 
the returns to educational qualifications. This could not have been foreseen by the early 
human capital theorists. It was generally assumed that as the number of graduates 
seeking employment increased, the wage premium for higher degrees would decline. 
Instead, the demand for educated workers appears to have increased along with the 
supply of education, resulting in the average returns to education remaining stable over 
time17. For over three decades, the rates of return to education have remained 
consistently high in all types of countries, in spite of a continuing increase in the supply 
of educated workers. Hanushek summed up the research findings on rates of return in 
1994:
The average earnings of workers with a high school education remain 
significantly above those of the less educated, and the earnings of workers with 
a college education now dwarf those of the high school educated . . . College- 
educated workers also enjoy greater job opportunities and suffer less 
unemployment. High technology economies seem to have a voracious appetite 
for skilled workers, who can adapt to new technologies and manage 
complicated production processes effectively. So for individuals, at least, the 
increased relative incomes of more educated people have been sufficient to 
offset the costs, making additional schooling an attractive investment 
(Hanushek 1994: 17).
In trying to explain the causes of the high rates of return, researchers fall into two main 
groups. The first group is composed of those who believe that education makes people 
more productive, which is consistent with the human capital approach. The second 
group suggests that education could simply be a device to enable employers to identify 
prospective workers of high innate ability through screening out less able potential 
employees (Arrow 1973, Spence 1973)18. However the human capital approach and 
“screening” theory are not mutually exclusive. It is probable that acquired skills and 
innate ability are both responsible for higher rates of return to education. Johnes (1993) 
cites studies which estimate that the proportion of an individual’s earnings differential 
that can be attributed to innate characteristics realised through screening is no more than 
35 per cent for higher education graduates, and up to 40 per cent for secondary school 
graduates (Psacharopoulos 1975, Williams and Gordon 1981). The remaining 
proportion is attributed to human capital advantages in the form of increased worker 
productivity (Johnes 1993). The respective influence of screening versus human capital 
assumptions may also be influenced by the relative rigidity of graduate labour markets. 
Magien (1990) argues that the high incomes of higher education graduates are more 
likely to be due to their concentration in the public sector and self-employed professions 
which limit labour supply. At lower levels of education, however, labour market 
segmentation is less evident.
17 The continuing demand for educated workers may be due to the rapid pace of technological change in 
advanced industrial economies (see Johnes 1993).
18 There is a difference between the “screening” hypothesis and the “signalling” hypothesis in the sense 
that education can be used by individuals to signal their ability to prospective employers, while it can also 
be used by uninformed employers to screen individuals instead of ascertaining their real ability levels.
The two approaches are described in Johnes (1993): 18-20.
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The most significant legacy of human capital theory is the evidence of continuing high 
rates of return to investment in education and training. Disputes about the causes of 
high rates of return have not undermined the basic message that -  in spite of a massive 
increase in participation during the past thirty years -  individuals continue to obtain 
high rates of return from higher levels of education. This high rate of return is generally 
attributed to higher levels of productivity among educated workers, although for higher 
education graduates, screening may play a more significant role. With respect to lower 
levels of education, the evidence tends to suggest that the rate of return to education is 
linked more strongly to worker productivity, due either to innate ability realised through 
screening, or to superior skills acquired in the education process (or more likely a 
combination of these).
Prior to human capital theory, the economic role of education and training was not well 
defined. In the early 20th Century, economic arguments underpinned several of the 
Australian Federal government’s forays into education, mainly in the areas of scientific 
and industrial research at the university level19. Commonwealth educational 
expenditure with an economic focus was always justified in terms of scientific 
advancement, employment creation or the repatriation of returned services personnel. 
These educational programs were seen as one-off, short-term responses to specific 
economic problems, rather than long-term investments in human capital20. The 
Australian response to human capital is discussed in Section 2.4 in light of the policy 
implications of the theory which are examined below.
2.2 The importance of completing secondary school
Human capital theory has demonstrated consistently the economic significance of 
completing secondary school. The continuing economic importance of completing 
secondary school is evident both in terms of relative rates of return to education as well 
as levels of unemployment. Although there has been some variability in the rates of 
return to education at the university level, this has not been the case in secondary school 
completion. The finding that the completion of secondary school delivers significant 
benefits over non-completion has been consistent in the literature on human capital for 
over thirty years (Miller 1982, Murphy and Welch 1989, Psacharopoulos 1985, Vella 
and Gregory 1992, 1996).
The wage returns from completing secondary schooling are significantly higher than the 
returns to non-completers, as shown in Tables 1.1 and 1.2. The average wages of all 
American workers who have completed high school are 14.5 per cent higher than the 
average wages of those who have not (Murphy and Welch 1989). In Australia, for each 
additional year of secondary school beyond Year 9, workers can expect average wage 
increases in the order of 21, 12 and 15 per cent respectively (Vella and Gregory 1996). 
Completing secondary school in Australia delivers greater increases in relative wages 
(compared to non-completers) than the completion of any subsequent years of
10 The policy rationale for the establishment of CSIR in the 1920s was primarily economic and the issue 
attracted heated parliamentary debate (Tannock 1969).
“0 For example, the Federal government provided educational assistance to returned services personnel 
after both World Wars and introduced a technical training program for young unemployed during the 
economic depression of the 1930s.
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education. In 1988, Australian university graduates with diplomas and degrees obtained 
wage margins of between 23 and 14 per cent over Year 12 graduates, whereas Year 12 
graduates’ wages were 27 per cent higher than Year 10 graduates’ wages, and 48 per 
cent higher than the wages of workers who left school in Year 9. These findings led 
Vella and Gregory to observe, “for all educational groups an important step in the 
earnings function occurs at the completion of 12th grade” (1992: 145)
Australian workers who have completed secondary school are also less likely to suffer 
from unemployment than those who have not completed school. When secondary 
school completers become unemployed, it tends to be for shorter periods than for those 
who have not completed school (Lamb et al. 1995). Fifty-five per cent of the long-term 
unemployed in Australia -  those out of work for more than two years -  have not 
completed secondary school (ABS Cat. No. 6235.0)
It is not perfectly understood why the completion of an Australian secondary education 
delivers such good returns in terms of wages and steady employment. The explanations 
tend to range within the well-worn parameters of the “screening versus productivity” 
debate (McKenzie and Long 1995). In addition, Vella and Gregory (1992) suggest it 
could be due to an increase in self-confidence among successful Year 12 graduates, or 
the fact that more Year 12 completers are from higher socio-economic backgrounds than 
non-completers, or simply a “stigma effect” associated with not completing secondary 
school. McKenzie and Long (1995) found that Year 12 graduates are more likely to be 
involved in work-based education and training than workers who have not completed 
Year 12. If one accepts the proposition that education makes some contribution to 
worker productivity, the rates of return to secondary schooling can be assumed to reflect 
-  in some measure -  the quality of senior secondary education. The additional years of 
senior schooling could well make Year 12 graduates more productive, more flexible and 
more capable of undertaking further training -  all of which increase their labour market 
value. Regardless of whether Year 12 adds productivity to students or is simply a 
device to screen students of innate ability for employers, the rate of return to Year 12 
completion confirms its value as an educational investment.
The economic significance of schooling was recognised by State Ministers of Education 
when they sought Commonwealth financial assistance in 1961 (Spaull 1987: 115). The 
Australian Federal government responded to this request by providing secondary 
scholarships and funding for school science blocks in 1964. However, as discussed in 
Section 1.3, Commonwealth involvement did not have a noticeable impact on levels of 
participation in senior secondary schooling. Before discussing the Australian policy 
response to human capital theory in Section 2.4,1 will examine the implications of 
human capital theory for the role of government in educational investment.
2.3 The role of government
Human capital theory had implications for both government policy and for individuals. 
At the policy level, human capital demonstrated that a nation seeking to increase its 
economic growth should not limit its capital investments to physical facilities such as 
plant and equipment. It was argued that investments to improve labour productivity, 
such as expenditure on health and education could also generate income, both for
21
nations and for the individuals who made the investment. While human capital theory 
provided a rationale for increased investment in education and training, it did not 
specify the extent to which governments -  as opposed to individuals -  should make the 
investment.
The early human capital theorists were quick to point out the policy implications of their 
research, but they did not presume to indicate how the policy changes should be brought 
about. In 1962, Edward Denison concluded his book with “a menu of choices available 
to increase the growth rate”21. Denison’s list included policy options such as: reducing 
the hours lost from work through industrial disputes, sickness and accidents; 
rehabilitating criminals; reducing unemployment; increasing the rate of private 
investment; doubling net immigration levels; and increasing the amount of time students 
stay at school by one and a half years (or making an equivalent improvement in the 
quality of education). Each policy choice on Denison’s menu was accompanied by an 
estimate of the contribution it would make to the rate of economic growth (Denison 
1962: 276).
While Denison’s menu illustrated the range of policy options inspired by human capital 
theory, he did not argue that governments should finance all or any of the changes he 
proposed. Human capital theorists have never argued that investment to improve the 
stock of human capital should be provided entirely by government. On the contrary, 
given the high rates of return to individuals from investing in education, the incentives 
to become educated already exist. As Murphy and Welch concluded,
The high returns to education that we observe make it more important that the 
government not inhibit the ability of individuals to get a college education, but 
the returns indicate also that no drastic change in policy is required to 
encourage individuals to obtain a college degree . .  . The high college wage 
premium is a signal that it pays to obtain a college degree. Perhaps the best 
policy is to spread the word of recent growth in college premia and then to sit 
back and admire the market at work (Murphy and Welch 1989: 26)
Human capital theory provided a persuasive argument for individuals to finance their 
own education and implied that the only role for governments was to make people more 
aware of the benefits of education investment. However, there are three significant 
exceptions to this rule, where government involvement in financing education can be 
justified.
The first reason for government intervention is to overcome imperfections in capital 
markets. Human capital theorists pointed out that in spite of the high rates of return to 
education, investment in human beings cannot be financed on the same terms or with 
the same ease as investment in physical capital. There is no way that the lender can 
obtain any security for a human capital loan -  short of some form of slavery. 
Government intervention would therefore be desirable to make capital available for 
people to invest in education. Milton Friedman (1962) proposed making loans available 
for students on the condition that the individuals repaid the loans as a specified
21 see concluding chapter in Denison, E.F (1962) The sources of economic growth in the United States 
and the Alternatives before us. Supplementary Paper No. 13, Committee for Economic Development, 
USA.
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percentage of their earnings after graduation. He suggested that the project could be 
combined with the payment of income tax to minimise administrative expenses. 
Friedman emphasised that the role of such a scheme was not to finance education, but to 
rectify imperfections in the capital markets.
The desideratum is not to redistribute income but to make capital available at 
comparable terms for human and physical investment. Individuals should bear 
the costs of investment in themselves and receive the rewards. They should not 
be prevented by market imperfections from making the investments when they 
are willing to bear the costs (Friedman, 1962: 105)
In theory, an income-contingent loans scheme could be introduced for all education 
beyond the compulsory years of schooling22. However the desirability of implementing 
such a scheme at the various levels of education has to be considered in the context of 
discount rates and externalities, which are discussed below.
The second reason why governments might get involved in financing education is to 
influence the education decisions taken by individuals with discount rates that are higher 
than socially optimal. If particular groups, notably poorer students, have higher discount 
rates than others, they will over-emphasise today’s costs of education over tomorrow’s 
higher income flows in their investment decisions. This is illustrated by the continuing 
gap in school completion rates between students from high and low socio-economic 
backgrounds, shown in Figure 4.3. Government intervention would therefore be 
justified to redress problems in the responses to incentives between rich students and 
poor students in terms of financing education investments23. The most popular means 
of addressing this issue is to make some form of direct financial assistance to students 
from low-income families.
The continuing gap in school completion rates between rich and poor students in 
Australia suggests that financial incentives alone are not the sole determinants of 
students’ educational choices. Even when students are equipped with accurate 
information about rates of return to particular occupations, they do not make their 
investment decisions entirely on the basis of financial returns. (Bosworth and Ford 
1985). While Australian students have enjoyed free university places and means-tested 
financial assistance since 197424 the Year 12 retention rate among low-income students 
remains below that of high-income students as shown in Figure 4.3. While higher 
discount rates may deter poor students from continuing their education, low 
participation rates among certain social groups can also be attributed to differences in
22The Australian Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) for funding university places closely 
follows Milton Friedman’s proposal for an income-contingent loans scheme.
23 The extent to which governments are motivated to equalise the “discount rates” can be outweighed by 
other policy concerns. When the Australian government introduced an income-contingent loans scheme 
for higher education in 1990, the policy consideration of equalising discount rates was outweighed by the 
government’s interest in attracting revenue from the payment of fees up-front. The government therefore 
offered a 15% discount to anyone paying fees up-front, thus providing additional benefits to wealthy 
students.
24 Various forms of financial assistance have been provided to students in Australia, but until 1974 these 
grants were merit-based scholarships to students of high ability, regardless of financial means. In 1974, 
the Australian Federal government introduced a financial assistance scheme that was means-tested 
according to the family income of the student.
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Standards of education provision between secondary schools, and barriers to further 
education imposed by Year 12 assessment systems and universities’ admission criteria 
(Teese 1989). These observations strengthen the argument for governments to target 
assistance to social groups who experience continual low participation rates in 
education. As financial considerations are not solely responsible for the low 
participation rates in education of specific social groups, the scope of government 
intervention may need to go beyond the provision of financial assistance schemes, if the 
policy objective of increasing participation rates is to be achieved.
The third reason that might justify government investment in education is the existence 
of externalities or “neighbourhood effects”. This means that the total benefit of 
education rarely accrues to the individual alone, because there are benefits to society as 
a whole from higher levels of education. Neighbourhood effects of education and 
training include breakthroughs in scientific research, increased economic and cultural 
capital, improved social cohesion, better health, a reduction in crime and lower levels of 
unemployment (Haveman and Wolfe 1984). Researchers estimating the value of the 
neighbourhood effects conclude that the “annual value of incremental schooling 
reported in the standard human capital estimates may capture only about one-half of the 
total value of an additional year of schooling” (Haveman and Wolfe 1984: 401)25. The 
neighbourhood effects of education are most significant at the lowest levels of 
attainment and gradually diminish in importance as a student moves through higher 
education (Haveman and Wolfe 1984, Psacharopoulos 1985). However, in the case of 
university research, the externalities -  while difficult to quantify -  are considered 
sufficient to justify government investment (Jaffe 1989, Mansfield 1991, Gambardella 
1995) 26.
The existence of neighbourhood effects provides a justification for government 
financing of education because these factors are not taken into account by individuals 
when making personal investment decisions. The risk of under-investment in education 
if the decision is left to individuals alone is illustrated by the fact that one in four 
individuals drop out of secondary school in Australia in spite of the significant 
neighbourhood effects of secondary school completion. While society would be better 
off if there were mass completion of Year 12, the individuals who make the decision to 
drop out cannot be expected to take this into account. Governments should therefore 
provide additional incentives for individuals to complete secondary school if they want 
to obtain the positive neighbourhood effects.
While the neighbourhood effects of mass participation in secondary schooling justify 
substantial government investment in schooling, the argument is weaker in regard to 
mass participation in higher levels of education. This has led some human capital
While Blaug (1987) is pessimistic about the prospects of quantifying externalities, several studies have 
tried to estimate the value of the social and as well as the private returns to education. These studies are 
few in number because of the complexity of the data set needed to calculate social benefits, compared to 
the relative simplicity of calculating private rates of return based on individual earnings (see Johnes 1993: 
27-38).
26 The Australian government began supporting medical research under its quarantine powers within the 
first decade of the 20th Century. The aim to broaden Australia’s economic base after the First World War 
led to the establishment of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research in 1926, which ultimately 
became the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation in 1949.
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theorists to question the level of government assistance to higher education (see Blaug 
1983). Psacharopoulos (1985) argues that the money saved by reducing subsidies to 
universities should be reinvested in schooling, particularly at the primary level. If 
government subsidies to universities were to be reduced, enrolments in higher education 
would not be expected to decline. Given the continuing high rate of return to 
individuals from higher education investments, there would still be a strong incentive 
for individuals to invest in higher education even if government assistance were reduced 
(Blaug 1983, Murphy and Welch 1989).
In the unlikely event that the returns to individuals from higher degrees fell so much that 
demand for university places declined, government would need to intervene to guarantee 
the neighbourhood effects. In such a scenario, the value of private returns to higher 
degrees would be less than the value of the social returns. Increased government 
intervention in higher levels of education would therefore be necessary to compensate 
for the low returns to individuals and to secure the benefits for society. To date, human 
capital theory has demonstrated that the rates of return to degrees have never been low 
enough to give governments any cause for concern about under-investment in higher 
education. Nevertheless, since the Murray (1957) report, Australian governments have 
encouraged an expansion in higher education through increased levels of public funding.
In summary, human capital theory implies that there are three main reasons for 
governments to be involved in the financing of education, namely: to address 
inadequacies in the capital markets; to improve the incentives for poor students; and to 
secure neighbourhood effects for society. Of these reasons, the existence of externalities 
or neighbourhood effects provides the strongest policy rationale for government 
involvement in funding education, particularly at the school level. While human capital 
theory supports the notion of increased investment in education, it does not imply that 
all of the costs of the investment should be borne by government. In making allocative 
decisions within the education sector, human capital theory implies that levels of 
government subsidisation should decline with levels of education. In other words, 
governments should place a high priority on universal primary schooling, should seek to 
maximise participation in secondary schooling, and should provide lower levels of 
support for students at the university level. Governments may also be justified in 
providing high levels of support for postgraduate research training.
2.4 Human capital theory in Australia
Human capital theory was first raised publicly in the context of Australian education 
policy in the inaugural Buntine Oration in 1962. Professor Peter Karmel, an economist 
from the University of Adelaide, advocated increased government investment in 
education at all levels. The basis for his argument was that the externalities of education 
were large in relation to the personal benefits. He surmised: “Whereas people will buy 
education in relation to the private benefit that they anticipate will accrue, the benefit 
accruing to society may be very much greater than that accruing to the individual" 
(Karmel 1962: 7). Karmel acknowledged that studies had found the personal rate of 
return on higher levels of education to be high, but he said that “a number of objections 
can be raised against the procedures used and the interpretation of the results” (Karmel 
1962: 6). Dismissing the rates of return findings, he asserted that the costs of increased
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government investment could be compensated for by economic growth. “Education has 
directly beneficial effects on production and the rate of economic growth so that there is 
a sense in which it pays for itself by future production”(Karmel 1962: 19).
Human capital theory thus entered Australia’s education policy debate as a rationale for 
increasing government investment in all levels of education. Karmel’s speech reflected 
the uncritical enthusiasm for human capital theory common in economic circles 
following Theodore Schultz’s presidential address to the American Economic 
Association in 1961 (Schultz 1961). Subsequent studies in human capital confirmed the 
rates of return findings and revised down the value of externalities as a rationale for 
government investment in higher education. When Karmel spoke in 1962, the level of 
understanding of human capital concepts was quite imprecise. It was generally believed 
that the high rate of return to higher degrees was due to under-investment in college 
education, and that if the number of college graduates were to increase, the wage 
premiums would fall (Becker 1960). The measurement of the value of externalities 
from education was also undeveloped. As Blaug reflected 25 years later, “in the 1960s, 
the standard view was that the externalities were large in relation to the private benefits 
of higher education but the new consensus, at least for advanced countries, is that they 
may well be negligibly small” (Blaug 1983: 127).
In 1962, the Australian Federal government was a major funding source for universities 
and was yet to became a minor partner in funding for schools. Karmel’s interpretation 
of human capital theory was therefore taken up to support increased Commonwealth 
expenditure on higher education. In 1964, the Martin Committee of Inquiry into the 
future of Tertiary education in Australia -  of which Karmel was a member -  stated “it is 
both realistic and useful to regard education as a form of national investment in human 
capital” (Martin 1964: par. 1.17). Quoting Denison’s estimates of rates of return to 
higher education, the Committee acknowledged that “investment in additional education 
yields a monetary return measured by the additional income earned in later life” (par 
1.20). However, the Committee said that the rates of return findings needed to be 
treated “with caution”, on the grounds that an increase in higher education graduation 
rates could result in a reduction in the wage premium for graduates (par 1.20). The 
Committee then repeated the assertion that the social benefits of education were more 
substantial than the private returns. “The material benefits of education, which accrue to 
the individual concerned, are only a fraction of the total benefits accruing to 
society”(par. 1.21 )27.
While the Martin Committee also pointed out that there was a significant financial 
handicap to students completing secondary school, it had not been established to advise 
the Federal government on schooling, nor on the allocation of resources between levels 
of education. During the 1960s, the Federal government became a minor funding 
partner in school education while increasing its funding role in higher education. In 
1967, the Federal government spent over $120 million on higher education and less than 
$20 million on schools (Commonwealth Budget Estimates 1967-68: 14-24). State and
27 In response to the Martin Committee’s report, the Federal government increased its funding for 
university places by 30 per cent (ie. the number of Commonwealth scholarships increased by that amount).
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Territory governments, in comparison, spent over $500 million a year on schooling in 
1967 (Karmel 1973: Table 4.10).
When State Education Ministers requested direct assistance from the Federal 
government in 1963, they cited economic policy goals as a reason for Federal 
involvement (Spaull 1987: 117). However, successive Federal governments were 
careful to avoid economic issues in their policy statements, relying instead on the more 
tractable concept of “needs-based” funding for schools. In 1973, the Committee of 
Inquiry which recommended the expansion of Commonwealth schools funding made no 
mention of human capital theory nor the economic significance of schools in its final 
report (Karmel 1973). Such issues were not mentioned in the Committee’s brief and 
were most likely considered outside its terms of reference. While expenditure on 
schooling increased significantly following the Karmel report, Commonwealth schools 
programs were not directed to meeting economic policy objectives. The most 
significant Commonwealth initiative in terms of human capital was the introduction, in 
1973, of means-tested student assistance schemes to replace Commonwealth 
scholarships for students at the university and the senior secondary school level.
In 1985, economic policy appeared in the Federal government’s policy agenda for 
schooling when the Commonwealth announced its goal to increase Year 12 retention 
rates28. Because the Federal Fabor government was responsible for the payment of 
unemployment benefits, the rising cost of supporting unemployed young people brought 
the issue of Year 12 retention rates onto the Federal policy agenda. Between 1978 and 
1983, the unemployment rate for 15-19 year olds had increased from 17 per cent to 26 
per cent and was double the rate for the adult population (ABS Cat. No. 6203.0). A 
report on Commonwealth labour market programs re-stated the classic human capital 
proposition that “ increased education and training effort not only improves the long­
term employment prospects of the individual, but also assists the economy by 
developing the nation’s skill base and its ability to adjust to changes in economic 
conditions and technology” (Kirby 1985: 109).
The Federal government supported its retention rate goal with funding initiatives which 
were quite separate from its major recurrent and capital funding programs for schools.
It introduced training schemes for the young unemployed and developed a common 
allowance structure between unemployment benefits and its student financial assistance 
scheme. It also initiated programs of targeted assistance to schools such as the 
Participation and Equity Program, and a one-off program for young people called the 
“Priority One” Youth Strategy (Commonwealth Budget Papers 1986-87). However it 
made no attempt to re-allocate resources within the education portfolio or to review the 
“needs-based” policy for general recurrent funding, which accounted for 70 per cent of 
all Commonwealth outlays on schools. Whereas economic goals featured large in the 
rhetoric of Federal government schools policy after 1985, the pattern of 
Commonwealth expenditure on schooling remained unchanged.
- 8 Senator Susan Ryan, Federal Minister for Education announced the goal in 1985, and it was supported 
by the Commonwealth Schools Commission in its 1987 report, In the National Interest: Secondary 
Education and Youth Policy in Australia.
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It is not possible to distinguish between the impact of the Commonwealth’s policy to 
increase Year 12 retention rates and the outcome of State government activity. Most 
State education authorities reformed their curriculum and assessment practices during 
the 1980s, widening the choices of study available to senior secondary students. These 
initiatives appeared to be successful as the Year 12 retention rate rose rapidly in the late 
1980s. The Federal government had aimed to achieve 65 per cent Year 12 retention by 
the early 1990s and the Year 12 retention rate reached 77.1 per cent by 199 229.
However, since 1992, the rate of senior secondary participation has fallen, in spite of a 
new national policy goal to increase Year 12 retention rates to 80 per cent by 200130. 
Federal and State Education Ministers have offered no explanation for why the Year 12 
retention rate has declined and although the Commonwealth remains publicly 
committed to economic policies for schooling, it has few policy instruments with which 
to pursue these goals.
In spite of its significance to education policy, human capital theory has been 
historically marginal to the formulation of schools funding policies in Australia. While 
the Federal government has couched its schools policy in economic terms since the mid- 
1980s, its major programs of schools expenditure are not based on achieving economic 
policy goals. Notwithstanding its commitment to increasing Year 12 retention rates in 
the 1980s and the economic policy framework of the Finn (1991) and Mayer (1992) 
reports, the Federal government has not been driven by economic imperatives to 
increase its involvement in schooling. The separation of powers between States and the 
Commonwealth may have been a structural barrier to the consideration of allocative 
issues within the education sector. The Federal government’s established role as a 
major funding provider for universities meant that human capital theory was used 
successfully to argue for increased Commonwealth investment in higher education. The 
Federal government played no role in funding schools until the 1960s, and economic 
considerations were not a rationale for Federal intervention in schooling. While one- 
third of Commonwealth education outlays are now directed to schooling, the major 
Federal schools programs are only indirectly associated with the pursuit of economic 
policy goals.
Conclusion
Governments began to invest in school education in the belief that a literate and 
numerate population would improve the quality and stability of civil society. As this 
goal could be achieved by the end of primary school, there was no policy imperative for 
State governments to create a comprehensive system of secondary schooling beyond the 
compulsory years. As a result, the completion of secondary school remained a largely 
private investment in Australia until well after the end of the Second World War. In the 
1960s, State education authorities were ill-equipped to meet the rising demand for 
senior secondary schooling and the completion of secondary school still required a 
substantial private investment from most students. The Federal government was slow to 
assist the States in meeting the demand for senior secondary education, and its
29Although State and Territory Education Ministers said that “the target of 65 per cent Year 12 retention 
by 1992 has . . . acted as a successful focus for policy development (Finn 1991: 36), it is difficult to 
pinpoint exactly why Year 12 retention rates increased so significantly during the decade.
30 This policy goal was set by the Finn Committee in 1991 and is discussed in the following chapter.
28
contribution in the form of Commonwealth scholarships was not very effective in 
improving participation at the senior secondary school level.
Although human capital theory highlighted the significant private returns to individuals 
from education, it also implied that governments could be involved in funding education 
-  particularly at the school level -  because of its positive neighbourhood effects. 
However, in the Federal sphere, where economic arguments are more relevant to 
government policy, human capital theory was used effectively to argue for an expansion 
of higher education funding long before it was deemed relevant to schools. Whereas 
Federal funding for schools has increased steadily since the 1960s, the purpose of this 
expenditure has not been to achieve economic policy goals. When the Federal 
government defined a human capital objective for senior secondary participation in the 
1980s, its programs to achieve this goal were short-term and supplementary to its main 
schools funding programs. Although economic goals have become a centrepiece of 
Commonwealth schools policy since the 1980s, the pattern of Federal expenditure on 
schooling has remained unchanged since 1974. The implications of human capital 
theory for government investment in school education, particularly at the senior 
secondary level, were never seriously addressed by State or Federal governments in 
Australia. The lack of interest by State governments may be due to the fact that 
economic policy is a Federal government concern; the reasons why Commonwealth 
schools policy developed in this way will be explored in the next chapter.
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Chapter Two
Survey of Federal intervention in schools
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to explain how Commonwealth schools funding has 
evolved since Federation and to identify the factors that have shaped Federal education 
policy. Under the Australian Constitution, the Federal government is not explicitly 
responsible for education. Commonwealth intervention in education developed as it 
carried out its responsibilities in the areas of Health, Defence and Post-war 
reconstruction. Within the first ten years of Federation, the Commonwealth’s 
responsibility for quarantine led to the payment of grants to universities for medical 
research. During the second decade of Federation, the Commonwealth’s responsibility 
for defence led to Federal government involvement in schooling. Because the pre­
school sector did not exist at the time of framing the Constitution, there was no 
impediment to the Federal government’s involvement in directly funding pre-schools 
and child care centres1.
The division of powers between the Federal and State governments enabled the Federal 
government to avoid direct involvement in schooling until the 1960s, when political 
conditions prompted a reversal of Commonwealth policy. During the 1960s, a series of 
election policy commitments resulted in the incremental growth of Commonwealth 
involvement leading to the introduction of directed current assistance to private schools 
in 1969. By 1975, the Federal government had established a substantial portfolio of 
Commonwealth programs for schools.
1 Early Commonwealth initiatives
The Commonwealth Department of Education was established in 1967, although the 
Commonwealth had been involved in schooling since 1911, with programs funded 
through other Federal Departments. During the first four decades of Federation, the 
Commonwealth government instituted a number of programs in the field of education 
and health but its school programs were "characterised by their lack of coordination, 
their emergency-based conception, and their temporary design" (Tannock 1969: ii). As 
the Federal government’s early forays into school education were directly related to its 
policy responsibilities, the first Federal initiatives in schooling were financed by the 
Department of Defence. These programs were administered by State Education 
Departments and grew to be a substantial funding commitment by the 1940s, but had 
little subsequent impact on policy development for schools at the Federal level.
1 Commonwealth responsibility for quarantine gave it responsibilities for public health, and its interest in 
disease control led to concerns about child health and nutrition, so in 1938 the Commonwealth established 
demonstration kindergartens in each capital city under the policy of promoting public health (Tannock 
1969: 26-29) which later led to Commonwealth funding of child care.
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1.1 Physical Training Scheme
The first Federal program for schools was a Physical Training Scheme to promote 
higher standards of physical fitness among schoolboys to prepare them for military 
service. Introduced in 1911 and managed by the Department of Defence, the Physical 
Training Scheme defined parameters for Federal policy interventions in schools.
The original proposal developed by the Federal Defence authorities proposed to give the 
Federal government responsibility for training instructors, choosing the curriculum and 
supervising a program of physical education in Australian schools (Tannock 1969: 76). 
The States rejected this proposal, arguing that it was their Constitutional responsibility 
to design and implement a general physical training program, and that there was no need 
for uniform national standards of training imposed on schools. After protracted 
negotiations, the Commonwealth’s agreed role was to provide free physical training 
courses for teachers by “Special Instructors” who were permitted to visit schools -  by 
invitation -  to give lectures and demonstrations.
In 1922, the Federal government wanted to abandon the scheme but the State 
governments petitioned to have it maintained at the Commonwealth’s expense2. The 
scheme was eventually abolished in 1931, but was re-introduced on a larger scale in 
1939 under the sponsorship of the Federal Department of Health (Tannock 1969: 80- 
89)3. Physical fitness remains a priority of State and Territory education systems, and 
the ninth goal of the Common and Agreed National Goals for Schooling is “to provide 
for the physical development and personal health and fitness of students and for the 
creative use of leisure time” (Australian Education Council 1989). In spite of the fact 
that it has been a joint policy priority of the Federal and State governments for over 
eighty years, the effectiveness of government expenditure on physical education has 
never been systematically assessed. The Physical Training Scheme was distinguished 
by the absence of any mechanism through which the Federal government could ensure 
that its policy objectives were being achieved and the State governments’ denial of any 
means by which Federal authorities could monitor program outcomes
1.2 Soldiers’ Children Education Scheme
The Soldiers’ Children Education Scheme was established to assist children whose 
fathers had been killed or permanently incapacitated by the First World War. Some 
12,000 children were eligible in 1921, and the number had grown by an additional 5,000 
students by 1937. The scheme offered educational support from the age of thirteen 
years, to enable the clients to complete the level of education necessary to fulfil their 
potential. It was administered by a Soldiers’ Children Education Board in each State, 
the membership of which was dominated by representatives of State and non­
government schools4.
2 The States rejected the Commonwealth’s suggestion that they pay for it themselves.
3 The new scheme established fitness councils in each of the States and provided funding to tertiary 
education institutions for teacher training courses.
4 Each Board comprised ten to fifteen members: three nominated by the Director-General of the 
Education Department representing primary, secondary and technical education; a nominee of the State 
University; two representatives of private boys’ secondary schools; one representative of private girls’
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Two forms of financial assistance were provided to the children: financial assistance to 
cover school and university fees; and a generous maintenance allowance, including 
assistance for travel, books, instruments and clothing. In addition, members of the 
governing Boards took on a pastoral role, taking an interest in the child’s social and 
physical development as well as their educational progress. Each child received 
individual attention from the Board, either through an individual Board member or 
through an expert sub-committee. The Boards took an interest in the educational 
progress of their clients at the earliest opportunity.
. . .  it is not until the child reaches thirteen years of age that the major benefits 
commence, but very practical assistance is extended some years before that 
age. Towards the end of primary education, direct supervision over the child’s 
education is undertaken by the Education Board -  in determining the important 
question as to the form which supplementary education should take . . .
(Repatriation Commission 1937: 19)
Most of the clients of the Soldiers’ Children Education Scheme were retained in 
education for far longer than expected, completing courses of education and training at a 
much higher rate than the rest of the population. Of 19,461 clients approved for 
assistance between the wars, 46 per cent completed secondary school and most of the 
remaining students completed vocational training or agricultural studies. Less than 15 
per cent of the Scheme’s clients dropped out of education and training at the secondary 
or vocational level. During the inter-war years, when participation in post-primary 
education and training fell, the beneficiaries of the Soldiers’ Children Education Scheme 
were one of the few groups who received government support to continue their 
secondary schooling (Repatriation Commission 1937: 23)* 5.
The success of the Scheme was attributed both to the generous level of financial 
assistance granted to clients and to the pastoral role undertaken by the Boards of 
management.
Experience has proved this to be the wisest and most effective element of the 
whole plan . . . With Boards of such constitution, with their practical system of 
administration, and with the sustained zeal which they have undoubtedly 
displayed, the success of the scheme to date is at once explained (Repatriation 
Commission 1937: 18).
The initial budget for the Soldiers’ Children Education Scheme was 1.25 million pounds 
over a twenty year period, but this estimate proved conservative as the number of 
eligible students increased and as the clients remained in education and training for 
much longer than originally envisaged6.
secondary schools; a representative of the Returned Servicemen’s League; and representatives of private
Foundations that had made substantial donations (Repatriation Commission 1937: 18).
5 During the inter-war years, access to the few technical training colleges and secondary schools was 
restricted to those who could pay fees, and many university courses were under subscribed -  a situation 
exacerbated by the economic depression in the 1930s.
6 The number of eligible children also increased over the twenty years of the scheme’s operation, as 
children born after the war were included and the eligibility criteria were extended to include more 
veterans (Repatriation Commission 1937: 18).
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The Soldiers’ Children Education Scheme differed fundamentally from any other 
programs of Commonwealth assistance for schools or students7. Eligibility for 
assistance was not conferred on the basis of a means-test, nor on the basis of academic 
merit. Second, the benefits offered by the scheme were uniquely comprehensive -  it 
assisted children from the age of 13 years and it provided sufficient financial support to 
cover living expenses as well as school fees. Third, the administration of the scheme by 
local Boards of education professionals provided a means of offering counselling and 
support to clients -  the earliest form of case-management in any Commonwealth- 
funded education program.
The most remarkable outcome of the Soldiers’ Children Education Scheme was its 
success in retaining clients in education longer than the norm, even though this was not 
one of the Federal government’s stated policy objectives. It demonstrated that a 
particular type of government intervention can be effective in improving students’ 
educational outcomes. It illustrated a level of resources and a policy instrument that was 
effective in raising the completion rates of students in secondary schools.
The scheme continued beyond the Second World War and was phased out in the 1970s. 
By then, the Commonwealth Department of Education was established and vast 
amounts of Federal assistance were flowing to schools. However, the Soldiers’
Children Education Scheme was never part of the “corporate memory” of the Federal 
Department of Education which had begun with the establishment of the Office of 
Education in the Prime Minister’s Department during the 1940s. Administered by State 
Education authorities on behalf of the Defence Department, the scheme was part of a 
package of repatriation measures that was not considered relevant to Federal education 
policy. In 1984, when the Federal Minister for Education adopted the policy of raising 
Year 12 retention rates, the success of the Soldiers’ Children Education Scheme in the 
1930s had been long forgotten. As the program had been run by State governments on 
behalf of a different Federal agency, lessons from the Soldiers’ Children Education 
Scheme have never informed Commonwealth education policy.
2 The development of a Commonwealth education portfolio
Over the two decades following the end of the Second World War, Commonwealth 
investment in education increased significantly, but none of it went to schools. In the 
early 1960s, a range of political pressures successfully delivered the first programs of 
direct Commonwealth assistance to schooling.
7 The Commonwealth’s main scheme of student assistance today is AUSTUDY which pays benefits to 
students over 16 year of age, confers eligibility on the basis of a means-test and offers no counselling or 
support services.
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2.1 Post-war reconstruction
Under the Constitution, Commonwealth responsibility for quarantine gave it a policy 
justification for supporting almost all types of medical and scientific research. This led 
to the development of a close relationship between the Federal government and the 
universities from the early years following Federation. In 1907, the Federal government 
funded a medical research project with the assistance of Australian universities, and 
established the Institute of Tropical Medicine in Townsville. This was followed by 
substantial programs of investment in medical and scientific research during the 1920s 
and 1930s.
In 1942, the Federal Labor government established a Universities Commission to 
administer a scheme of Commonwealth Financial Assistance to university students to 
ensure that there would be a ready reserve of skilled manpower in universities to assist 
in the war effort8. The Universities Commission assumed an advocacy role on behalf of 
the Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee and lobbied for increased Commonwealth 
assistance to tertiary education (Tannock 1969). Chaired by Professor R.C. Mills, a 
close friend of Ben Chifley, the Universities Commission was well placed to influence 
the direction of Commonwealth policies for education in the post-war era. As a result, 
under the post-war re-construction program, the universities received a substantial 
injection of capital funds, the provision of 10,000 Commonwealth scholarships9 and for 
the first time, subsidies for their operational costs (Tannock 1969: 412). By 1949, the 
universities’ total income had trebled in a decade, and fifty-four per cent of their 
operating income came from government10.
School education was not absent from Commonwealth policy deliberations after the 
war, but was overshadowed by other priorities. The Federal Labor government was 
aware that the majority of Australian children lacked the financial means to complete 
secondary school.
It soon became apparent to those responsible for the implementation for the 
Financial Assistance Scheme during the war that despite its aim to make 
university education available to the whole community on the basis of ‘merit’, 
the fact that selection for assistance had to be based on results in matriculation 
examinations immediately tended to defeat this objective. Only a relatively 
restricted number of students were completing their high school education and 
the majority of these came from the more affluent section of Australian society. 
(Tannock 1969: 339)
8 The scheme included means-tested living allowance to holders of Commonwealth Scholarships in 
universities and technical colleges, accompanied by a bond to serve the government, if required, up to 
three years after their graduation (Tannock 1969: 292-309).
9 This exceeded the total number of pre-war university student enrolments (7,800 students) in 1939.
In 1939, only forty per cent of university funds were provided by government, and the remainder came 
from private endowment (22 per cent), investment income (2.5 per cent) and student fees (34 per cent). 
Commonwealth funding for universities increased from $71,000 per year in 1939 to $1.2 million per year 
in 1949 in constant prices (Mathews 1972: 86).
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Concerned about the inequity of providing assistance to university students but not to 
secondary students, the Federal government asked its only source of education policy 
advice -  its Universities Commission -  “ . . .  for a report regarding the possibility of 
providing assistance to prevent leakage of students at the secondary school stage” 
(Tannock 1969: 339). The Commission’s report, produced in December 1944, 
suggested providing financial assistance to children staying on at school. However it 
also pointed out that if the government proposed to increase school completion rates, the 
universities would need more funding to cope with the additional students (Tannock 
1969: 340)11. The Federal government took no action on the Commission’s 
recommendations because according to the Minister for Post-War Reconstruction, John 
Dedman, Chifley did not think “the time was right”(Birch 1975: 50). Tannock surmises 
that Chifley took no action in providing secondary school assistance because the 
Commonwealth was already committed to large increases in expenditure on university 
education; the government was unsure of its Constitutional position; and Chifley feared 
becoming involved in a debate about state aid for church schools (Tannock 1969: 341).
The uncertainty over Commonwealth education funding arose from a High Court 
challenge to the Commonwealth’s power to implement its Pharmaceutical Benefits Act 
1944 under Section 81 of the Constitution -  the power under which the Commonwealth 
appropriated Consolidated Revenue for most purposes. A successful challenge to the 
scope of this power would have limited the Commonwealth’s capacity to provide grants 
for education (Birch 1975: 78-79). Nevertheless, the High Court challenge did not stop 
the Federal government from passing its Education Act to perpetuate the Scholarship 
Scheme for university students in October 1945 -  two months before the High Court 
handed down its decision in the Pharmaceutical Benefits Case12. Although the High 
Court decided for the Commonwealth in the Pharmaceutical Benefits Case, its judgment 
led the Commonwealth to seek further protection of its powers by Constitutional 
amendment. In a 1946 referendum, the Commonwealth successfully amended Section 
51 of the Constitution to extend its powers to provide a range of benefits in the social 
security sphere, including a “benefits to students” provision. Dedman claimed that the 
“benefits to students” power would have been used to introduce secondary school 
scholarships and a Schools Commission if Labor had been returned to office in the 1949 
election (Birch 1975: 50).
In 1943, the Australian Teachers’ Federation began lobbying the Federal Labor Party to 
provide Federal finance for schools (Birch 1975: 46-48). In 1948, Chifley again 
requested advice on how to help secondary school students, asking his new source of 
policy advice, the Commonwealth Office of Education for a “Study of Wastage of 
Ability at the Secondary School Level” (Tannock 1969: 341). After exhaustive 
research, drawing on the records of armed services personnel, the Office concluded:
11 Until 1956, Australian universities had open enrolment policies, whereby any student who matriculated 
was admitted to the course of their choice. “This apparently benign selection regime was possible only 
because almost every young person had already been culled in primary and lower secondary education. 
Even as late as 1948, only 2 per cent of 17 year-olds entered university” (Marginson 1997: 131).
12 Birch (1975: 40-41) points out that the Commonwealth government was aware of the dubious 
Constitutional validity of a universities scholarship scheme after the cessation of hostilities, but it went 
ahead anyway.
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. . . two-thirds of the youngsters with the ability corresponding to the top half of 
university graduates were not getting an education commensurate with their 
ability. And of those, the reasons given for their not going on with their 
education, for two-thirds of them it was economic; they just couldn’t afford to 
go on.
T.L Robertson, Assistant Director of the Office of Education, interviewed by 
Tannock (1969) p. 342.
The Office of Education recommended the introduction of a Commonwealth bursary 
scheme to cover the last two years of secondary education. The report reached Chifley’s 
desk one month before the 1949 Federal election, which saw the defeat of the Chifley 
government. When the proposal for a secondary scholarships scheme was presented to 
the new Menzies government in 1950 by Professor R.C. Mills, by then the Director of 
the Office of Education, it was not taken up.
2.2 Federal government resistance to funding schools
Throughout the 1950s, Prime Minister Menzies steadfastly refused to provide any 
system of support for secondary students, on the grounds that school education was a 
State government responsibility. Menzies was well-known for his Federalist perspective 
on government and he often stated that the Commonwealth did not have a legitimate 
role in school education (Menzies 1961, Smart 1978: 2). He may have also have been 
deterred by the cost of Commonwealth participation in schooling (Tannock 1969: 345). 
However, in the 1950s, Menzies provided substantial indirect support to the private 
schools sector. In 1952 Menzies introduced a tax concession of up to fifty pounds per 
year for private school fees (Smart 1978: 28). In 1954, the tax laws were amended to 
allow gifts to schools for building purposes as a tax deductible item13. In 1956 Menzies 
provided interest subsidies for capital expenditure by private schools to be built in 
Canberra (Tannock 1969: 457-460). The assistance to schools in Canberra largely aided 
the Catholic sector, as a disproportionate number of Commonwealth public servants 
were Roman Catholic (Menzies 1970: 95). The combined effect of these measures in 
the ACT was significant.
By 1968, the still-in-power Liberal-Country Party Commonwealth government 
was underwriting virtually all of the capital costs and much of the recurrent 
expenditure of denominational schools in the Federal Capital Territory with the 
result that private schools flourished in this area as nowhere else in Australia 
(Tannock 1969: 461).
Given the Liberal Party’s conservative and non-Catholic affiliations, Menzies felt no 
compulsion to provide Commonwealth assistance to government schools or direct aid to 
Catholic schools in the 1950s. Menzies’ tax concession policies for private schools 
emerged from his own experience and personal connections with his former private 
school (Menzies 1970: 96). Some credit for these decisions was also claimed by The 
Headmasters’ Conference, which represented about sixty Independent boys’ schools and
13 The cost of the taxation concessions is impossible to determine. The tax deductibility of school fees 
was phased out in the 1970s, and interest subsidies were replaced with direct grants. Most State 
governments continued to provide interest subsidies to non-government schools in the 1990s. The tax 
deductibility of donations to school building funds continues.
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was politically close to the Liberal party (Smart 1978: 28). Although the Headmasters’ 
Conference was historically opposed to the provision of direct financial assistance to 
private schools, its policy changed during the late 1950s as rising costs threatened the 
viability of some of its members (Smart 1978: 52)14 In 1959, the Conference released a 
statement saying that Independent schools could accept capital grants from the 
government “without any prejudice to their independence” (Smart 1978: 53). In 1967, 
the Headmasters’ Conference approved in principle the receipt of recurrent funds from 
the government, clearing the way for the Federal government to introduce recurrent 
funding for non-government schools (Smart 1978: 53).
Universities were more fortunate than schools during the Menzies government’s first 
decade in office. When the funds for post-war reconstruction began to dry up in the late 
1940s, the Universities Commission lobbied for the continuation of Commonwealth 
financial assistance to the higher education sector15. In response, Chifley appointed a 
committee of inquiry in 1949, headed by Professor R.C Mills. The team was to examine 
the financial position of the universities, the contributions of State governments and the 
financial effect of the elimination of the reconstruction training scheme (Tannock 1969: 
440). The Mills review was greeted favourably by Menzies who extended its terms of 
reference to attend to the needs of university residential colleges. On 15 November 
1951, Menzies introduced a landmark States Grants (Universities) Bill which installed a 
permanent system for funding universities.
Within a few years of receiving funding under the States Grants (Universities) Act 1951, 
the Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee published a document entitled A Crisis in 
the Finances and Development of the Australian Universities, which demanded a 
national plan to fund further growth in the sector. Menzies appointed another 
committee of inquiry to review the needs of universities headed by Sir Keith Murray, the 
chair of the Universities Grants Commission of Great Britain. The Murray report 
recommended a major expansion of Federal funding for universities and the 
establishment of an Australian Universities Commission. The Menzies government 
adopted the Murray Committee’s recommendations in full and in 1959, established an 
Australian Universities Commission which “became the most powerful agency of the 
Federal government’s program of aid to the tertiary educational institutions” (Tannock 
1969: 482). Over the next three years, the public resources provided to universities 
doubled. By 1962, more than eighty per cent of the universities’ total income was 
sourced from government (Mathews 1972: 86)16.
If most of the Commonwealth’s decisions to instigate secondary and technical 
education programs during the 1960s were a result of political promises made 
at election time by Prime Ministers, the same could not be said for its 
university and other higher education programs. These were essentially the
^A ny program of direct government assistance would be of more benefit to Catholic schools than to 
Protestant schools, and old sectarian jealousies fuelled the Independent schools’ opposition to state aid 
(Smart 1978: 52).
15 Tannock cites sources of the pressure on the Federal government as “frequent deputations from 
University Senates and the numerous visits to Canberra by the vice-chancellors of various universities, the 
State governments and . . .  the Federal Parliament” (Tannock 1969: 443).
Proportions are derived from Table 6.10 in Mathews 1972: 86.
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result of government action on the recommendations of the Australian 
universities Commission and its associated committees.
(Tannock 1969: 526)
The Federal government’s long association with universities and the close links forged 
by the Australian Vice Chancellor’s Committee and the Commonwealth through the 
Universities Commission created a sense of responsibility towards universities that was 
absent in Federal deliberations about schools. Although Commonwealth funding to 
schools eventually commenced in the early 1960s, the differences in origin continued to 
influence the process of Federal policy development for each level of education.
2.3 Australian Education Council
Menzies always argued that he would not provide any assistance to schools because the 
States had not requested it and any intrusion by the Commonwealth would infringe 
States’ rights. In 1936, the State Education Ministers formed a national Ministerial 
Council with the intention of making representations to the Commonwealth, but their 
capacity for effective lobbying was limited (Spaull 1987: 4)17 Spaull’s research 
suggests that the Commonwealth’s generosity to universities in response to the Murray 
report prompted the State Directors-General of Education to encourage their Ministers 
to “go public” about the financial needs of government schools. In 1959, the State 
Ministers of Education agreed to adopt the universities’ tactics of developing a 
statement on the financial needs of Australian schools to place pressure on the Federal 
government. It took several years to produce the statement as the process was hampered 
by the changing political persuasions of the members. It was eventually placed on the 
agenda of the 1962 and 1963 Premiers’ Conferences, under the title of A Statement of 
Some Aspects of Australian Education (Spaull 1987: 115). The Statement argued that 
investment in education was a key factor in economic growth, that overseas countries 
were investing heavily in education, and that under-investment would endanger “future 
standards of national development” (Spaull 1987: 114).
When the Statement of Needs was put to the Premiers’ Conferences of 1962 and 1963, it 
said that the States needed additional current assistance of 3.5 per cent per annum over 
the next four years to meet minimum teaching standards (Australian Education Council 
1963). Because the major injection of additional funding from the Commonwealth was 
not forthcoming, State recurrent outlays on schooling subsequently increased by an 
average of 8.1 per cent per annum between 1963-64 and 1971-72 in constant prices -  
more than double what had been requested from the Federal government (Karmel 1973: 
par 4.30)18. The size of this increase in outlays sourced from State budgets raises 
questions about the extent of the financial “crisis” that was invoked to justify the 
demands for Commonwealth intervention. It also casts doubt on the received wisdom 
that the States could not afford the costs of education due to the vertical fiscal imbalance 
caused by uniform taxation arrangements (see Smart 1978, and Mathews 1983).
17 The Australian Education Council’s first request to the Commonwealth -  in 1937 -  was for capital 
funds to revitalise technical education, to which the Federal government eventually responded with an 
amount one-tenth of the sum requested.
18 On a per student basis, the increase per pupil between 1963/64 and 1971/72 was an average of 4.3 per 
cent per annum in real terms (Karmel 1973: par 4.31).
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Although Menzies rejected the States’ request for current financial assistance for 
schools, in 1964, the Federal government introduced Senior Secondary scholarships and 
capital grants for science facilities in government and non-government schools. The 
main effect of the States’ request was to remove any political and constitutional 
impediment to the introduction of direct Commonwealth assistance. Throughout the 
1950s, Menzies maintained that as the States had never requested assistance for schools, 
Commonwealth intervention would be unconstitutional. The fact that States requested 
Commonwealth assistance in 1963 reduced the likelihood of any State challenging the 
legitimacy of Commonwealth involvement, either politically or through the High Court.
2.4 Catholic campaign for state aid
During the 1960s, a nationwide campaign for the provision of state aid to non­
government schools placed political pressure on both the Federal and State governments 
to introduce direct funding for schools. A century earlier, the Catholic Church had 
decided to finance its own system of schooling, in a rejection of perceived State 
government interference in religious schools (Austin 1961: 202-229). By devolving 
responsibility for Catholic schools to the parish level and utilising the labour of religious 
orders, the Catholic Church established a large system of parochial schools funded 
entirely from community resources. This system survived for almost one hundred years 
until rising participation rates in the post-war years placed a strain on the finances of 
Catholic parishes. In the 1960s, the Catholic campaign for state aid was so successful 
that it forced a change in the Labor Party’s platform and saw the introduction of direct 
current funding for private schools, first in Victoria and other States in 1967, followed 
by the Commonwealth government in 1969.
The Catholic campaign for state aid was initially mounted by Catholic parents’ groups 
who by 1960 had emerged in most States to press for direct government assistance to 
private schools. The cause was embraced by the Roman Catholic Bishops who released 
a statement in 1961 calling for a per capita grant for each child in a non-government 
school to be provided by the States and possibly the Federal government (Smart 1978: 
55). The campaign was pursued at the State level by individual Bishops with a great 
deal of success, and a National Catholic Education Committee was established under the 
leadership of the experienced Sydney Archbishop James Carroll (Davis 1974, Hogan 
1978, 1984). In the early 1960s, when the allocation of Democratic Labour Party 
preferences was significant factor in the electoral prospects of the major parties at both 
the State and Federal level, the time was ripe for the Catholic Church to mount a 
nationwide campaign for state aid to private schools.
Prime Minister Menzies was committed publicly to the principle of federalism and 
argued that education should remain the responsibility of State governments (Menzies 
1961). However, his actions in office during the 1950s revealed his readiness to 
override federalist principles on issues that attracted his personal sympathies or would 
lead to political advantage. In the early 1950s, Menzies provided taxation concessions 
for private school fees and donations to school building funds. In 1956 he provided 
interest subsidies to assist the establishment of private schools in the Australian Capital 
Territory. In 1957, he ensured that Commonwealth assistance to universities more than
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trebled in the wake of the Murray review (Menzies 1970: 90). State aid became a 
Federal political issue in the early 1960s when the Coalition held government with a 
one-seat majority. When it became apparent that the Labor Party was divided over the 
state aid issue, Menzies embraced state aid for non-government schools in a successful 
ploy to remain in office.
The 1960s became the decade of a state aid electoral auction, with the major 
parties vying at election times to attract voting support with offers of new 
forms of aid or greater amounts of money (Hogan 1984: 3)
During the 1950s, the Labor Opposition had regularly attacked Menzies for not 
implementing the secondary school scholarship scheme proposed by the Office of 
Education when Menzies won office in 1949. In 1961, the Labor Party promised to 
introduce a scheme of senior secondary scholarships tenable at both government and 
private schools -  a proposal which aimed to win back alienated Catholic voters 
(Albinski 1966). The Menzies government almost lost the election and was returned to 
power by a one-seat majority in 1961. A government White Paper on Education 
presented late in 1962 repeated the Menzies policy of opposition to Federal involvement 
in schooling. However, within a year, Menzies had reversed his long-held position of 
opposition to Federal assistance to schools in a successful strategy to highlight the 
divisions in Labor ranks. In 1963, a decision by the New South Wales Labor 
government to grant State aid to parents in private schools invoked intervention by the 
Federal Executive to override State government policy. This well-publicised clash over 
Labor policy on state aid is believed to have contributed to Menzies’ decision to call an 
early election in 1963, one year before it was due (Smart 1978: 64, Oakes 1973: 104).
In his election policy speech on 6 November 1963, the leader of the Opposition, Arthur 
Calwell, promised to introduce an unspecified number of senior secondary scholarships, 
available to all students meeting a qualifying standard, tenable at both State and private 
schools, and means-tested according to family income. He also promised an emergency 
grant of 10 million pounds to the States for urgent educational needs, and an 
investigation into the further needs of State education systems (Tannock 1969: 347). A 
week later, in his election policy speech, Menzies promised to introduce 10,000 senior 
secondary scholarships of up to 200 pounds per year, without a means-test, for students 
at both State and private schools. He also promised 10 million pounds in capital grants 
for science facilities at State, technical and private schools. Menzies’ promises were 
made without consultation with his party (Smart 1978: 71). He reversed his well- 
documented opposition to the provision of direct Federal assistance to school education 
in a clever strategy to remain in office.
(Menzies) capitalised on rather than lost by his audacious move on direct State 
aid (because) his very ability to put forward a distinct State aid program, 
defend its merits, and ultimately give credible promise of enacting it stood in 
sharp contrast to Labor’s agonies on this topic. The Government’s overall 
image was made to appear clear, decisive and resolute, while Labor’s was 
ambiguous, timid and irresolute (Albinski 1966: 24).
The Coalition government won a landslide victory in 1963 and implemented the first 
Commonwealth programs of direct assistance to schools and secondary students in
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1964. The reversal of the Coalition government’s opposition to state aid in November 
1963 appeared to be motivated purely by political expediency (Hogan 1984, Smart 
1978, Tannock 1969). As an editorial in the Catholic Advocate summed up in 1966,
The changed attitude of the Liberal and Country Parties, it may be freely 
admitted, is due more to an enlightened perception of economic and political 
facts than any great zeal for educational justice. They perceive that this further 
expansion of state aid proposals is an excellent means for winning the votes of 
Catholics and others involved in support of the denominational school system 
(Advocate, 17 February 1966).
The Catholic campaign for state aid was a political headache for the Federal Labor 
Opposition in the 1960s as their party’s policy platform barred the provision of direct 
government assistance to private schools. Since the 1957 Federal Party Conference, the 
ALP’s platform had supported the “promotion of secondary and higher education by 
bursaries and scholarships and other benefits payable directly to students”. Although 
the platform did not outlaw state aid to private schools specifically, it could be 
interpreted as doing so, and the meaning remained open to interpretation by the left and 
right wings of the party (Freudenberg 1977). The policy was not an electoral liability 
for the Federal Labor Party until the 1963 election.
The battle within the Labor party to change its policy on state aid during the 1960s was 
inextricably linked to the issue of party reform. According to Oakes, Whitlam’s three 
great battles between 1963 and 1967 were: the reform of the Federal Executive (the 
“faceless men” issue); the state aid policy; and the removal of the leader Arthur Calwell 
(Oakes 1973: 101). In the early 1960s, several initiatives by State Labor governments 
granting some form of assistance to private schools, were overruled by the Federal 
executive, highlighting the Party’s internal divisions (Oakes 1973: 104). In 1965, when 
Labor lost government in New South Wales and Western Australia, Whitlam attributed 
the loss to the Federal Executive’s intransigence over the state aid issue (Oakes 1973:
119). In February 1966, after a promising by-election campaign in Queensland was de­
railed by a pronouncement on state aid by the Party’s Federal Executive19, Whitlam 
launched a public bid to change the ALP policy. In July 1966, the Party’s platform was 
changed -  by a narrow majority -  to endorse the principle of direct aid to non­
government schools (Oakes 1973: 144). This amendment and Whitlam’s promise to 
“bury” state aid as an election issue won the support of prominent Catholic state aid 
campaigners such as Sydney Archbishop James Carroll who helped to win back the 
Catholic vote for Labor in 1972 (Oakes and Solomon 1973). The 1972 election victory 
marked the end of a decade where internal divisions over state aid had helped prevent 
the Labor Party from gaining office.
19 At the instigation of their left-wing President, Chamberlain, the Executive announced that the Party’s 
legal committee would investigate the legality of State aid with a view to a constitutional challenge in the 
High Court, and that labor MPs were to oppose any further grants for science laboratories and campaign 
only on the issue of direct assistance to students (Oakes 1973: 125).
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2.5 High Court challenge to funding for private schools
Towards the end of the 1960s, a Council for the Defence of Government Schools 
(DOGS) emerged to organise opposition to state aid for private schools. Hogan 
describes DOGS as a “coalition of people from government school teachers’ unions and 
parents’ groups, allied with sectarian Protestant leaders and anti-religious rationalists” 
while noting that the “bigoted Protestant element” had disappeared by the 1970s (Hogan 
1984: 8). Although the group failed to exert any political influence, it mounted a High 
Court Challenge to the validity of Commonwealth aid to private schools which 
languished in the Court for almost a decade before it was dismissed by a majority of six 
to one, on 10 February 1981.
The main argument in the DOGS case was that funding for private schools contravened 
Section 116 of the Constitution:
116. The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, 
or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of 
any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any 
office or public trust under the Commonwealth.
The plaintiffs argued that as the religious and secular components of the educational 
programs in private schools were inseparable, Commonwealth funding was being used 
to sponsor religion20. The DOGS case relied heavily on the judicial interpretation of the 
first amendment of the American Constitution -  upon which Australia’s Section 116 
had been based -  which outlawed any form of direct government assistance to Church 
schools. The Australian High Court Justices who dismissed the DOGS case played 
down the significance of any link between the American and Australian Constitutions. 
They also adopted a narrow interpretation of the concept of “establishment” to mean 
“statutory recognition of a religion as a national institution” (Wilson, J), rather than the 
broader definition of “sponsorship” or “support” which had applied in the United States 
(Murphy, J). The six Justices also accepted the defendants’ argument that the main 
activity of non-government schools was educational rather than religious, therefore “it 
cannot be said that the primary purpose of the legislation is to advance religion”
(Wilson, J)21.
3 Funding schools on the basis of “need”
Both the Catholic schools’ campaign for Federal assistance and the States’ request for 
direct funding were framed in terms of general financial “needs” rather than specific 
policy objectives. As there was no obvious policy role for the Federal government in 
schools until the advent of human capital theory in the 1960s, the demand for Federal
20 The plaintiffs also argued that the payment of grants to non-government schools via the States was not 
a payment of monies to the States and therefore violated the spirit of Section 96 of the Constitution. 
However this approach had been upheld in previous judgments and was not considered a strong argument. 
2  ^ This analysis is based on the written judgments of each member of the High Court -  Barwick C.J. 
Gibbs J, Stephen J, Mason J, Murphy J, Aickin J, and Wilson J. in Her M ajesty’s Attorney-General for 
the State of Victoria (at the relation of Black and others) and others v. The Commonwealth of Australia 
and others (1981).
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assistance focused on the alleviation of a financial “crisis” in schools funding. In the 
1940s, the Australian Teachers’ Federation had begun a public campaign for 
Commonwealth involvement in education. This contributed to the decision to include 
education among the powers to be asked for in the 1946 constitutional referendum 
(Smart 1978: 23). The concept of financial “needs” as presented by the Australian 
Education Council in 1961 was modelled on the Australian Vice-Chancellors’ 
Committee’s successful campaign for Commonwealth assistance to meet the financial 
“needs” of universities (Spaull 1987). The Catholic campaign for state aid to private 
schools during the 1960s also focused on Commonwealth assistance to meet the 
financial “needs” of non-government schools.
Menzies resisted the “financial needs” approach, and chose to target capital funding to 
science facilities, then to school libraries, in addition to the provision of secondary 
scholarships. These programs were targeted to meet specific policy objectives and the 
funding was capped at a pre-determined level. Menzies had retired as Prime Minister 
when State governments introduced direct assistance for private schools in 1967, and 
the Federal government introduced recurrent funding for non-government schools two 
years later.
The States Grants (Independent Schools) Act 1969 authorised payment per annum of 
$35 per primary student and $50 per secondary student from the beginning of 1970. 
Funding was not capped and any student enrolled in a registered private school was 
eligible for the Commonwealth subsidy. In May 1972, its last year in office, the Federal 
Coalition government provided further Commonwealth recurrent assistance to non­
government schools as part of a package of measures that included capital grants for 
both government and non-government schools. The Coalition government also 
announced its intention -  from January 1973 -  to provide per capita grants for students 
in non-government schools at a rate of twenty per cent of the cost of educating a child in 
a government school.
3.1 Karmel report
/
In the early 1970s, Australia’s total public outlays on school education were only 2.6 
percent of Gross Domestic Product, below the OECD average of 3.3 per cent (OECD 
1976: 19). By 1975-76, after the Federal Labor government’s three years in office, 
total public outlays on school education in Australia had increased to 3.6 per cent of 
GDP. While Commonwealth expenditure accounted for 10 per cent of total schools 
expenditure in 1971-72, by 1975-76 the Commonwealth’s contribution had risen to 24 
per cent of total outlays on schools (ABS Cat No. 5510.0).
When the Labor Party was elected in December 1972, Prime Minister Whitlam and his 
deputy, Lance Barnard, conducted a two-man Ministry during the two weeks prior to 
Christmas. This Ministry established the Interim Committee of the Australian Schools 
Commission, chaired by Peter Karmel and consisted of representatives of both 
Protestant and Catholic non-government schools, State Education Departments, teacher 
unions and parents’ organisations. In its terms of reference, the Committee was asked 
to
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. . . make recommendations to the Minister for Education and Science as to the 
immediate financial needs of schools, priorities within those needs, and 
appropriate measures to assist in meeting those needs, including . . .  -  grants 
from the Commonwealth to the States in respect of both government and non­
government schools; (Karmel 1973: 1)
When the Karmel Committee assessed the resource needs of government schools, there 
was little evidence of a funding crisis in State education systems. The Committee noted 
that “the past decade has witnessed more than a threefold increase in public expenditure 
on both government and non-government schools in the various States”(Karmel 1973: 
par 4.30)22. The Committee noticed different levels of resource use between the States 
and said that one goal of Federal funding would be to reduce the differences in funding 
needs between State systems. The Committee therefore recommended different levels 
of funding to each State system to compensate for lower levels of resource use in 
secondary schools (par. 6.13)23. In 1978, the Schools Commission abandoned this 
approach and introduced a uniform per capita grants system for government schools. 
Over the long term, the Commonwealth’s involvement has had no impact on the amount 
of variation in resource use between States, as shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Government schools’ recurrent resources index, 1972,1976,1994.
Primary Secondary
State 1972 1976 1994 1972 1976 1994
NSW 99 92 93 95 90 95
Victoria 101 104 99 100 110 98
Queensland 100 104 94 99 90 91
South Aust. 102 104 114 106 112 118
West Aust. 97 101 97 113 109 102
Tasmania 103 111 104 109 103 96
All States 100 100 100 100 100 100
Sources: Karmel (1973) Schools in Australia; Schools Commission (1978) Report for the Triennium 
1979-81, April: 29; MCEETYA (1996) Statistical Annex, National Report on schooling in Australia 
1994: 36).
The Karmel Committee found it easier to identify the financial needs of non­
government schools because they could be benchmarked against the government school 
system. The Committee noted that Catholic schools operated at about four-fifths of the 
resource levels of government schools (par 6.40). On the Committee’s 
recommendations, the Commonwealth allocation for Catholic schools more than 
doubled from $18 million in 1973 to $38 million in 1975.
For the remaining non-government schools, the Committee noted wide variations in 
resource use. While twenty-five per cent of these schools operated below the average 
for government schools, fifty per cent operated above average State levels. The 
Committee therefore recommended that the system of uniform per capita grants be
22 ie. in current prices, without taking inflation into account.
22 States with lower resource-use indices for secondary school systems were to be allocated larger grants 
as a short term measure to overcome the inequalities in resource use (Karmel 1973: 6.35).
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replaced by differential funding, and that the schools be divided into eight funding 
categories. The Committee also recommended the phasing out over two years of all 
funding for schools in the lowest funding category (those with the highest resource 
levels).
The recurrent funding program accounted for almost fifty per cent of Commonwealth 
schools funding under the Karmel Committee’s recommendations. The remaining 
expenditure was divided between a capital grants program and a targeted grants program 
as illustrated in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2 Commonwealth Schools Programs expenditure 1974-1975 ($m)
Type of Program
State
Schools
Private
schools
Joint
programs
Total Distrib­
ution
m
General Recurrent 
Grants Program
175.9 133.4 - 309.3 48
Capital Grants 
Program
197.3 39.7 - 237 36
Other Targeted 
Programs
87.3 6.2 16.5 110 17
Total 460.5 179.3 16.3 656.3 100
Distribution (%) 71 27 3 100
Notes: Expenditure in 1973 prices
Sources: Karmel (1973) Schools in Australia, Table 14.3
The Karmel report gave a detailed picture of school education in Australia, based on 
consultations with education experts and school authorities. It emphasised the 
importance of equality of opportunity for students, diversity in schools provision, and 
devolution of school management. It identified the specific priorities of Aboriginal 
education, migrant education, isolated children, socio-economically disadvantaged 
schools, teacher training, and special education for students with a disability. These 
priorities all received funding as individual targeted programs, which accounted for 17 
per cent of the expenditure recommended by the Committee.
The Committee produced its report within five months and the Whitlam government 
introduced new schools funding legislation in 1973 to commence in January 1974. To 
obtain Opposition support to get the Bill through the Senate, the government had to 
change the policy to phase out recurrent grants to high fee Independent schools. The 
Coalition then agreed to support the Bill by allowing members of the Country Party to 
cross the floor in the Senate to vote with the Labor government.
3.2 Schools Commission
The Australian Schools Commission was established on 1 January 1994 under the 
Chairmanship of Dr K. R McKinnon, and several members of the Interim Committee 
were appointed on it. The Act establishing the Commission reflected the government’s 
hopes for an extraordinary level of consensus that would lay to rest the state aid debate.
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The Act stated that in its work, the Commission should “have regard to” two principles: 
first that “the primary obligation . . .  of governments to provide and maintain 
government school systems that are of the highest standard and are open, without fees or 
religious tests, to all children”; and second, “the prior right of parents to choose whether 
their children are educated at a government school or at a non-government school”. 
These two principles proved difficult to reconcile in practice, particularly when limits 
were placed on total government outlays (Blackburn 1977: 195, McKinnon 1984).
Like the Interim Committee, the Schools Commission was composed of representatives 
of the government school sector, parents’ organisations, teacher unions and non­
government school lobby groups -  chiefly the National Catholic Education Commission 
(NCEC) and its non-Catholic counterpart, the National Council of Independent Schools 
Associations (NCISA). Although the Act establishing the Schools Commission 
contained no special provisions for representation of particular interest groups, the most 
significant educational lobby groups were always represented. The Coombs Royal 
Commission on Australian Government Administration noted that, “the 
‘representativeness’ of the Commission is motivated more by desire to conciliate the 
established bases of power than to gain access to a wide range of expertise” (Coombs 
1976: 139). The links between the Commission and the funding stakeholders were 
strong. The lobby groups appointed senior and experienced representatives to the 
Schools Commission. Although the Chairman of the Commission was usually 
independent of any particular interest group, when Dr Peter Tannock’s term as 
Chairman ended in the mid-1980s, he took up the position of Executive Director of the 
Western Australian Catholic Education Commission.
The era of the Whitlam Labor government was the “Golden Age” of Commissions, 
several of which the government established to obtain advice that was independent of 
the permanent Federal bureaucracy. The Schools Commission provided a national 
forum for teachers and others involved in education and some of its targeted programs 
were at the forefront of educational change. For example, the Disadvantaged Schools 
Program and the Country Areas Program fostered the involvement of parents and 
community groups in school policy development. In the early 1980s, the Commission 
funded a program called “Basic Learning in Primary Schools” which supported 
initiatives in literacy and numeracy development (McKinnon 1984, Connell 1993: 279- 
282). The Commission also raised awareness of gender equity issues in teaching and 
learning, leading to the development of a national policy for the education of girls (CSC 
Working Party on the Education of Girls 1984).
The Commission was, in the jargon of the time, a consciousness-raising body 
of considerable importance. It made educators much more aware of the 
inequities in educational provision and practice that existed in Australian 
education; it stimulated community interest and participation in education; and 
it provided an authoritative critique of established educational practices 
(Connell 1993: 280).
On the key issue of recurrent funding -  its largest program of schools expenditure -  the 
Schools Commission was incapable of providing independent advice or sponsoring
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innovation24. Given that its members were all recipients of Federal funding, the 
Commission’s advice on funding was the best possible compromise that could be 
obtained between the competing interests of powerful stakeholders. Such a compromise 
could only be obtained by promising more money to everyone. This meant that the 
Commission’s advice always recommended increased levels of funding across the 
board, and never attempted to redistribute funding between the various education 
interests (SC 1975, 1980, 1981, CSC 1984a).
Like Frankenstein, the Schools Commission quickly became a political “monster” of the 
government’s creation. Established as a source of expert policy advice, the Commission 
afforded all stakeholders a prominent platform from which to lobby for increased 
funding. Membership of the Commission equipped representatives of interest groups 
with information about funding policy, gave them ready access to government, and lent 
a legitimacy to their complaints when they did not get what they wanted. While 
membership of the Commission did “conciliate the established bases of power” 
temporarily, it also increased the political power of stakeholders as pressure groups.
By establishing the Schools Commission as both an advisory and a funding body, the 
government was asking the stakeholders to tell it how much money they wanted -  in the 
full expectation that the government would comply. This approach soon created 
problems for the government. The Karmel Committee’s funding recommendations for 
1974 and 1975 were accepted in total by the Labor government, amounting to an 
increase in Federal spending on schools of 300 per cent over two years (Karmel 1973: 
par 14.11). However in 1975, the Labor government deferred the Commission’s 
recommendations for a triennial funding program for 1976-78 and held schools funding 
at existing levels in real terms (Commonwealth Budget Papers 1975-76). In 1978, the 
Coalition government rejected the Commission’s recommendations and provided 
budgetary guidelines for the Commission’s policies on schools funding in the future.
The imposition of budgetary constraints created tensions among stakeholders on the 
Commission, particularly between the representatives of government and non­
government schools. In 1984, consensus broke down when the two representatives of 
the Australian Teachers’ Federation and the Australian Council of State Schools’ 
Organisations (ACSSO) presented a minority report to a Commission document about 
schools funding policies. The dissenting report raised the question of the relative 
decline in Commonwealth support for government schools and the impact of the 
increase in non-government schools on the quality of the government systems (CSC 
1984b). With the Commission’s influence waning, its major programs were transferred 
to the Department in 1985 and it was abolished in 1987 (Connell 1993). The schools 
programs remained intact and most of the Commission’s staff were transferred to a 
Schools Division in the Federal Department of Employment, Education and Training25.
-4 Although the Schools Commission did come up with some innovative proposals for schools funding, 
such as the “supported schools” concept, it was never able to obtain the agreement of its members to 
change the schools funding arrangements (see Chapter Four).
25When Dawkins abolished the Schools Commission and the Tertiary Education Commission in 1987, he 
replaced them with a Schools Council and a Higher Education Council, under the structure of the National 
Board of Employment, Education and Training. While the membership of the new Schools Council was 
mainly representative of interest groups, the function of the Council was limited to an advisory capacity,
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3.3 The eight-year funding scheme
In 1983, the new Labor government implemented policies of fiscal restraint and 
established an Expenditure Review Committee (ERC) to vet the budget proposals of 
portfolio Ministers. Pressed to obtain savings from the education budget, the Federal 
Minister for Education, Susan Ryan implemented the long-held Labor policy to phase 
out grants to private schools with the highest level of private resources. She announced 
the withdrawal of funding to the forty-one schools which operated at above average 
resource levels which would save $4 million from the Federal education budget. At the 
same time, Ryan announced a review of the funding system for non-government 
schools.
By November 1983, the Australian Parents’ Council, which represents mostly parents 
from Independent Schools, had launched a national campaign against the Federal 
government. Warning that “Ryan’s hit list” was the thin end of the wedge for all non­
government schools, the APC gathered support from parents across the non-government 
sector. Five thousand people attended a rally in Sydney in November 1983, and five 
thousand more attended a similar meeting in Melbourne. Ryan’s refusal to attend the 
first rally in Sydney attracted such negative criticism from the media that she was 
compelled to attend future meetings to defend the government’s actions. In spite of the 
fact that Catholic schools were not affected by the government’s “hit list”, the Catholic 
Education authorities tacitly supported the APC campaign and parents from Catholic 
schools filled most of the seats at the mass public meetings organised by the APC 
(Hogan 1984).
The timing of the funding review became problematic when the Prime Minister decided 
to call an early election in 1984. As the snap election proved politically unpopular, the 
government had to fix any problems that might threaten its chances of re-election. In an 
humiliating snub to Susan Ryan, Prime Minister Hawke intervened to resolve the 
dispute over non-government schools’ funding by meeting personally with members of 
the Catholic Bishops Conference (Ashenden 1989). The settlement negotiated by 
Hawke and his staff guaranteed funding levels to non-government schools for the next 
eight years. Under the deal, grants for the forty-one “hit list” schools would be 
maintained in real terms, while Catholic schools would receive real increases in per 
capita grants on a sliding scale from 6 per cent in the early years phasing out to less than 
one per cent in 1992. Government schools also received real increases in their per 
capita grants. After the Hawke Labor government was returned to office in 1984 with a 
reduced majority, the first four years of funding were guaranteed in legislation.
3.4 Federal schools funding since 1988
After the 1987 Federal election, the former Finance Minister, John Dawkins replaced 
Susan Ryan as Minister of a new portfolio of Employment, Education and Training, and 
both the Schools Commission and Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission 
were abolished. Initially, Dawkins attempted to reduce the level of consultation with
and it was not included in the Budget deliberation process. The National Board and most of its Councils 
were abolished by the Coalition government in 1996.
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interest groups, refusing to meet with the National Catholic Education Commission and 
other stakeholders. The Bishops reacted by arranging an appointment with the Prime 
Minister, who in 1984 had undertaken to meet them at any time they had concerns about 
school education policy. Once he had been made aware of the significance of the 
understanding between the Prime Minister and the Catholic Bishops, Dawkins thereafter 
consulted the NCEC prior to making any changes to Commonwealth funding policy for 
non-government schools.
As a former Finance Minister and a member of Cabinet’s Expenditure Review 
Committee, Dawkins was committed to finding budgetary savings in schools 
expenditure (Pusey 1991: 147)26 The legislation for the second four-year period of the 
eight-year funding scheme was due to be introduced after the 1988 Federal budget. In 
the lead-up to the government’s May 1988 Economic Statement, Dawkins considered a 
series of options to reduce the funding increases promised to non-government schools 
between 1989-1992, aiming to save about $40 million against the forward estimates. At 
the same time, his Department calculated the cost of the recently awarded second tier 
wage increase of 4 per cent for teachers in government and non-government schools. 
Normally, wage increases for teachers were incorporated into the Schools Prices Index 
(SP1), the mechanism for adjusting the level of Commonwealth grants to schools to 
reflect real costs (see Appendix Four). Because the cost of the 4 per cent productivity 
wage increase was more than $40 million, Dawkins proposed to exclude the 4 per cent 
productivity increase from the Schools Prices Index instead of re-negotiating the eight- 
year funding scheme. Such an action could be justified, he suggested, by the fact that 
the 4 per cent wage increase was supposed to have been granted on the basis of genuine 
improvements in teacher productivity. The National Catholic Education Commission 
accepted this proposal and the previously agreed funding schedule for 1989-1992 
remained in place (Dawkins 1988b).
Prior to the 1990 Federal election, Dawkins sought to finalise the issue of funding for 
non-government schools beyond 1992. In 1989 he released a discussion paper outlining 
proposed funding arrangements for the eight year period 1993 to 2000. He proposed to 
award no more increases in funding to government schools whereas Category 10 schools 
and above -  mainly Catholic schools -  would be given annual real increases of 1.8 per 
cent per year until 2000 (DEET 1989). But reaching agreement on schools funding 
three years in advance did not help Dawkins to quarantine schools funding policy from 
an “electoral auction” in 1992.
In the 1987 and 1990 Federal elections, the Coalition’s funding policy had posed no 
threat to the government’s relationship with the non-government schools’ lobby because 
it had not offered any additional benefits to Catholic schools. This changed when the 
Coalition’s Fightback! policy was released late in 1991. Under Fightback! the Coalition 
promised increased funding to Catholic schools of more than 4 per cent per year 
between 1994 and 1996, funded through a consumption tax. This gave the National
26 The Expenditure Review Committee was established by the Hawke Labor government in 1983 to 
consider all proposals for new expenditure prior to their consideration by Cabinet. The original members 
of the Committee were Bob Hawke, Paul Keating, John Dawkins, Ralph Willis and Peter Walsh -  most of 
whom were committed to the principles of economic restraint (Walsh 1995: 101).
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Catholic Education Commission an opportunity to negotiate increased funding in return 
for Catholic support in the lead-up to the 1993 Federal election.
Early in 1992, the National Catholic Education Commission presented the new Federal 
Minister for Employment, Education and Training, Kim Beazley, with several options 
for new funding arrangements for capital and recurrent funding beyond 1992. Each 
option was a re-configuration of the agreed funding scheme for 1993-2000 that would 
provide an increase in funding similar to that promised in Fightback! In response, in its 
1992-93 Budget, the Labor government provided an additional $140 million to the 
capital grants program over four years and made a one-off injection of $40 million (ie. 4 
per cent) to the base funding of the general recurrent grants program (Commonwealth 
Budget Papers 1992-93). This change effectively restored the money Dawkins had 
saved by excluding the 4 per cent wage adjustment from the SPI four years earlier.
When the Coalition government won office in March 1996, it promised to review the 
Education Resources Index, which determines a school’s funding level under the 
General Recurrent Grants Program (see Appendix Four)27. The review commenced an 
extensive consultation process and released a discussion paper in 1997 (DEETYA 
1997b). The government delayed its announcement on the outcome of the review until 
after the Federal election in October 1998. In its election campaign, the Labor Party 
promised an additional $85 million a year in general recurrent funding for Catholic 
schools, based on a re-categorisation of their funding from Category 10 to Category 11 
(Australian Labor Party 1998). Within a week, the Coalition parties also promised $85 
million a year to the Catholic system. This provoked the ire of non-Catholic private 
schools, who had received no promise of increased funding. The Chief Executive 
Officer of the Association of Independent Schools of Victoria criticised the promises to 
Catholic schools as “political expediency”, accusing both parties of “target(ing) public 
resources on the basis of perceived vote-catching, not on the basis of some objective or 
transparent measure of relative needs of students” (Ogilvy-O’Donnell 1998).
3.5 Changes in Commonwealth expenditure on schools
Although the structure of Commonwealth schools programs has not changed in the 25 
years since they were introduced, the distribution of total program expenditure is now 
quite different. As shown in Table 2.3 compared to Table 2.2, the general recurrent 
grants program now dwarfs other programs (82 per cent of all funding compared to 48 
per cent in 1974) and the major funding recipient has shifted from government to non­
government schools (60 per cent in 1998 compared to 27 per cent in 1974).
The shift in the balance of Commonwealth school education expenditure between 1974 
and 1998 is indicative of the power of non-government schools as a sectional interest 
group. The interests of the sector are represented by the National Catholic Education 
Commission (NCEC), the National Council of Independent Schools Associations 
(NCISA) and the Australian Parents’ Council (APC). When Labor is in government the 
NCEC has insider status in negotiating government policy, whereas the NCISA and the 
APC are more influential with a Coalition government. As all three groups support the
27The Coalition also promised to abolish the New Schools Policy which is discussed in Chapter Four.
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common goal of securing Federal funding for non-government schools, the emphasis of 
Commonwealth policy only differs by degree, favouring either Catholic or non-Catholic 
schools, depending on which party is in office.
Table 2.3 Commonwealth Schools Programs expenditure 1998 ($m)
Type of Program
State
Schools
Private
schools
Joint
programs
Total Distrib­
ution
(%)
General Recurrent 
Grants Program
1,008.5 1,990.9 - 2,999.4 82
Capital Grants 
Program
212.4 83.5 - 295.9 8
Other Targeted 
Programs
221A 113.2 13.9 354.5 10
Total 1,448.3 2,187.6 13.9 3,649.8 100
Distribution (%) 40 60 0 100
Notes: Expenditure in 1998 prices. Expenditure on General Recurrent Grants for government schools 
takes into account the deduction for the Enrolment Benchmark Adjustment.
Source: DEETYA (1998) Commonwealth Programmes for Schools Quadrennial Administrative 
Guidelines 1998.
The non-government schools’ lobby groups all exhibit Eckstein’s indicators of effective 
lobbying influence -  size, money, media influence and members in influential positions 
(Eckstein I960: 23). The groups are structured on hierarchical lines which mirror the 
structure of government and give their leaders the authority to negotiate with Ministers 
without involving rank and file membership. Their political power lies chiefly in their 
ability to marshall large numbers of people at short notice to attract media attention and 
to pressure the government on policy issues. This power was last used to considerable 
effect in 1983 when mass rallies were organised to oppose the policy direction of the 
new Labor Education Minister, Susan Ryan. There are a few non-government schools 
which do not enjoy the power of the NCEC, the APC and the NCISA. The majority of 
private schools outside of the Catholic system over the past decade have been small 
schools under the auspices of local religious communities (McKinnon 1995a).
Although these schools are represented at the Federal level, they do not have the 
influence of the major lobby groups, and do not possess any of Eckstein’s indicators.
4 National cooperation in schooling
After 1987, as general recurrent funding absorbed an increasing proportion of 
Commonwealth outlays on schools, the Federal government sought to influence 
education policy through cooperative arrangements with State and Territory Education 
Ministers (Lingard et al. 1993). This was in keeping with a more general “shift in the 
rules of the game of federal politics towards collaborative, as distinct from arms-length, 
patterns of inter-governmental relations” (Painter 1998: 1).
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4.1 “Strengthening Australia's Schools”
In 1988, the Federal Minister for Education, John Dawkins released a short policy 
statement called Strengthening Australia’s Schools which called on State and Territory 
Education Ministers to address community concerns about an alleged decline in 
education standards. The document proposed that members of the Australian Education 
Council work together to minimise the differences between State and Territory 
education systems in terms of curriculum and school structures, develop a set of agreed 
national goals for schools, develop an agreed national curriculum and produce an annual 
national report on schooling (Dawkins 1988a). Strengthening Australia’s Schools was 
different to previous Commonwealth initiatives in education because it did not promise 
any direct financial inducement to the State and Territory governments. In this sense, 
Dawkins’ approach reflected a general disillusionment in Commonwealth agencies 
about methods of grant administration which relied on inputs rather than outcomes 
(Painter 1998: 14-15).
After a year of negotiations, the Australian Education Council agreed to participate in a 
national cooperative effort at a meeting in Hobart in 1989. Over the next four years, the 
AEC developed agreed national goals for schools, and produced an annual national 
report on schooling. The most contentious project was the development of national 
curriculum frameworks to inform parents and employers about the standards of 
achievement to be expected of students at each level of schooling. After agreeing on 
eight subject areas, sub-Committees of the Australian Education Council produced draft 
curriculum documents for each subject over a period of four years, and the final set of 
documents was presented to the Australian Education Council in June 1993. It was 
expected that Ministers would agree to publish the documents by 1994 and undertake 
extensive trialing with a view to implementation by the year 2000 (Watson 1993).
Between 1988 and 1993, the composition of the AEC changed. In 1993, Dawkins was 
no longer Federal Minister, non-Labor governments had replaced Labor governments in 
Victoria, Western Australia and South Australia, and the NSW Liberal Minister Virginia 
Chadwick occupied the Chair. Before the AEC meeting in June 1993, the Liberal 
Education Ministers caucused and decided to stall the national curriculum process.
When the curriculum documents were presented, a long debate ensued and it was finally 
agreed to take the statements back to the States for further consultations. Although the 
documents have been incorporated into some State education systems, the momentum 
for a national curriculum has now disappeared. The Ministerial Council continues to 
produce the annual national report on schooling and is currently revising the national 
goals for Australian schools.
The cooperative schooling initiative differed from other Federal government programs 
because it sought State cooperation without the promise of additional financial 
resources. The national curriculum process was an attempt to pursue Commonwealth 
policy objectives through cooperation with State authorities under the mantle of the 
Australian Education Council. It was assumed that if the States were part of the process, 
they were more likely to “own” the outcome. This approach also carried the risk that if 
the States withdrew their cooperation, projects like the national curriculum frameworks
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would not survive. Nevertheless, the cooperative approach was entrenched as a means 
of developing education policy and continued to characterise Commonwealth schools 
policy initiatives in the 1990s, with varying degrees of success.
4.2 Vocational education in schools
During the 1990s, the Federal government pursued its economic policy goals by 
initiating significant reforms in vocational education and training28. The training reform 
agenda applied mainly to the provision of industry training within the sector of technical 
and further education (TAFE), but it also had implications for schools. Vocational 
education and training takes place in colleges of technical and further education 
(TAFE), while a small number of secondary schools offer specific vocational courses at 
the senior secondary level. These courses are designed to meet the needs of students not 
interested in the more academic curriculum which leads to university entrance 
examinations. Although fewer than ten per cent of secondary schools offer formally 
accredited vocational courses, all secondary schools provide a “general education” to 
students not destined for university entrance in Years 10, 11 and 12. This “general 
education” is intended to equip students with relevant skills for employment or industry 
training.
In 1990, the Federal government initiated a collaborative effort through its Ministerial 
forum, the Australian Education Council, to seek agreement from all States and 
Territories to improve rates of secondary participation. In July 1991, the Finn 
Committee, on which all States and Territories were represented, recommended the 
adoption of a new national participation target: “ . . . that by the Year 2001, 95 per cent 
of 19 year olds should have completed Year 12, or an initial post-school qualification or 
be participating in formally recognised education or training” (Finn 1991: Rec. 3.2) To 
meet the target of 95 per cent participation, there had to be significant growth in 
participation in all sectors, particularly in vocational education and training which 
needed to expand by over six per cent per year. For schools, the Finn report said that 
Year 12 retention rates should increase to 80 per cent by 200129.
The Finn Committee also concluded that there were essential skills that all young people 
needed to learn in their preparation for employment. The report proposed that 
employment-related “key competencies” should be identified in all areas of the school 
curriculum. The Finn Committee proposed the development of a “standards 
framework” to describe the nature of each key competency at a number of levels. In 
response, a committee chaired by Eric Mayer was appointed to identify the key 
competencies within a framework that would be relevant to schools, the training sector 
and employers. The Committee concluded that there were seven key competencies that 
all young people needed to participate effectively in the workplace30. The report was
The most significant reform in the area of vocational education and training was the establishment of 
the Australian National Training Authority (ANTA) in 1992, described in detail in Painter (1998): 158- 
173.
Although the size of the 15-19 year old population has declined during the 1990s, this factor was taken 
into account in setting the Finn target for Year 12 retention.
3b The seven key competencies are: analysis, communication, planning, teamwork, numeracy, problem­
solving and technological skills (Mayer 1992: vii).
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consistent with trends in the United States and in the United Kingdom to identify the 
basic outcomes of school education in terms of workplace skills (Mayer 1992: 13). In 
defining key competencies, governments sought to ensure that the outcomes of general 
education in the post-compulsory years were transferable to the workplace, in the name 
of international economic competitiveness and improving economic productivity.
In response to the Finn report’s target of improving participation rates to Year 12, the 
Commonwealth provided increased financial support to vocational training but did not 
provide any additional financial assistance to schools. Over subsequent years, 
participation rates increased in higher education and in vocational education, and the 
only sector in which there was no progress towards the Finn targets was in schools. In 
schooling, Year 12 participation rates began to fall almost as soon as the Finn targets 
were announced. The Year 12 retention rate declined from 77.1 per cent in 1991 to 71.8 
% in 199731. There is no indication that the target of 80 per cent retention to Year 12 
will be met by the Year 2000, and the goal of increasing Year 12 participation appears 
to have vanished from the policy agenda of State and Federal governments.
Although the Year 12 retention rate target is no longer a policy goal, in 1996, the 
Federal government made a financial commitment of up to $187 million over four years 
to vocational education in schools (DEETYA 1998: 108)32. Announced in the 1996 
Federal Budget, the Commonwealth’s School to Work Program provided $23 million 
over four years for the expansion of accredited vocational education courses in senior 
secondary schools (Kemp 1996a). As a targeted program, the School to Work funding is 
allocated to State and non-government education authorities on the basis of enrolment 
share, to be distributed in accordance with principles of a Commonwealth/State 
agreement. The Commonwealth has retained a “strategic component” of the Program 
to fund individual projects approved by the Federal Minister (DEETYA 1998: 109).
4.3 COAG’s attempt to reform schools funding.
In the early 1990s, Commonwealth funding for schools came under the spotlight in the 
context of a major review of federal financial relations initiated by central agencies 
under the auspices of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG). The sheer size 
of Commonwealth specific purpose payments to schools always ensures that it has a 
prominent position on any agenda to review Commonwealth/State financial relations 
(see Chapter Five). But in spite of a concerted effort by central agencies to review 
Commonwealth schools funding arrangements in the early 1990s, schools funding was 
dropped from COAG’s reform agenda within two years. This result was achieved 
through political manoeuvres by key players at the Federal and State level and pressure 
from school education lobby groups.
The labour market prospects for students leaving school early have not improved: in fact, they got 
worse over the 1980s. Of 15-19 year olds not engaged in any education or training, a little over half get 
full-time jobs, a quarter get part-time jobs and the remaining quarter are unemployed (Lamb et al. 1995).
32 The package of $187 million over four years contained funding earmarked from existing 
Commonwealth programs such as: ANTA funds ($80m); Australian Student Traineeship Foundation 
($78m); and Job Pathways ($6m).
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In 1990 at the instigation of the Prime Minister, a Special Premiers’ Conference was 
established to examine the possibility of new financial arrangements that would increase 
the States’ budgetary flexibility. While the Commonwealth’s goal was to pursue 
national micro-economic reform, the States agreed to participate on the condition that 
the Commonwealth examine proposals to reduce vertical fiscal imbalance (Galligan 
1995: 203, Painter 1998: 3). In the forum that became the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG), the Premiers sought to reduce vertical fiscal imbalance by two 
means: first, through some form of shared national income tax arrangement, and second, 
through a reduction in Commonwealth tied grants (Painter 1998: 39)33.
To pursue the reform of tied grants, the Prime Minister and Premiers established a Tied 
Grants Working Group of officials from their central agencies (ie. the Premiers’ 
Departments and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet) to examine the 
prospects for reform of specific purpose payments (SPPs). Their brief was to 
recommend which specific purpose payments could be “rationalised” by transferring 
them to untied Financial Assistance Grants (FAGs). The Heads of Government wanted 
a clear division of responsibilities between the Commonwealth and the States so that 
services could be assigned to one level of government. Except in genuine cases of 
“shared responsibility”, “funding would have a simple relationship to functional 
responsibility and adjustments to Financial Assistance Grants . . . would follow as 
appropriate” (Communique 1990, October). The commitment to achieve a “substantial 
reduction of tied grants as a proportion of total Commonwealth grants” was reiterated at 
the next Special Premiers’ Conference (Communique 1991, July). It was generally 
expected that a proportion of total SPPs would be “traded-off ’ in the negotiations 
leading up to the November 1991 Conference.
Whereas the goal of maximising budget flexibility was a high priority among State 
Premiers and Treasurers, it was not as popular among their portfolio Ministers, who 
received reliable sources of funding through SPPs. Because the distribution of schools 
expenditure is calculated on a per capita basis, the Ministers in more populous States 
received higher levels of funding than they would if the allocation were transferred to 
untied Financial Assistance Grants (FAGs). Furthermore, although SPPs are not 
affected by the fiscal equalisation formula that determines levels of FAGs, the 
calculation of a State’s level of FAGs takes into account most of the revenue received 
through SPPs34. In effect, State portfolio Ministers receive a reliable source of revenue 
from Commonwealth SPPs, and the level of untied grants paid to State Treasuries is 
adjusted to take this into account. While Premiers would gain bigger budgets and more
33 The Communique read, “Secondly, in considering the issue of fiscal imbalance, Leaders and 
representatives recognised that a major concern of the States is how to achieve greater flexibility in the 
management of their budgets. A substantial factor contributing to that concern is the extent of tied grants 
-  specific purpose payments from the Commonwealth to which detailed conditions are attached in many 
cases -  and the substantial growth in those grants in the post-war period. Leaders have decided that this 
trend must be reversed; that the goals should be a substantial reduction of tied grants as a proportion of 
total Commonwealth grants. This would represent a major shift in the development of the Australian 
Federal system” (Communique 1990, Oct: 2).
34 The fiscal equalisation formula which determines per capita relativities “includes” most SPPs to the 
States as revenue for meeting States expenditure needs, while it “deducts” most SPPs through the States as 
expenditure in addition to what the States would otherwise have undertaken (see Budget Papers 1996-97, 
No. 3: 19).
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flexibility from the conversion of SPPs to FAGs, the proposal would diminish the power 
of State portfolio Ministers, who would have to compete for more of their revenue from 
State budgets.
At the Federal level, Ministers and Departments which distributed large SPPs were as 
nervous of fiscal reform as their State and Territory counterparts.
Commonwealth departments and ministers were not eager to stop trying to 
control aspects of (for example) school education or community health. The 
aim was often a substitution of new controls, not their removal or surrender of 
jurisdiction (Painter 1998: 14).
The public justification for the Federal portfolio agencies’ concern was that the Tied 
Grants Working Group appeared to be heading towards a transfer of SPPs based on 
principles alone, without taking into account national policy interests.
By placing the review of tied grants in the hands of central agencies, Heads of 
Government tried to ensure that Federal and State portfolio Ministers (ie. those 
responsible for granting SPPs and those who received SPPs) would not obstruct the 
review process. But portfolio Ministers and their agencies moved quickly to counter the 
new authority of the “central agency club” (Painter 1998: 89). Shortly after the first 
Special Premiers Conference in October 1990, portfolio Ministers at the State and 
Federal level commenced their own reviews of SPPs through their Ministerial Councils 
-  in parallel with the working party established by Heads of Government. In December 
1990, the Australian Education Council (AEC) and the Ministers of Vocational 
Education, Employment and Training (MOVEET) established working parties to review 
schools, higher education and training and labour market programs. The Schools 
Working Party was asked to address “possible duplications and inefficiencies in 
Commonwealth and State/Territory provision of programs and services” (Terms of 
Reference, Schools Working Party, December 1990)35. The Federal Minister ensured 
that the terms of reference for the AEC Schools Working Party excluded the issue of 
SPPs for non-government schools from consideration, except where Commonwealth 
programs were jointly available to government and non-government schools.
The Ministerial Councils’ Working Parties produced reports on each policy area by mid- 
1991 and passed them on to the Tied Grants Working Group appointed by the Heads of 
Government. The Federal Minister for Employment, Education and Training used the 
reports to establish a Commonwealth negotiating position prior to the scheduled 
November 1991 Special Premiers’ Conference. In regard to schools, the AEC review 
canvassed options for transferring SPPs for government schools to FAGs while 
“broadbanding” the targeted programs as one SPP. The Commonwealth government 
also considered making direct payments to non-government schools, under the “benefits 
to students” power, to further reduce the level of Commonwealth SPPs.
35 The Schools Working Party was also asked to “have regard to the framework of principles set out in 
the Communique from the Special Premiers’ Conference” (ie. the terms of reference for the tied grants 
working group) and to “consider proposals put forward by the Commonwealth Minister and any other 
proposals raised by State and Territory governments”.
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At the November 1991 meeting of Premiers and Chief Ministers, the AEC and 
MOVEET reviews were taken into account and the decisions reflected the portfolio 
agencies’ reports36. The Premiers and Chief Ministers did not endorse the AEC’s 
principle of “shared responsibility” for school education, but stated that schools were the 
responsibility of State governments. Nevertheless, they endorsed the funding 
arrangements recommended by the AEC’s Schools Working Party and said that SPPs 
for government schools ($1 billion p.a) should be transferred to FAGs. They agreed to a 
tied grant to broadband all equity programs (amounting to $190 million p.a). They also 
recommended that a tied grant ($1.4 billion) should be retained to fund non-government 
schools (Communique 1991, Nov: 18-19).
The Premiers’ decision to transfer government schools funding to FAGs did not 
proceed. It was scheduled for discussion at the June and November Premiers’ 
Conferences in 1992, but was deferred on the pretext that it should await the Industry 
Commission’s review of Government Service Provision initiated in 1993. The issue 
was raised again in the lead-up to CO AG in February 1994 as a potential trade-off for 
concessions on micro-economic reform but did not make it to the conference table. The 
only reform that proceeded was the broadbanding of Commonwealth targeted programs 
in 1994, which still left the targeted programs as a Specific Purpose Payment.
In principle, schools funding was a prime target for fiscal reform because of the fact that 
school education was unquestionably a State responsibility under the Constitution. 
However, there were political barriers to any fiscal reform in school education. The first 
barrier was the strategic opposition of the Federal and State Ministers responsible for 
schooling, who ensured that the issue of transferring schools funding to FAGs was 
sidetracked into processes that remained within their control. The interests of portfolio 
Ministers were in conflict with the interests of their State Premiers on this issue.
Second, a powerful barrier to fiscal reform in Commonwealth schools funding was the 
opposition of the non-government schools sector, particularly the Catholic Education 
authorities. As the major recipient of Federal schools funding, private schools had 
benefited from the division of responsibilities that had provided them with annual 
increases in funding for twenty years. Although Commonwealth SPPs for non­
government schools are paid on a uniform per capita basis, if the money were 
transferred to FAGs, the available resources would vary from State to State and be 
subject to the fiscal discipline that is routinely applied to FAGs in the Federal 
government’s budget process. Non-government schools representatives also opposed 
the transfer of SPPs for government schools to FAGs in the expectation that such a 
division would highlight the different funding arrangements for government and non­
government schools, and undermine the rhetoric of a Commonwealth “needs-based” 
funding policy for all schools. Representatives of private schools made their objections 
clear to Heads of Governments and Education Ministers at both the State and Federal 
level throughout the review process.
36 When the Commonwealth government withdrew its offer to consider tax-sharing in October 1991, the 
State Premiers angrily cancelled the scheduled Special Premiers’ Conference in November 1991, and 
convened their own meeting to which the Commonwealth was not invited (Painter 1998: 41-42). 
Nevertheless at the meeting, Premiers and Chief Ministers made a number of commitments to pursue the 
SPC agenda and invited the Commonwealth to join the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) 
established in May 1992 (Communique 1991, Nov.).
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CO AG’s statements about responsibility for schooling became increasingly 
contradictory as the Premiers wrestled with the clash between issues of principle and the 
realities of politics. In their November 1991 Communique, even though the Premiers 
and Chief Ministers stated repeatedly that school education was the sole responsibility 
of the States, they recommended that only government schools’ funding be converted to 
FAGs, and that non-government schools funding remain a tied grant. Only State 
Premiers who were committed to the principles of Federal fiscal reform, such as the 
New South Wales Premier Nick Greiner (Painter 1998: 4), were prepared to brave the 
opposition of the Catholic Bishops. On several occasions, the New South Wales 
Premier’s Department attempted to have SPPs for non-government schools included in 
the review being undertaken by the AEC Schools Working Party. But as non­
government schools funding had been excluded from the review’s terms of reference, 
officials from the Commonwealth and other States argued successfully that the non­
government sector was not within their brief. In 1993, when the new Western 
Australian Education Minister suggested that the Commonwealth should withdraw from 
a direct role in funding schools, he drew a swift response from the National Catholic 
Education Commission.
While the new era of collaborative federalism has produced many policy achievements, 
the expectation that roles and responsibilities could be determined on the basis of a set 
of principles has never been realised. Commonwealth schools funding is one example 
of “short term political and policy concerns (overriding) managerial rationales, with the 
Commonwealth continuing to be drawn to traditional instruments of control and 
direction in response to the concerns of clients and pressure groups” (Painter 1998: 15). 
State and Territory portfolio Ministers united with the Commonwealth Education 
Minister to ensure that there was minimal change to Commonwealth funding 
arrangements for schools. Their opposition, combined with the political influence of the 
non-government schools lobby, weakened the push by central agencies to re-define the 
Commonwealth’s role in schooling. The fact that some aspects of Federal involvement 
in schools policy have taken a more cooperative turn in recent times does not mean that 
the major programs of Commonwealth assistance to schools will change. The political 
forces that have contributed to the current level of Commonwealth involvement in 
schooling will always seek to ensure that the main forms of Federal assistance to 
schools remain in place.
Conclusion
The reasons why the Federal government become involved in school education fall into 
three categories: fiscal federalism; political opportunism; and policy incrementalism. 
Historical accounts of Commonwealth intervention in education highlight the growing 
fiscal power of the Federal government vis a vis the States, following the introduction of 
uniform taxation in 1942. The implication of this argument is that its increased fiscal 
capacity gave the Federal government the will to intervene in policy areas that would 
otherwise have remained the sole responsibility of State governments. It is also argued 
that State governments were so starved of revenue after the Second World War that they 
were unable to meet their policy commitments without Federal assistance (Mathews 
1972, Smart 1978, Tannock 1969: 8). Their fiscal dependence led State governments to
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request direct Commonwealth assistance for school education in the 1960s to help meet 
the crippling burden of financing schools. While this argument might apply to other 
policy domains, it is less persuasive in regard to schooling.
Although State education systems were stretched to the limit to accommodate 
enrolments from the post-war baby boom during the 1950s and 1960s, their difficulties 
were caused more by material shortages than by financial incapacity. Lack of qualified 
teachers and the fact that schools could not be built quickly enough created a palpable 
sense of crisis in State education during the period. But when the State Education 
Ministers requested support from the Commonwealth for schools in 1963, the amount 
requested was only a fraction of their total outlays. Subsequently, when the 
Commonwealth assistance was not forthcoming, the States increased their own outlays 
on schooling. From the Commonwealth’s perspective, increased fiscal power gave it no 
incentive to provide direct support for schooling, until political circumstances became 
amenable to exploitation on the issue of state aid to non-government schools.
The Commonwealth’s intervention in school education was the product of political 
forces rather than a policy development process. The Federal government had 
sponsored education initiatives in schools under its Defence portfolio since 1911, but 
universities were structurally better placed than schools to attract Commonwealth 
funding. Although any attempt by the Federal government to become substantially 
involved in education always carried the risk of a High Court challenge, the likelihood 
that such a challenge would be successful receded after 1961 when the States asked the 
Commonwealth for financial assistance to schools. It was political pressure rather than 
policy concerns which led to the establishment of Commonwealth assistance for schools 
in 1963. This assistance was limited to a few Federal programs tied to specific policy 
goals until the late 1960s when Commonwealth and State governments were persuaded 
to implement permanent programs of recurrent assistance to non-government schools.
After the Karmel Committee initiated a major expansion of Commonwealth 
involvement, the Federal government attempted to conciliate the competing claims for 
schools funding by appointing representatives of pressure groups to the Schools 
Commission. But the establishment of the Schools Commission merely strengthened 
the power of education lobby groups who argued for an expanded Commonwealth role 
in schooling. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the power of the non-government 
schools lobby has been the primary influence over levels of funding and policy priorities 
for Commonwealth involvement in schooling. During this time the emphasis of 
Commonwealth funding has shifted from its original balance of targeted, capital and 
recurrent funding, distributed between government and non-government schools in 
proportions roughly approximate to their share of total enrolments. Today, eighty-two 
per cent of Commonwealth assistance is recurrent funding and sixty per cent of all 
Federal government funding is allocated to non-government schools. The absence of a 
coherent policy rationale for Commonwealth schools programs creates difficulties when 
we try to evaluate the effectiveness of the Federal government’s involvement in 
schooling.
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Chapter Three
The effectiveness of Commonwealth involvement in schooling
Introduction
This chapter will examine issues in performance monitoring relating to government 
involvement in school education. The first section will discuss why it is important to 
monitor government performance in school education provision and indicate how it can 
be done. The second section explores the way in which the Commonwealth government 
has determined its funding priorities and how the quality of performance information 
has influenced its processes of policy development. The third section discusses why it is 
so difficult to obtain information about school performance and suggests a way to 
improve the quality of information on schooling.
1 Measuring school performance
Giving managers greater flexibility and freedom to manage resources is a 
necessary but insufficient condition for achieving improved performance.
Autonomy alone is not enough. The counterpart of the devolution of authority 
is more stringent performance requirements and enhanced accountability 
(OECD 1995: 33).
In the past, parliaments could be assured of the performance of public sector agencies 
through monitoring detailed cash transactions. The maximum accountability required of 
bureaucrats was a timely and accurate account of how they spent resources on behalf of 
the government. The arrival of “new managerialism” in the public sector has given 
public sector managers greater autonomy over decision-making and increased power to 
determine program priorities (Considine and Painter 1995). In return for this autonomy, 
public sector managers are held responsible for the impact of their activities and the 
outcomes achieved. While recent reforms were designed to improve the efficiency of 
the public sector by “letting the managers manage”, they have placed new demands on 
instruments of public accountability (Uhr 1998: 164-169). Today, being accountable for 
performance means being able to demonstrate that a government agency has been both 
efficient and effective in the allocation of public resources.
While in the private sector, the performance of any organisation can be assessed by the 
single indicator of profit or loss, it is more difficult to evaluate the performance of a 
government-run organisation (Painter 1988). The private sector’s key performance 
measure of profit is of little use in a public sector context unless the agency is 
“corporatised” to the extent that it generates profit and loss. It is more difficult to 
measure the performance of an organisation if its outcomes cannot be readily quantified. 
While the private sector model of decentralised decision-making may have improved the 
efficiency of public sector management, it has created a need for new methods of 
monitoring agency performance.
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1.1 A model for measuring efficiency and effectiveness in schooling
The efficiency of an agency or program is measured by the relationship between its 
inputs and its outputs. In schooling, the most common efficiency indicator is average 
cost per student. However an accountability system which is based on financial data 
alone produces a distorted picture of a system's efficiency because it does not take into 
account the system’s effectiveness. To measure only the efficiency of an agency is 
pointless unless we have some measures of how effectively the agency achieves its 
goals. This applies to evaluations of the performance of managers in both the public 
and private sector. As Drucker says,
Effectiveness is the foundation of success -  efficiency is a minimum condition 
for survival after success has been achieved. Efficiency is concerned with 
doing things right. Effectiveness is doing the right things. (Drucker 1974: 45)
On Drucker’s reasoning, the measured efficiency of any industry or service provider is 
irrelevant if the industry is not providing the right services (ie. being effective). The 
most efficient school or system (ie. the one with the lowest cost per student) could well 
be the least effective in terms of service delivery.
Figure 3.1 An input-output model of production
COST - EFFECTIVENESS
EFFICIENCY EFFECTIVENESS
OUTPUTS OBJECTIVESINPUTS OUTCOMES
Definitions
Inputs: resources used in the production process, usually expressed in terms of a monetary value.
Outputs: the product produced by a system or program.
Outcomes: the impact of the whole production process on the system’s clients.
Performance indicator: information about the performance of an enterprise or system of management. 
Efficiency indicator: the ratio of inputs to outputs in a production process, usually expressed in terms of a 
cost per unit of output (eg average cost per student). An efficient system is one which minimises the cost 
(input) per unit of output.
Effectiveness indicator: measures the extent of success in achieving the objectives of the system or 
program. An effective program is one which the program's outcomes fulfil the program's objectives. 
Cost-Effectiveness: the unit cost of the program outcome.
In an industry like schooling, where effectiveness is reflected mainly in students' 
educational achievements, educational outcomes data provide the best indications of a 
school’s effectiveness. To explore this relationship between inputs and outcomes, 
governments need to collect performance information in a systematic way based on a
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model of the production of school education. The first step in developing a model of 
school education is to define the key elements of the education production process. As 
performance measures ultimately reflect the relationship between these elements (ie. the 
conversion of inputs, or resources into educational outcomes) the model must 
differentiate between the outputs and the outcomes of schooling. The model must also 
enable us to identify the many purposes of schooling which should then become the 
primary focus for indicator development.
The model in Figure 3.1 is adapted from a generic input-output model developed by the 
Federal Department of Finance for use in public sector performance evaluations 
(Department of Finance 1986). This modified input-output model is a useful starting 
point for modelling production in service industries such as education because it 
highlights the important relationship between outcomes and objectives in measuring 
system effectiveness. It also improves upon more simplistic input-output models by 
emphasising the primary importance of identifying system or program objectives, as a 
prerequisite to evaluating both the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of a production 
process.
To begin to understand the education production function, we need data on educational 
inputs and on educational outcomes. But even when information about school 
effectiveness is available, it is very difficult to demonstrate the relationship between 
expenditure and outcomes because school education is not a simple production process 
(Winston 1994). Industries that resemble a simple production process exist to produce a 
particular commodity, like electricity, and the processes involved in producing the 
desired outcome are easily identified. The production of school education, on the other 
hand, has multiple objectives, multiple inputs and outputs and multiple outcomes. 
Moreover, the way in which education's many inputs (eg. teachers, classrooms, students 
etc.) work to produce educational outcomes, (ie. the education production function) 
remains the subject of considerable dispute (see Cohn and Geske 1990, Ch. 7). 
Nevertheless, to the extent that it is possible to identify the goals of schooling it is also 
possible to produce measures of school performance.
1. 2 The objectives of schooling and measures of school effectiveness
One lesson which has become clear from public sector experiments with performance 
evaluation is the importance of identifying clearly the objectives of a system or program, 
even those which appear to defy quantitative measurement, as a precursor to developing 
performance indicators (Oakes 1986). If a less than comprehensive set of system 
objectives is established, the resultant performance indicators (which, by definition, 
measure progress towards system objectives) will be flawed. Inadequate indicators, 
based on ill-defined policy goals are likely to cause confusion to both educational 
practitioners and policy-makers as well as having the potential to seriously distort the 
direction of policy development.
The difficulty in obtaining consensus on the fundamental purpose of school education 
provision is common to many areas of government policy, particularly in the social 
services. It is difficult to define clear objectives for most Government programs, given 
the political, legal and historical constraints within which public servants operate
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(Alford 1991). The role of learning in our economy and society has always been the 
subject of theoretical debate (see Becker 1964, Magien 1990, Stiglitz 1975, Sander and 
Schaeffer 1991) and such debate has influenced the direction and focus of public policy 
(Pusey 1991, Marginson 1993). Nevertheless, at an operational level, lack of agreement 
about theoretical issues does not prevent governments from implementing specific 
programs in order to achieve identified policy objectives. If governments are to render 
account for the way in which they carry out their responsibilities, their performance 
must be evaluated in terms of the extent to which they have achieved stated policy goals.
Differences of opinion tend to be about the relative emphasis given to one objective 
over another, rather than the legitimacy of the range of policy goals. For example, even 
those schools which place great store by academic achievement, also insist that the 
purpose of education is to develop well-rounded individuals capable of making a 
contribution to society. The view that schooling should serve a wide range of policy 
goals is reflected in Australia’s first nationally agreed statement of objectives for 
schooling, endorsed by Australia's eight State and Territory Education Ministers in 
1989. The "Common and Agreed National Goals for Schooling in Australia" 
(reproduced in Appendix 1) are a useful starting point for performance measurement 
because they encompass a broad range of educational objectives including both 
cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes.
As a broad statement designed to encompass all possible objectives for schooling, the 
National Goals are too unstructured to incorporate into an input-output model. It is, 
however, possible to summarise the goals into four main areas or "fields" to provide a 
basic structure for a performance indicators framework. Based on the national goals, 
government performance in school education provision should be measured in terms of 
progress towards the following objectives:
1. Acquisition of functional literacy and vocational skills
2. Acquisition of discipline-based ("academic") knowledge
3. Attainment of maturity, physical health, confidence and social skills
4. Shared values and an appreciation of Australian society, economy and 
culture.
Attempts to measure student outcomes in any of the four fields inevitably invites 
controversy, reflecting the range of opinions within the education community on the 
issue of education measurement. Such controversy is fuelled by the need to select a 
limited number of instruments to measure outcomes in each field.
In the field of "functional literacy", for example, there is widespread disagreement 
among experts over the best measure to assess literacy outcomes (Department of 
Employment, Education and Training 1991 Ch. 3, House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Employment, Education and Training 1993 Ch. 4). However the absence 
of agreement on such issues has not prevented education authorities from conducting 
literacy surveys in Australia over recent decades (see Bourke and Keeves 1977, Bourke 
et al. 1981, Management Committee 1997, Wickert 1989). Due to methodological 
inconsistencies, the data produced by these surveys have not been useful for comparing 
literacy outcomes over time. The Australian Council for Educational Research (ACER)
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conducts a longitudinal survey on behalf of the Commonwealth government which can 
be used by researchers to explore the relationship between education and employment 
outcomes (ACER 1997).
In 1996, the Federal government commissioned a National English Literacy Survey 
which is likely to be repeated annually. The Commonwealth is using the survey to 
develop national benchmarks for literacy and numeracy for students in primary and 
secondary schools. The benchmarks will provide base-line data against which schools, 
teachers and systems can assess the effectiveness of their programs (Management 
Committee 1997: iv). If the survey is conducted consistently over several years, it will 
provide longitudinal national data on literacy achievement in Australia. As it remains a 
sample survey, it will be of no use in monitoring individual students’ performance.
Heated arguments also arise over the issue of assessing vocational skills, given the 
difficulties of definition and the extent to which some critics question whether these 
skills can be measured at all (Norris 1991). The task is compounded by the differences 
in the way in which the States provide vocational training in schools (Russell 1993).
One approach to assessing the effectiveness of vocational courses would be to track the 
educational and employment outcomes of high school graduates. This requires data on 
student subject choice in the senior secondary years as part of surveys on transition rates 
from school to further education or employment (Lamb et al. 1995).
Data for measuring the acquisition of discipline-based knowledge (ie. Field 2) can be 
collected from the range of State-mandated testing programs that are currently 
implemented in Australian schools. All of the testing programs assess levels of student 
achievement in specific disciplines at various stages of schooling. However, they differ 
significantly from state to state in terms of content, methodology and the stage of 
schooling at which they are conducted (Lokan and Ford 1994). As these inconsistencies 
are unlikely to disappear, a better source of data for performance indicators is Year 12 
results. All jurisdictions implement public assessment at Year 12 and the results can be 
used to monitor the acquisition of discipline-based knowledge. Given the existence of 
largely untapped data sources, it should be possible to aggregate data from these tests to 
develop useful performance measures in this field.
Educational psychologists have developed a range of instruments for assessing the 
aspects of personal development included in Field 3, however, the quality of the data is 
always affected by the method in which it is collected. Attempts to measure outcomes in 
the area of personal development cannot avoid becoming embroiled in controversies 
within the discipline of psychology over research methods and validation of results. 
Nevertheless, as the development of personal characteristics such as student self-esteem 
and social skills is accepted as a legitimate objective of schooling, these traits should be 
included in a performance indicators framework. Instruments such as the "Quality of 
School Life" survey (Epstein and McPartland 1976) and the Educational Outcomes 
Survey (NBEET 1995), which measure student attitudes to school, provide a model for 
developing indicators of students’ personal development.
Assessing achievement in Field 4 is probably the most difficult of all, given the 
reluctance of any government to define acceptable "shared values" or desirable qualities
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of citizenship. But political participation and preparation for citizenship is a goal 
against which the performance of educational systems should be measured (OECD 
1973: 40). A Senate Committee inquiry into "Education for Active Citizenship" relied 
on quiz-type questions of the "Who is the Prime Minister?" variety to assess the extent 
to which Australian children appreciated Australia's political and social context (Senate 
Standing Committee on Employment, Education and Training 1989). The Federal 
government recently announced that it would fund a “citizenship” program in Australian 
schools based on an historical understanding of features of the Australian democratic 
tradition (Kemp 1997b). As the program will be pursued within a Key Learning Area of 
the agreed curriculum frameworks, desired student learning outcomes will be identified. 
In the absence of an explicit definition of a desirable outcome in the area of "values" , 
any data purporting to measure this are likely to be of limited policy relevance in the 
short term. Nevertheless, the inculcation of a certain set of values is deemed important 
enough to be identified by Federal and State governments as a policy objective of school 
education. Therefore school systems should at least attempt to understand how schools 
perform this role. Data for this indicator can be collected through sample surveys or 
focus group interviews.
The lack of definitive measures of the outcomes of schooling reinforce the need for 
caution in the selection and reporting of performance information. A key assumption is 
that no statistic can convey everything about schools’ performance. The performance 
measures only provide an indication of where a system appears to be performing well 
or poorly and not a complete picture or summation of a school’s performance. 
Unfortunately, the costs of monitoring and the difficulty of explaining school 
performance to the general public tend to lead to simple indicators and simplistic 
interpretations of them.
1.3 The influence of student background on educational outcomes
To obtain an accurate picture of school effectiveness, it is necessary to take into account 
one of the most significant "inputs" into the education production process -  the prior 
educational endowment of the student. Research over a long period of time has 
established that the nature of this endowment is dictated largely by social background 
variables such as family income and parents' occupation (Cohn and Geske 1990 Ch. 7, 
Eckland 1964,1965, Sewell et al. 1957, Sewell and Shah 1967, Teese 1994). Studies of 
student achievement consistently demonstrate that the variable of social background, 
usually measured by a proxy index of socio-economic status (SES), is significantly 
correlated with students' educational performance.
Although the effect of family background on student achievement is well established, 
there is less agreement about the extent to which it influences educational achievement 
and the way in which schools can overcome its influence. Nevertheless in order to 
understand the “value added” by schools to student achievement, social background 
variables must be taken into account.
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Figure 3. 2 Mathematics Enrolment Rates and Honours Rates by Student’s 
Occupational Background and Gender, Victoria 1990
(Female values are underlined)
GAINING 
HONOURS (%)
AD
HIGH HONOURS 
LOW ACTIVITY
HIGH HONOURS 
HIGH ACTIVITY
PROFESSIONS ■
50 - -
PROFESSIONS
■ MANAGERS*
40 +
UNEMPLOYED-
SALES-CLERICAL TECHNICAL-
35 40
MANAGERS 30 - -
UNEMPLOYED 
SALES-CLERICAL ■ m 
TECHNICAL
TAKING 
j MATHS (7<j)
f M |-SKILLE& ' SKILLED
SEMI-SKILLED ■
SKILLED
20 - -
io - -
LOW HONOURS 
LOW ACTIVITY
LOW HONOURS 
HIGH ACTIVITY
Source: Teese, R. "Evaluating School Systems: Provider versus Client Perspectives on Performance" in 
Schools Council, Public Investment in School Education: Costs and Outcomes, Canberra March 1994
66
It is important to incorporate family background characteristics into analyses of social 
indicators because they are factors over which government service providers have little 
control. When measuring school performance in any of the four policy fields identified 
above, students' social background is likely to be a significant influence on their 
educational outcomes. Whereas private schools and selective government schools can 
control their student intake, most government schools have no capacity to manipulate 
the social background of their student populations. As the aim of monitoring 
government performance is to assess the effectiveness with which schools use the 
resources within their control to produce good educational outcomes, schools serving 
students from different social backgrounds should not be judged by the same 
performance criteria.
For example, a school in the Western suburbs of Sydney which improves the 
participation and pass rates in mathematics of its students from a low base, would have 
added more value to its clients than a school in the Eastern suburbs which simply 
maintained the already high achievement rates of students from professional family 
backgrounds. Yet if social background factors are not taken into account in measuring 
student outcomes, the Eastern suburbs school would be judged more effective. Such a 
conclusion would be misleading both for public accountability purposes and for those 
using the indicators for policy development.
An example of student outcomes data disaggregated by background characteristics is 
reproduced in Figure 3.2. The plot illustrates two measures of educational outcomes in 
mathematics for students from different social backgrounds. First, it plots the 
proportion of Year 12 students from different social backgrounds taking mathematics as 
a subject in Year 12 (on the x axis). Second, it illustrates the relative educational 
success of the various social groups by measuring the proportion obtaining honours 
grades in the subject (y axis). The plot demonstrates that male students from 
professional families participate in maths at a much higher rate (63%) than females 
whose parents are semi-skilled (30%), and that such males earn honours grades at over 
double the rate (52%) of females from semi-skilled backgrounds (20%).
It is not necessary to understand how family background influences student performance 
in any of the four policy fields to acknowledge that socio-economic status is a variable 
which should be taken into account in a performance measurement framework. 
Experience with indicator development in other areas of social policy, such as health 
and employment reinforces the importance of using family background characteristics to 
identify sub-groups of the population to understand the impact of government policies 
(Mumane 1987, Wyatt 1994). In school education, by measuring educational outcomes 
for sub-groups of the population against any of the objectives, we can obtain a more 
valid indication of the amount of "value added" to the student by the school. Data for 
sub-groups of the population are therefore essential for making fair comparisons in 
relation to the performance of schools and the educational outcomes of individual 
students.
Acknowledging the influence of family background does not mean that all data sets 
must “control” for the student background variable. It is important, however, to ensure 
that we compare "like with like" when assessing the impact of different schools or
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systems on similar client groups. While controlling for student background variables is 
one way to do this, population characteristics can also be represented in a regional 
reporting framework.
1.4 Reporting performance information
The process of defining performance indicators for schooling should not restrict the 
capacity of system authorities to run schools. Given the complexity of the education 
production process and the multiplicity of inputs and outcomes, it is important to 
exercise caution in the selection and publication of performance information.
Simplifying education production to the extent necessary to produce indicators of 
outcomes runs the risk of ignoring significant areas of school performance and 
conveying misleading messages about what is important in schooling. While a few 
simple indicators may be sufficient for public accountability purposes, a much more 
complex set of statistics would be needed to inform the decision-making and policy 
development processes (Darling-Hammond 1994). Indicator systems should not be 
constructed for their own sake, but to meet the information needs of public sector 
managers and institutions of public accountability (OECD 1992: 12). In developing its 
system of international education indicators, the OECD emphasised that the role of any 
indicator system is to inform educational policy and improve the quality of schooling 
(OECD 1992: 10).
On the other hand, over-reliance on simple performance indicators as a basis for policy 
development can result in a narrow and instrumental approach to educational decision­
making. Some education outcomes, such as cognitive skills are easier to quantify than 
others (eg. social skills), so there is a danger that policy makers will focus on the more 
accessible set of statistics. If financial decisions are made on the basis of such limited 
data, practitioners will receive a clear message about what is considered important in 
schooling and are likely to change their behaviour as a result. In the United States of 
America, this phenomenon is called "high-stakes testing " and it describes a situation 
where test score data is used as a basis for making policy and funding decisions 
affecting schools. In "high stakes" testing environments, educational practitioners are 
likely to distort their behaviour in order to meet the demands of the indicator, usually to 
the detriment of their real job. The most common distortion is to "teach to the test", or 
to drill students in test-taking skills, although in extreme cases, some students are not 
allowed to sit the test or cheating is encouraged to ensure that test results are high (Paris 
et al. 1991). Such "goal-displacement activity" tends to occur in any workplace where a 
limited range of performance indicators is used as a basis for decision-making, rather 
than as a starting point for investigation of performance issues (Winston 1994). Such 
activities are not only educationally unproductive, but they affect the validity of test 
results, and undermine their usefulness as indicators of performance.
“High stakes testing" is most likely to occur when a narrow statistical indicator 
measuring only cognitive aspects of school performance (ie. basic skills acquisition) 
assumes the unwarranted status of an evaluation tool. A survey of teachers in a high 
stakes testing environment in the United States revealed a widespread belief that the 
State-mandated Iowa Test of Basic Skills was “routinely inappropriately used to 
evaluate administrators, teachers, and schools with quite harmful effects” (Smith 1991).
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Examples of the misuse of test results included abandoning curriculum packages and 
questioning the competence of teachers on the basis of one year’s results, and making 
invalid comparisons between schools serving different client groups (Smith 1991).
To guard against the creation of a “high stakes” testing environment, the following 
principles should underpin any performance information system:
• effectiveness indicators are developed which reflect the wide spectrum of 
objectives for education, not just cognitive outcomes;
• indicators compare "like with like" by reporting performance information for 
different sub-groups of the population or by statistical regions; and
• any published material conveys the limitations of performance indicators for 
policy decisions and emphasises the need for qualitative investigations of policy 
issues which are raised by the statistics.
Following these guidelines will not always ensure that performance data are not 
misused, because the accountability requirements demanded by a number of 
stakeholders can conflict with the needs of system management (Corbett 1992: 191- 
196). In schooling, the most common conflict is caused by the demand for the 
publication of school-by-school comparisons of student outcomes data. In New South 
Wales, for example, the publication of HSC results by school is used by some parents to 
select secondary schools for their children. The publication of exam and test results by 
school without reference to student background can undermine the goal of monitoring 
school performance because it can misrepresent the performance (in “value-added” 
terms) of schools which cater for different student populations. The publication of 
academic results alone also ignores the contribution of outcomes in the non-cognitive 
domain which are equally important objectives for schools.
The pressure to publish school-by-school comparisons indicates the importance of 
disaggregated data in monitoring school performance. Systems could meet this demand 
better if they published academic results in the context of students’ social background 
characteristics and included measures of the non-cognitive aspects of schooling. 
Performance information must be disaggregated to identify variations in the quality of 
service provision. Given the size of State education systems, it is impossible to detect 
any meaningful trends in data reported at the statewide level. When students’ mean 
scores for the Basic Skills Test between 1990 and 1995 are published at a statewide 
level, the degree of variation over the period is never greater than two percentage points 
and there is no clear trend in the data (Review of Commonwealth/State Service 
Provision 1995: 241). Such highly aggregated data provides no information about any 
variability in the patterns of service provision and could conceal any significant 
differences in the quality of service provision. For example, it is possible that the slight 
overall improvement in the Statewide mean score for the Basic Skills Test could have 
occurred as a result of significant gains made by some students, while other students 
may have made no progress, or even fallen behind. The disaggregation of educational 
outcomes data is essential for examining the distributional effects of government 
policies and for identifying variations in the quality of service delivery.
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There are many ways of reporting performance information and many levels at which 
educational outcomes data can be aggregated. In the development of school education 
indicators, there have to be trade-offs in determining the appropriate degree of 
disaggregation of data on student educational outcomes. If the publication of school 
level data is considered undesirable, educational outcomes can be reported at a slightly 
higher level of aggregation such as by region. This level of aggregation is sufficiently 
broad to protect the identity of individual schools, yet sufficiently differentiated to 
display degrees of variability in educational outcomes. In a regional reporting 
framework, student educational outcomes could be published together with the social 
and economic characteristics of the client population which are known to influence 
school performance. Reporting information by statistical regions also enables 
population characteristics to be reported together with data on educational outcomes, 
providing a richer information base for evaluating government performance1.
Educational outcomes are currently reported at a regional level in Europe, Japan and the 
United States of America (see Statistical Office of the European Communities 1995, 
Ministere de l’Education Nationale 1995, Istituto Nazionale di Statistica 1993a, 1993b, 
Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency Japan 1996, US Department 
of Education 1991).
When educational outcomes are reported within regions which conform to the standard 
geographical classification employed by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, contextual 
data relating to the population characteristics of the region are readily available. This 
means that data on educational outcomes can be reported in the context of important 
explanatory variables that are known to influence educational outcomes such as levels 
of household income, educational attainment and unemployment.
In summary, disaggregating results to a regional level has the following advantages:
• the ability to interpret educational outcomes in the context of social and economic 
factors that are known to influence student performance
• the ability to compare the educational outcomes of regions which have similar 
population characteristics
• the capacity to monitor changes in educational outcomes on a consistent basis over 
time
• when significant change is observed in educational outcomes, the capacity to 
understand the extent to which the educational change is due to changes in the 
regional population
Across the public sector as a whole, a regional reporting framework would be useful for 
interpreting data across several social policy fields, such as health, education, 
employment, corrective services and community services, all of which have an impact 
on the quality of educational outcomes in schools. A regional reporting framework 
would therefore be a useful instrument for the Commonwealth to use in assessing school 
effectiveness on a consistent basis throughout Australia.
‘The standard geographical classification employed by the Australian Bureau of Statistics enables a range 
of social and economic indicators to be reported on a consistent basis by region.
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2 Measuring the Federal government’s performance in schooling
To the extent that national goals2 for education require Federal involvement in schools 
funding, States should be accountable for reporting on how they pursue these objectives 
when in receipt of Commonwealth Specific Purpose Grants. The Federal government 
also needs this information to inform its own policy development process. However, as 
the Federal government does not run any programs within schools, the effectiveness of 
Commonwealth schools expenditure must be evaluated on the basis of information 
provided by the States and Territories and non-government schools.
2.1 The Karmel report and the Schools Commission
Prior to 1969, Federal policy objectives for schools funding were quite specific and the 
bulk of Federal funding was allocated for science laboratories, libraries, or secondary 
scholarships. In 1972, the Karmel Committee was asked for advice on how to 
implement the much broader policy objective of funding schools on the basis of “need”. 
The Karmel Committee concluded that “beyond a basic minimum level, the needs of 
schools can only be considered in relation to the objectives set for them” (Karmel 1973: 
par 5.8). It identified four possible criteria for assessing educational need. They were 
the need for:
1. a minimum quantity and quality of resources in schools;
2. a particular level and kind of outcomes from schools;
3. resources of varying types and amounts having regard to their effectiveness in 
moving towards desired goals; and
4. recognising the extent of the cognitive, physical, social or economic 
disadvantages of individual pupils (Karmel 1973: par 5.9).
The Committee said that lack of adequate data ruled out the possibility of using the 
second and third criteria (ie. the outcomes measures) as a basis for funding schools, 
which left only criteria 1. and 4. (ie. the input measures). The Committee therefore 
concluded “it should make its needs assessments along two dimensions: inputs of 
resources to schools and school systems, and degree of disadvantage of groups of pupils 
in particular schools” (5.10). The policy objective was to bring all schools up to a 
uniform standard of education service, through providing differential levels of recurrent 
and capital assistance to all schools and additional (targeted) assistance to schools with 
special needs.
The Karmel report noted the inadequacy of this approach for defining needs.
The Committee acknowledges the limitations of dealing with inputs of 
educational resources and ignoring outcomes. . . It has however, emphasised 
many of the wider issues which it expects will be pursued by the Schools 
Commission (Karmel 1973: par 5.11).
2 As discussed in the previous chapter, the national policy objectives relate primarily to economic 
objectives such as full employment and industrial growth as well as the promotion of citizenship values at 
a national level.
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This directive was not pursued by the Schools Commission that was established in the 
wake of the Karmel Report, even though many members of the Committee were 
appointed as Commissioners. The Commission never identified educational outcomes 
objectives that could be used to measure the effectiveness of the Commonwealth’s 
expenditure on schools. Instead, the means by which the Commonwealth’s goals were 
supposed to be achieved became its end, in that a “resources standard” (ie. the amount 
of money that schools needed) was the policy goal rather than any particular educational 
objectives.
The Karmel Committee set a resources target for government primary schools of a 40 
per cent increase over 1970-71 funding levels by 1979. A resources target of 35 per cent 
was set for secondary schools (Karmel 1973: par 5.13 and 5.23) The resources target 
was reached two years early, due to continuing increases in expenditure by State and 
Territory governments. By 1979, the resources available to government primary schools 
had increased by 54 per cent in constant prices (Schools Commission 1981: par 4.10). 
The majority of non-government schools remained below the average resource levels of 
government schools due to a drop in the level of private contributions (see Appendix 
Two).
As the Karmel resources target for government schools was reached by 1979, one might 
assume that Commonwealth and State expenditure on government schools could have 
been capped (because all schools had reached the desirable resources standard). 
However the Schools Commission cited a study of the resources available to schools 
that found significant differences between schools in terms of class sizes and the 
availability of specialist teachers (Schools Commission 1981: 4.7). As the Karmel 
report had defined no policy objective other than a resources standard, the 
Commonwealth had no capacity to measure whether any educational policy goals had 
been achieved by its funding contribution over the decade, nor did it have any basis 
upon which to determine the schools’ need for additional resources in the future. The 
only option available was to set a new resources target.
In 1981, the Schools Commission acknowledged, as the Karmel Committee had noted 
eight years earlier, that to focus on resources alone as a determinant of need was 
inadequate.
There is no simple arithmetical relationship between the input of resources and 
particular outcomes. For example, a good teacher working with a large class 
may achieve better resources than a poor teacher with a small class, or badly 
organised schools may negate the most valiant efforts of competent teachers 
(Schools Commission 1981: 4.2).
Nevertheless, the Commission was not prepared to incorporate any educational criteria 
in its determination of resources targets. It proposed a new funding formula called a 
“basket of services” approach that was based on inputs such as class sizes and teaching 
conditions. The only change from previous methods was that the calculations were 
limited to the resources used within schools, rather than total systems costs and the 
Commission attempted to demonstrate that all schools did not require the same level of 
resources (Schools Commission 1981: 4.5).
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The new funding formula involved the identification of three “baskets of services” to 
characterise different configurations of resources which schools might use. Each basket 
of services was costed out and averaged over the total number of students, to provide a 
level of per capita expenditure which was intended to make up a new resources target 
(Schools Commission 1981: 4.11 and Appendix II). Although the “basket of services” 
approach identified the different ways in which schools could organise their resources, 
the difference between the cost of each “basket” was less than 5 per cent (Schools 
Commission 1981: Appendix II). For primary schools, the baskets involved an 8-12 per 
cent increase in funding, while for secondary schools, the baskets were 5-9 per cent 
lower than existing per capita allocations (Schools Commission 1981: 4.23). On the 
basis of a weighted average combining both primary and secondary schools, the 
Commission recommended an increase in Commonwealth expenditure per student of 3 
per cent over three years.
Although the components of the baskets were the real costs of staff salaries and 
associated conditions, the baskets were hypothetical configurations for the purpose of 
producing a new resources target. The configurations of resource-use had no policy 
rationale other than to support arguments for increases in expenditure and did not relate 
to any specific policy objectives. The weakness of a formula based on inputs alone was 
illustrated by the finding that secondary schools were over-resourced at a time when a 
national policy goal was to increase student participation rates in Year 12. The need to 
increase Year 12 retention rates and the associated issue of re-designing the senior 
secondary curriculum -  which would involve considerable cost -  were discussed at 
length in the Commission’s report (Schools Commission 1981: 66-100). But as the 
input-based funding formula had no link to policy goals, the cost of increasing the Year 
12 participation rate could not be taken into consideration in the Commission’s funding 
advice.
Table 3.1 Increase in outlays per student in government schools over three 
decades (in constant prices)
Increase in States Increase in Increase in total
and Territories Commonwealth expenditure per
expenditure expenditure student
1961-62 to 1971-72 66% n.a 66%
1971-72 to 1981-82 54% 55% 72%
1981-82 to 1991-92 14% 28% 15%
Notes: The data exclude expenditure on preschools, and includes expenditure on special education, 
targeted programs and joint programs. Commonwealth expenditure on joint programs is attributed to 
government schools. The data are drawn from all Australian States excluding the Australian Capital 
Territory and the Northern Territory. Expenditure is in constant prices deflated by GNFP(e).
Sources: Commonwealth Budget Papers, ABS Cat. No. 4221.0 Schools Australia', ABS Cat. No. 5510.0 
Expenditure on Education , Australia', ABS (1996) “Expenditure on Schools” Unpublished Data.
The “basket of services” approach was rejected by the Commonwealth government 
because it was too expensive. Nevertheless, the principle of averaging out desired levels
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of inputs (eg. class sizes, teaching staff levels, release time, etc.) underpinned the 
(lower) resources standard eventually adopted by the Commonwealth. A target called 
the “community standard” provided modest increases in funding to government schools 
and differential increases in funding to non-government schools from 1985 to 1992.
The eight-year funding plan assumed that if the States and Territories matched the 
Commonwealth’s funding increases, all government schools would reach the 
Community Standard by 1992. In 1989, the Commonwealth decided that after 1992, it 
would cap its funding for government schools (ie. maintain grant levels in real terms) on 
the rationale that the resources target should have been reached if the States had 
maintained their level of contributions (Dawkins 1989). But the States had not matched 
the Commonwealth’s funding increases in terms of percentage growth during the 1980s, 
as shown in Table 3.1. And as most non-government schools would still have been 
below the community standard by 1992, the Commonwealth promised continuing real 
increases to private schools in Categories 10 to 12 after 1992.
By ensuring that the Federal government’s schools funding policies remained input- 
driven, the Schools Commission succeeded in obtaining increasing levels of 
Commonwealth assistance for all schools in the 1970s. However, the strategy broke 
down when the Federal government placed global limits on its spending and instructed 
the Schools Commission to identify policy priorities. The need to make choices 
between competing interests destroyed the fragile consensus between the members of 
the Schools Commission -  all of whom represented stakeholders in competition for 
Commonwealth funding. In 1984, the Commission’s government school representatives 
produced a dissenting report on funding issues. After the Commission was abolished in 
1987, the government established a new set of advisory councils for each education 
sector under the National Board of Employment, Education and Training. The Councils 
of the National Board had no program responsibilities and were not directly involved in 
the budget process. They were instructed that if they provided advice containing any 
new spending proposals, they had to identify offsetting expenditure from existing 
programs.
In 1984, the Federal Minister for Education appointed a Quality of Education Review 
Committee (QERC) to examine the effectiveness of Commonwealth involvement in 
primary and secondary education. Chaired by Professor Peter Karmel, the Committee 
was asked to advise on ways to improve the efficiency of Commonwealth expenditure 
on school education with regard to strengthening the links between schooling and 
employment. The Committee comprised only five members, none of whom represented 
education interest groups3. The Committee’s terms of reference focused on the need for 
schools to promote the achievement of basic skills, maintain high standards in Years 11 
and 12 and improve educational opportunities for girls, in recognition of the role of 
education in Australia’s international economic competitiveness (Karmel 1985).
The QERC report represented a major shift in emphasis from inputs to outcomes in its 
analysis of the impact of Commonwealth involvement in schooling. It made an attempt 
to assess the effects of the spending resulting from the 1973 Karmel report and carefully 
examined trends in enrolments and expenditure. It recommended the negotiation of
3 In addition to the Chair, Peter Karmel, the Committee comprised Hugh Hudson, Peter Kirby, Barry 
McGaw and Helen Williams.
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agreements between the Commonwealth and the States, the review of many targeted 
programs and the provision of detailed data on student attainment by all recipients of 
Commonwealth general recurrent funding. Its advice included the recommendation 
that:
All specific purpose programs should operate on the basis of:
• a small number of simply stated objectives;
• a small number of pre-determined effectiveness indicators;
• reporting arrangements which allow progress towards objectives to be 
noted;
• the use of some funds for staff development; and
• ongoing evaluation and adequate administrative support.
(Karmel 1985: 203).
Although the QERC report’s advice on monitoring effectiveness of expenditure was not 
taken up, in 1985 the Commonwealth implemented resource agreements with the States 
requiring them to report how they used the "betterment" component of their general 
recurrent grants (ie. the amount of the real increase they received in Commonwealth 
funding each year). The amount concerned was approximately $10 million per year -  
less than 2 per cent of the Commonwealth’s total grant for government schools. In 
practice, it was impossible to distinguish the expenditure of Commonwealth grants from 
State-funded activities, but for several years the States reported how they spent this 
small component of their resources in pursuing Commonwealth priorities. In 1989, the 
Commonwealth dropped this requirement from its resource agreements when it asked 
the States and Territories to agree to participate in the National Report on Schooling.
2.2 Accountability for Com m onwealth expenditure on schools
In theory, States and Territories should be able to account for the expenditure of 
Commonwealth resources to the Federal government. However, as Commonwealth 
resources are pooled with State-sourced funds to pay for schools run by the States, it is 
impossible for States to account for the Commonwealth portion of school education 
expenditure (ANAO 1995, Spedding 1993). Its lack of control over inputs increases the 
importance of the Commonwealth being able to monitor the outcomes of school 
education (SEETRC 1995).
The fact that Commonwealth and State resources are pooled also means that the 
Commonwealth cannot be too prescriptive about how its resources should be spent. As 
education remains the primary responsibility of State and Territory governments, the 
Federal government cannot be seen to be influencing how the States spend their own 
resources on schooling. As long as the State and Territory authorities provide some 
financial contribution towards meeting the same funding goal as the Federal 
government, it is impossible to separate the expenditure of Federal monies from State 
monies for accountability purposes. When making specific purpose payments under 
Section 96 of the Constitution, the Federal government can specify its policy objectives, 
but the States and Territories are responsible for implementation. The only alternative 
to using Section 96 of the Constitution would be for the Federal government to run its 
own programs for schools.
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In 1946, the Federal government’s potential to become a services provider in schools 
was enhanced by the passage of the “benefits to students” amendment to the 
Constitution. The “benefits to students” power gave the Federal government increased 
scope to intervene in education matters, but the Commonwealth has never exercised this 
power in a way that would threaten the States’ role as the primary service provider. The 
amendment provided a Constitutional basis for the establishment of the Commonwealth 
Office of Education in 1948 and the Commonwealth Schools Commission in 1974, 
however it has never been used to fund schools on a direct basis (ie. without going 
through the States). It is difficult to predict the extent to which the Commonwealth 
could provide direct funding to schools under the “benefits to students” clause because 
the scope of the power has never been tested in the High Court (Birch 1975: 83). To 
date, the Commonwealth has chosen the safer route of funding schools under Section 96 
of the Constitution, rather than risk an examination of the legitimacy of its involvement 
by the High Court.
In 1989, the Federal government sought and obtained the agreement of all States and 
Territories to produce an annual National Report on Schooling, to "inform the citizens 
of Australia about. . .  the performance of our schools" (Australian Education Council 
1989) and fulfil accountability requirements with respect to Commonwealth General 
Recurrent Grants for schools. By proposing the national report, the Federal government 
recognised the futility of expecting school systems to account for the proportion of their 
expenditure sourced from the Commonwealth. Instead it sought the States’ agreement 
to produce a joint report on expenditure and outcomes for all schools in Australia. Non­
government schools were also invited to participate in the national report. To obtain 
their agreement, the Commonwealth had to give the States responsibility for writing the 
report as well as a right of veto over any material published in it.
The National Report on Schooling has been produced every year since 1990, yet the 
quality of its performance information declines each year. The National Report's 
Statistical Annex is sixty-four pages long, and at least 75 per cent of its statistical tables 
convey information about costs, such as data on income and expenditure, staffing levels, 
student numbers and so on (AEC 1993). The most common expenditure indicator 
published by States and Territories is the input-output ratio of average cost per student 
(MCEETYA 1996: 36). This statistic provides no information about the distribution of 
resources to schools and students and encourages simplistic judgements to be made 
about the relative efficiency of the various education systems. Although comprehensive, 
the expenditure statistics are highly aggregated and convey little information about the 
distribution of resources within systems.
The only data in the National Report relating to system effectiveness are retention and 
participation statistics. Retention and participation statistics are limited indicators of 
effectiveness because they do not contain information about the quality of student 
learning. Nevertheless, because retention statistics reflect progress towards a specific 
national policy goal, they should be of some use in performance measurement. In the 
National Report, however, the retention and participation statistics for each State have 
been presented in a way that limits the range of comparisons which could be made 
between States' and Territories' performance in this area of policy. For example, a table 
comparing Year 12 completion rates for students of high and low socio-economic status
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presents figures for Australia as a whole but does not include the rates for each group by 
State and Territory, even though it would have been necessary to compile State-level 
statistics in order to aggregate the national figures (AEC 1993, Table 11a). Other 
statistics in the report which relate to educational effectiveness are aggregated nationally 
to prevent State by State comparisons, such as data on the destinations of school leavers 
and the number and proportion of Year 12 students enrolled in tertiary-accredited 
subjects (AEC 1993, Tables 13, 14, 15).
Highly aggregated performance information such as that presented in the National 
Report invites simplistic interpretations that underplay the complexity of the education 
production function. When comparing average costs per student and average student 
outcomes data, it invites the conclusion that “the rapid increases in expenditures on 
schools of the past three decades have simply not been matched by measurable increases 
in student performance” (Hanushek 1994: 18).
For example, analysts have assumed that the higher level of average expenditure per 
student in some States and Territories reflects inefficiency in service delivery, rather 
than a superior quality of service (Clare and Johnston 1993, South Australian 
Commission of Audit 1994). On this assumption, savings of $700 million per year 
could be achieved if all States reduced their expenditure to the level of the lowest 
spending State -  without having any effect on school quality.4 When financial data are 
examined in isolation from information about school effectiveness, the obvious 
conclusion is that higher levels of expenditure by some systems reflect inefficiencies 
rather than superior performance. In the absence of data on outcomes, it can be assumed 
that expenditure reductions will not affect the quality of the service provided. Reports 
which have recommended reductions in school education expenditure to benchmark 
levels compare the costs of schooling between States and Territories without any 
accompanying data comparing educational outcomes (Clare and Johnston 1993, South 
Australian Commission of Audit 1994). The South Australian Commission of Audit 
used this approach in its review of State government finances which recommended 
reductions in schools expenditure (South Australian Commission of Audit 1994). After 
comparing South Australia's average student: teacher ratio with the national average, the 
Audit Commission recommended that 931 teachers should be shed from the South 
Australian education system, saving $40 million per annum (South Australian 
Commission of Audit 1994, Rec. 12.19). The report also noted that if South Australia's 
student: teacher ratio was reduced to the then New South Wales benchmark, 2000 
teaching positions could be abolished in the interests of improved efficiency. (South 
Australian Commission of Audit 1994, Section 12.5)
Whereas a dearth of performance information benefited all education stakeholders in the 
high-spending days of the 1970s, the lack of data on outcomes has proved a liability for 
State education systems(in a climate of fiscal restraint). The financial statistics
4 This calculation is derived from Tables 17 and 18 in the National Report on Schooling in Australia 
(MCEETYA 1996) and refers to per capita expenditure on government schools in the 1993-94 financial 
year. When Clare and Johnston estimated that savings of over $1.4 billion could be obtained if State 
governments were to adopt "the Australian lowest cost practice" for providing school education services 
(Clare and Johnston 1993: 64), they used “in-house” data which was possibly based on 1989-90 
expenditure. However, on the basis of published data for 1989-90, savings of $900 million, not $1.4 
billion would be achieved by benchmarking expenditure in that year (see AEC 1990: Tables 16 and 19).
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produced by the States and Territories and published in the National Report on 
Schooling are the primary source of data used by efficiency audits to suggest that 
schools expenditure could be reduced to benchmark levels (Clare and Johnston 1993, 
South Australian Commission of Audit 1994). The States’ reluctance to publish 
performance information has contributed to the suspicion that school systems are 
inefficient “monopoly providers” that would benefit from increased market competition 
(Scales 1993).
2.3 The review of Commonwealth/State service provision
In 1993, the Federal government attempted to pressure State governments to improve 
the quality of performance information by initiating a review of Commonwealth/State 
service provision in schooling under the auspices of the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG). The Industry Commission was asked to define performance 
benchmarks for Australia’s eight government education systems. The review was 
expected to produce a set of performance indicators that would enable comparisons to 
be drawn between Australia’s eight education systems and thus establish benchmarks 
for best practice in system performance (Dawkins 1993)5.
By making public comparisons between each State's performance on schooling, the 
review was expected to introduce an element of competition into Australian education 
that would drive down costs. Called "yardstick competition", this approach aimed to 
encourage greater efficiency among State education authorities by revealing their 
inefficiencies compared to other States (Scales 1993). The approach had been 
successfully applied to a previous review of Government Trading Enterprises which had 
compiled performance indicators for many State-owned utilities such as electricity 
generation, and water supply (Steering Committee on National Performance Monitoring 
of Government Trading Enterprises 1993). However it proved as difficult for the 
Industry Commission to obtain adequate performance information on schooling as it had 
in the Annual National Report project.
To undertake the review, the Industry Commission established Working Parties 
consisting of representatives of State and Territory agencies and the Commonwealth. 
The Chair of the Schools Working Party said that it would avoid the focus on inputs that 
had characterised recent public sector audits and said it would develop outcomes 
indicators from data on students achievement (Wilkins and Doyle 1995). However, in 
its early meetings, the Schools Working Party decided that it would not undertake any 
new work to produce a comparable set of statistics on educational outcomes throughout 
Australia. It decided that “the most productive course is to make use of the extensive 
work being undertaken already by the different jurisdictions rather than going for 
something completely different” (Wilkins and Doyle 1995).
^Benchmarking refers to a company's examination of the costs, productivity and organisational features of 
more successful rival companies in order to define principles of best practice which can be used to 
improve its own performance (Winston 1994). In the public sector, benchmarking is a mechanism 
through which governments can evaluate the efficiency of State-run monopolies by making comparisons 
between the performance of similar organisations (Scales 1993).
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Although each State and Territory had its own data on educational outcomes -  mostly 
derived from tests of Basic Skills in Years 3 and Years 5 or 6 -  the data sets were not 
comparable between jurisdictions. In 1994, consultants commissioned by DEET to 
ascertain the extent of literacy difficulties in Australian schools summarised the 
problems of obtaining nationally comparable data on educational outcomes from 
existing sources:
any attempt to present firm conclusions about literacy levels in Australia is
hampered by several factors:
• data are not collected annually in all States and Territories;
• where data are collected, different Year levels are studied;
• the instruments used differ greatly in nature; they include for example 
commercially produced standardised tests, specially designed tests and 
teacher judgements using rating scales;
• the operational definition of literacy differs from one study to another, with 
consequent differences in what is judged to be the minimum satisfactory 
level of literacy;
• the basis for deeming students to be at risk differs from one study to 
another;
• sampling methodology differs; some studies use structured random 
samples, in others randomness is less evident; some samples are 
sufficiently large to enable performance of sub-groups to be reported 
reliably; in other cases this is not so;
• not all results of studies are publicly available.
(Hill and Russell 1994)
In spite of the lack of comparability, the Working Party set about “examining the use of 
various statistical techniques and moderating processes in order to establish equivalence 
between tests” (Wilkins and Doyle 1995: 30). The Chair of the Working Party also 
claimed it would collect time series data from each State to compare the changes within 
jurisdictions over time. “Some of the most valuable findings may come from not trying 
too hard to compare NSW with Victoria and Queensland etc. at least not initially, but in 
plotting the changes in performance over time in each separate State” (Wilkins and 
Doyle 1995: 31).
After two years of deliberation, the Working Party produced a report that concluded, “no 
nationally comparable data on student learning outcomes are available” (Steering 
Committee for the Review of Commonwealth/State Service Provision 1995: 199).
From the data provided by State and Territory authorities, the Working Party was only 
able to draw “some limited conclusions” along the lines that “generally, the available 
information suggests that there has not been any marked improvement or deterioration 
in student performance over the last few years” (Steering Committee for the Review of 
Commonwealth/State Service Provision 1995: 199). The Working Party’s attempts to 
obtain “equivalence” between State and Territory outcomes data using statistical 
techniques had not worked. The report concluded that the only way to obtain nationally 
comparable data was by “embedding common items in existing State and Territory tests 
or by administering tests to a common sample of students” (Steering Committee for the 
Review of Commonwealth/State Service Provision 1995: 200).
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In two years, the Industry Commission review did not produce any new data, and its 
report relied upon published information from the National Report on Schooling and the 
Basic Skills Tests administered by States and Territories. Because none of this 
information could be used to compare the effectiveness of each system’s expenditure, 
the Inquiry was forced to conclude there was no way of judging the relative performance 
between jurisdictions. The suspicion that higher levels of expenditure in some States 
reflected inefficiency in service provision remained unchallenged. In response to the 
industry Commission review, the Federal government, made its first tentative steps to 
initiate a National Literacy Survey of Australian schools.
2.4 National English literacy survey
In 1993, a House of Representatives Standing Committee on Employment, Education 
and Training, chaired by Mary Crawford MP, produced a report which stated that "10 to 
20 per cent of children finish primary school with literacy problems" (HRSCEET, 1993 
p.v). While no quantitative evidence was provided to substantiate this claim, and the 
Committee admitted, “the actual numbers of children with such problems are not known 
(HRSCEET, 1993, p.v), the report fuelled uncertainty about the effectiveness of 
Australian schooling. The lack of reliable information about literacy levels in Australian 
schools hampered the Federal government’s capacity to respond to the report.
In its May 1994 White Paper, Working Nation, the Federal government announced that 
it would provide $3 million to conduct a survey of literacy levels in schools in 1996.
The survey aimed to collect “reliable national data on English literacy levels of school 
students at three significant stages in their schooling (for example, ages 7, 9 and 13). To 
oversee the project, the Commonwealth established a Steering Committee of 
stakeholders consisting of teacher unions, parents’ organisations, professional literacy 
associations, the business sector, non-government school authorities and State and 
Territory governments to oversee the project (DEET 1996). The Steering Committee 
decided to undertake a national sample survey in the second half of 1996 using labour- 
intensive performance assessment techniques. It also decided to limit the survey to 
Years 3 and 5 of schooling due to the cost of the testing methodology and the lack of 
comparability between curricula in the secondary years.
In designing the National Literacy Survey, the need for universal, national indicators of 
school performance was soon replaced by concerns about maximising the validity of the 
results through labour-intensive classroom assessments. In any large-scale testing 
program, the benefits of detailed performance assessment at the classroom level must be 
weighed against the higher cost (Stecher and Klein 1997). Although in-depth 
assessments examine higher order thinking skills, such assessments have only limited 
value as performance indicators because they cannot be administered cost-effectively to 
all students. As the success of the National literacy survey was dependent on the 
participation of stakeholders -  particularly school teachers -  discussions over the type of 
assessment instruments to be used took precedence over the issue of monitoring system- 
wide performance on a consistent basis. When the Liberal/National Party coalition 
gained office in March 1996, work on the National Literacy Survey was suspended 
temporarily.
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The new Commonwealth Minister for Schools, Dr David Kemp, revised the process for 
undertaking the National Literacy Survey to include the setting of national literacy and 
numeracy benchmarks for school performance. In 1997, the results of the Survey 
provided a detailed picture of literacy achievement, particularly at the primary school 
level (Management Committee 1997). On the basis of a separate analysis of the survey 
results, the Federal Minister issued a press statement claiming that about a third of 
primary school children could not read or write at an adequate standard. He demanded a 
national co-operative effort to raise standards of literacy achievement (Kemp 1997c).
The National Literacy survey will be a useful accountability instrument in terms of 
reporting on the broad objectives of Australian education, and should provide useful 
information on changes in literacy levels over time. But because the survey is a sample 
only, it is of limited use in understanding the distribution of literacy problems between 
schools and within sub-groups of the population. Knowledge of the specific location of 
literacy problems is crucial both for performance monitoring and to inform policy 
development. Where literacy problems exist in Australian schools, they are most likely 
to be concentrated within individual schools or in particular sections of the community 
(HRSCEET, 1993, pars. 1.16 & 1.17). Such data can only be collected by a census of 
all students. State and Territory governments may have access to such data from their 
own tests of basic skills. The Commonwealth’s use of a sample survey, rather than a 
universal test does not shed any light on this issue. It would have been very expensive 
for the Federal government to administer a national census of literacy achievement. 
Instead, it could have encouraged the States and Territories to administer a common 
basic skills test. This would have provided nationally consistent data on the distribution 
of literacy achievement throughout Australian schools and would have provided useful 
information on the distribution of achievement to policy makers at both levels of 
government. States could still have included State-specific items in a uniform national 
testing instrument. A more efficient use of expenditure on basic skills tests would 
release resources for measuring student outcomes in the non-cognitive domain. 
Although the social and emotional aspects of education have been recognised as 
essential parts of schooling, this policy goal continues to be ignored by governments 
when collecting data on school performance.
3 Improving performance data for Australian schooling
The Commonwealth allocates nearly $3.6 billion annually to schooling, but as the 
Industry Commission has concluded, there is no information on how efficiently or 
effectively these resources are used by State and Territory Education Departments 
(Scales 1997). The barriers to collecting useful performance information on schooling 
appear to be as old as public education itself.
By 1900 the annual reports issued by the Departments of Education were so 
edited and expurgated that neither the Minister, whose reports they were 
supposed to be, nor anyone else had much chance of discovering the truth 
about the condition of public education (Austin 1961: 256).
State governments have been well-placed to resist Commonwealth attempts to improve 
the quality of performance information about schooling because they have controlled
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access to data on outcomes, and have dominated national Committees to examine school 
performance. The following discussion examines some of the barriers to national 
monitoring of school performance and explores a possible way to overcome them.
3.1 The complexity of the education production function
The production of school education is not simple, and this could account for the 
difficulty in obtaining data on school effectiveness. Australian schooling, like most 
areas of social policy, serves a complex set of policy objectives, many of which appear 
contradictory, or overlap with other government services. Nevertheless, over the past 
thirty years, performance measures have been developed in many areas of social policy 
to monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of government expenditure (Wyatt 1994). 
Experiments in areas such as health, recreation and employment, have reinforced the 
importance of linking indicator development to specific policy objectives (Oakes 1986, 
Mumane 1987).
Although the education production function is complex, we can learn more about it by 
improving the quality of information on student outcomes. Our understanding should 
improve as we collect and use the data. One of the oldest social policy indicators, the 
unemployment rate, was initially a simple indicator of limited use. Early unemployment 
data were reported for the nation as a whole, but over time, as governments needed to 
monitor unemployment levels for policy purposes, the information was disaggregated to 
smaller geographical units (Mumane 1987). Australia’s monthly unemployment data 
are now disaggregated to the level of Statistical Local Areas enabling governments to 
monitor unemployment closely and target their policy responses. Mumane concludes 
that the problems in improving economic indicators and education indicators are 
similar:
First, just as it has been difficult to develop meaningful indicators of student 
achievement, it has been extremely difficult to develop indicators that capture 
critical labour market concepts. Indicators are always no better that proxies for 
the outcomes of concern. Second, real progress has been made in improving 
indicators of educational outcomes and labour force outcomes. This progress 
has dramatically increased our understanding of the performance of the 
educational system and the economy. It has also raised new questions, and 
highlighted deficiencies in existing indicators. These will continue to be the 
consequences of new and improved indicators (Murnane 1987: 105).
Acknowledging the complexity of the education production function should not imply 
that the government’s performance cannot be measured. Performance measurement 
should be monitored in the context of the full range of policy objectives, and we should 
never assume that indicators represent a definitive measure of performance. It is only by 
commencing a process of systematic performance measurement that our understanding 
of the education production function will improve and better indicators will be 
produced.
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3.2 Separating process from outcomes
In spite of the emphasis placed on effectiveness indicators by government authorities, 
developing valid measures of program effectiveness is a recurring difficulty for most 
government agencies (Clark 1994). Although decisions made in the Federal 
government’s budgetary process are supposed to be informed by program evaluation, 
performance information is not used systematically in the budget process by any 
Commonwealth Department (Di Francesco 1998). A review by the Department of 
Finance of the quality of performance information provided by Federal Government 
Departments observed that "for all types of program, outputs rather than outcomes are 
reported, reflecting a continuing preponderance of process-oriented objectives". (MAB- 
MIAC Task Force 1992: 353). A possible cause of this deficiency is the assumption 
that quantitative information is more valid than qualitative assessments of program or 
system performance -  but this should not stand in the way of performance reporting. As 
a parliamentary committee pointed out,
The performance of many programs can only be measured in subjective, 
qualitative terms. The Committee presumes that all program managers must 
have some notion of whether they are doing well or badly, some standard by 
which they can say they are doing the job they have set out to do as reflected in 
ihe objectives of their particular programs. All that the Parliament requires is 
that these sorts of measures should be set down so that sensible judgements can 
be made about whether programs are meeting their objectives (Senate Estimates 
Committee E, 1989, p.2 cited in MAB-MIAC Task Force 1992)
The poor quality of school performance indicators in Australia may be due to a lack of 
appreciation of the role of performance measurement by school and system 
administrators -  at both the State and Federal level. The prevalence of teachers in 
education bureaucracies has meant that the fields of educational administration and 
educational evaluation have -  since their inception in the early twentieth century -  
focused on what happens within schools, rather than the performance of school systems. 
The bulk of educational research in Australia focuses primarily on what happens within 
the classroom, or within the school. “Education planning and evaluation approaches 
appear to address only part of the education effectiveness equation, to the exclusion of 
other, potentially relevant factors” (Fasano 1994: 72). Fasano observes that the influence 
of new economic, social and political perspectives since the 1950s has made little 
impression on the narrowness of administration and evaluation in education. The effect 
of this “school focus” of indicator systems is to “ignore the possibly sizeable 
contribution, positive and negative, of the education bureaucracy, not only to the 
effectiveness of the education system as a whole, but to the effectiveness of the schools 
themselves” (Fasano 1994: 73).
While a “school focus” is useful in most aspects of schooling, a different perspective is 
needed to develop system-wide measures of school performance. “When education is 
considered as a public sector organisation like any other, this includes both its 
bureaucracy and its delivery points, the schools” (Fasano 1994: 67). To develop good 
performance indicators in education, it is necessary to measure the performance of 
schools within a common framework. While there may be administrative efficiencies in 
devolving management responsibility to the school level, such developments increase
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the need for governments to collect adequate information on school effectiveness. 
Regardless of how autonomous a school is, the performance of all schools must be 
measured on a system-wide basis. A “school focused” ethos among State education 
bureaucrats could impede the development of a system-wide perspective in performance 
measurement for schooling.
3.3 Eliminating the “stakeholder effect”
Our understanding of the education production function is impeded both by the lack of 
information on the inputs and outcomes of schooling in Australia and the way in which 
the data are presented. State and Territory governments have consistently resisted 
initiatives to measure educational outcomes in a way that would produce comparisons 
over time and between educational systems. They also refuse to provide information on 
resource allocations in a way that would enable links to be made between expenditure 
and educational outcomes. Incomplete reporting of performance information is so 
familiar to government auditors in all policy domains that one commentator has called 
for a strict regulatory framework governing the reporting of performance information for 
public accountability (Clark 1994). However, given the ease with which statistics are 
manipulated, such a framework is unlikely to eliminate all the possible loopholes likely 
to be employed when bureaucratic stakeholders have the power to obstruct the 
information-gathering process.
The main stumbling block to obtaining performance information through cooperative 
mechanisms, such as the Schools Commission, the National Report on Schooling and 
the Review of Government Service Provision, is the power of stakeholders to obstruct 
the information gathering process. The "stakeholder effect" is where government 
officials are reluctant to provide information which may expose areas of poor 
performance, particularly if funding decisions are likely to be made on the basis of the 
information provided (Mumane 1987). The States and Territories have the right of veto 
over any information about their own system published in the National Report on 
Schooling, in addition to providing most of the data reproduced in it. The Report 
therefore presents glowing accounts of every State and Territory’s achievements, but 
contains very little data on educational outcomes, and no data that could be construed as 
critical of a system’s performance.
The power of stakeholders to influence the direction of Federal expenditure without 
being accountable for any specified education outcomes has been apparent since the 
beginning of Federal government involvement in schooling. Keeping Commonwealth 
policy focussed on inputs suited the stakeholders that were represented on the Australian 
Schools Commission. Because most of the Commissioners represented school systems 
that received Commonwealth funding, they had no interest in developing policy 
objectives nor in identifying outcomes against which their performance could be 
assessed. The appeal of a resources target was simple -  it could always be moved 
upwards. An educational standard, on the other hand, might suggest at some stage that 
schools were adequately resourced. If the Commonwealth had no data on educational 
outcomes, it had no capacity to question the repeated claims of its Schools 
Commissioners that schools were under-resourced.
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It is unrealistic for governments to expect stakeholders, whether they be public servants 
or grant recipients, to produce information that is critical of their own performance. 
When a funding agency asks for performance information from a recipient body, it does 
not appreciate the conflict between the need for public accountability and the 
stakeholders’ loyalty to their organisation. As no State official would be thanked for 
providing critical performance information to the Federal government, it seems absurd 
to expect State officials to perform a function that so clearly conflicts with their 
employer’s interests. If the quality of accountability information provided to the 
Commonwealth is to improve, the Federal government would need to obtain the 
information in a way that does not create a conflict of interest for stakeholders. The 
only way to improve the quality of performance information in a Federal system, is to 
remove the process from negotiation between the Commonwealth and the States.
3.4 Establishing an independent reporting mechanism
In theory, improving accountability for Commonwealth expenditure on schools should 
not be particularly difficult. There is an agreed set of national goals for schools that 
could act as a framework for reporting educational outcomes. Although the Federal 
government cannot dictate how States and Territories spend their own resources, it does 
have the power to request information from States and Territories about the 
effectiveness of their school systems in return for the payment of Federal grants under 
Section 96 of the Constitution.
When grants are paid to the States under Section 96, the States and the Commonwealth 
negotiate a formal annual agreement about how the resources should be spent. A 
“resource agreement” is the contract that authorises the payment of specific purpose 
grants from the Commonwealth to the States. Resource Agreements are simply a letter 
from the Commonwealth dictating the terms of the grant and a letter from the State 
minister agreeing to those terms. The agreements are negotiated annually between the 
Commonwealth Minister and State and Territory education ministers as a prerequisite 
for receiving Commonwealth specific purpose payments for schools. In its letter the 
Commonwealth Minister defines the Federal government’s educational objectives and 
seeks the agreement of the States and Territories to allocate the Commonwealth’s 
resources towards meeting its goals. It would be quite feasible for the Commonwealth to 
request that the States and Territories provide information to the Commonwealth under 
the terms of annual resource agreements. However, for many years, the only 
accountability information requested was an annual statement from an auditor that the 
grant had been spent on the purpose for which it was appropriated6 7. More recently, the 
Federal government has requested the States’ agreement to participate in the National 
Report on Schooling as its accountability requirement.
In 1995, a report from the Commonwealth Auditor-General recommended changes to 
the way in which resource agreements were developed to include the specification of
n
performance targets and the imposition of sanctions if the targets were not met .
6 An investigation by the Commonwealth Auditor-General in 1992 found that even these statements were 
often not provided by States and Territories (Spedding 1993).
7 The Commonwealth Auditor-General’s office began to take an increased interest in the efficiency of 
Commonwealth expenditure in the early 1990s, and found that it was prevented from conducting
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Recognising that the States could not be expected to account for the allocation of 
resources, the report argued that they should be held to account for their achievements 
against agreed policy objectives. The Auditor-General recommended that all resource 
agreements covering Commonwealth Specific Purpose Payments to the States should:
• set out the purpose of a program’s existence and the objectives to be 
pursued;
• specify performance indicators that are directly linked to the objectives;
• document agreed performance targets;
• clearly disclose the form of penalties or sanctions to be applied where 
there is non-compliance with the agreement; clearly disclose the form of 
penalties or sanctions to be applied where program targets are not met;
• include a graduated range of sanctions; and
• include arrangements, where applicable, for recognising all involved 
parties from each tier of government in application documentation, media 
releases, official openings, signs and plaques and other program publicity
(ANAO 1995: xvi).
The Auditor-General recognised that the Commonwealth has limited scope to pursue 
instrumental educational objectives when making grants under Section 96. His report 
therefore placed a high priority on the provision of performance information that would 
enable the Commonwealth to engage in an accountability dialogue with State and 
Territory governments on education issues.
Even if the Commonwealth exercised its legal powers to demand performance 
information from the States and Territories, the quality of any information provided 
would always be poor, due to the “stakeholder effect”. The only way to overcome the 
“stakeholder effect” is to remove the participation of stakeholders in the data collection 
process. To achieve nationally consistent information of a high quality, the data should 
be collected by a third party -  such as a statutory authority or an independent agency 
protected from direct stakeholder influence. Comprehensive school performance data is 
collected by an autonomous agency in the United States of America and some lessons 
can be learned from their experience.
Safeguarding the independence of the agency and granting it powers of access to schools 
would be the first step to improving the quality of performance data. In America, the 
productivity of the National Center for Education Statistics has been undermined by the 
need to obtain the agreement of State and local education authorities before initiating 
surveys in schools, which has often led to below standard response rates (Levine 1986: 
16-17). The lack of concern about this and other technical problems among Center staff 
has raised questions about the staffs motivation and technical competence (Levine 
1986: 45). Mumane (1987: 114) suggests that skilled statisticians would quickly tire of 
being involved in political processes that impeded their work, and that this may be why 
the Center has had difficulty in attracting and retaining skilled staff. One way to ensure 
that a reporting agency is free from political and bureaucratic obstruction is to obtain the 
prior support of State and Territory governments. Once agreement has been obtained on
efficiency audits of this expenditure of specific purpose payments under the provisions of the Audit Act 
1901 (ANAO 1993).
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the broad direction of the agency’s work and on the way in which its results will be 
published, the agency should be free to pursue its research interests.
A protocol which guaranteed the co-operation of schools and systems would remove the 
need for consultation with State and Territory education authorities and other 
stakeholders which can impose costly delays on the administration of surveys. If the 
protocol also restricted the identification of schools and systems in published reports, it 
should safeguard most concerns of stakeholders about the mis-reporting of performance 
information. No government should have a right of veto over the publication of 
performance information. A model for such an agency exists in the Australian Council 
for Educational Research (ACER) which was established with a grant from the Carnegie 
corporation in 1930. The State and Territory education systems and the Commonwealth 
contribute a share of the Council’s base grant and ACER undertakes additional work on 
a consultancy basis. ACER is governed by a Board of Directors consisting of the States 
and Territories and research interests, and its day-to-day operations are conducted 
independently of Commonwealth or State governments. An existing agency, like the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics could also perform the role of an independent monitoring 
agency over educational outcomes, provided it operated under a protocol that allowed it 
access to all Australian schools.
To end its fruitless quest for performance information from States and Territories, the 
Commonwealth could seek their consent to commission an independent agency to 
monitor school performance. If necessary, their agreement to co-operate could be 
sought as a condition of Commonwealth funding. The agency would be required to 
operate under agreed guidelines, and States and Territories would be represented -  with 
research interests -  on its governing board. However, no school or system would be 
able to refuse to participate in the agency’s work and systems would have no right of 
veto over the type of performance information collected. The independent agency 
would have a monitoring role only and its work would be confined to providing 
information for public accountability purposes. Decisions made on the basis of the 
information, including action to remedy poor performance, would remain the 
responsibility of State and Territory governments and the Commonwealth.
Conclusion
In its accountability arrangements for Commonwealth expenditure on schools, the 
Federal government relies heavily on the cooperation of State and Territory 
governments and non-government school authorities. As these stakeholders are 
reluctant to produce data that might reflect adversely on their performance, there is 
limited information on the effectiveness of Australian schooling. A focus on 
expenditure has served the interests of stakeholders in times of funding growth, but it 
has proved counter-productive in times of budgetary restraint. The lack of information 
on school effectiveness has enabled auditors to conclude that school systems with 
above-average levels of expenditure are inefficient because States and Territories are 
unable to demonstrate the link between expenditure on schooling and education 
outcomes. Without the establishment of an independent monitoring and reporting 
mechanism, the quality of the performance information collected on Australian schools 
is unlikely to improve.
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As the Commonwealth’s funding priorities have been dictated by information on inputs, 
it has not been possible to monitor the effectiveness of Federal government involvement 
in terms of educational outcomes. The main structural impact of Commonwealth 
schools funding has been growth in the number of non-government schools. The main 
recipient of Federal funding is now the private school sector. The implications of this 
development for school education policy in Australia will be explored in the next 
chapter.
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Chapter Four
The impact of government funding for private schools
Introduction
When the Federal government introduced recurrent funding for non-government schools 
in 1969, it aimed to arrest the decline in private school enrolments through improving 
the quality of education services (Marginson 1993: 208). The provision of government 
subsidies to private schools succeeded in improving their quality relative to government 
schools. The Commonwealth’s inability to monitor the outcomes of its funding 
programs makes it difficult to judge changes in the quality of public and private schools 
resulting from Federal involvement. It is only possible to compare the quality of the 
public and private school sectors in relation to each other (Marginson 1997: 158).
This chapter will assess the impact of Federal funding for private schools in Australia.
It summarises the history of private schools’ funding and then discusses the extent to 
which the government’s fiscal policy goals have been achieved. The provision of 
subsidies to non-government schools has not been successful in reducing the 
government’s funding burden for schooling. The third section explores issues 
surrounding the relative quality of government and non-government schools and, within 
the limitations of the data, assesses the impact of government funding on school quality. 
The final section analyses the dimensions of competition in school education and the 
extent to which government funding influences the competitive environment for 
schools.
1 Government support for private schools in Australia
Late in the last century, State governments assumed control of education provision in 
order to ensure mass participation in education to a minimum standard of achievement.
In the 1960s, State governments -  with the assistance of the Federal government -  
restored funding to non-government schools. Although this policy may have reduced 
the cost of education provision in the short term, it had implications for the standards of 
education provision in both sectors.
1.1 The origins of funding for non-government schools
Following the occupation of New South Wales in 1788, Churches fought hard to 
maintain their control over schooling provision in Australia, resisting attempts by 
colonial governments to enter the field (Austin 1961). Eventually, as sectarian conflict 
undermined the Churches’ common interests, and the rapid increase in population 
stretched their resources, Australian governments were able to take control of mass 
education provision in the 1870s. “Owing to rivalry between the various interests, to 
overlapping and to failure to provide adequate schools in outlying areas, it was gradually
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realised that the State itself would have to assume responsibility for the provision of 
education for the mass of the people” (Cunningham et al. 1939:15).
Between 1870 and 1900, all Australia’s colonial governments established education 
systems that were “free, secular and compulsory”, and state aid to non-government 
schools was withdrawn. Several factors led to the complete withdrawal of grants to 
private schools. The liberals and Protestants who dominated colonial government 
feared the growing power of an anti-liberal Catholic church whose members reached 
close to one-third of the Australian population by 1870 and which had begun to 
establish a system of Catholic schools independent of government control. (Austin 
1961: 207-212). Austin comments that the “long-term influence of agnosticism, 
voluntaryism and liberalism helped to produce the state of mind which found this 
‘secular’ legislation acceptable (1961:173). The introduction of the “free, secular and 
compulsory” Education Acts was not designed to drive all religion out of schooling. In 
New South Wales and Western Australia, schools were still allowed to provide non­
sectarian religious teaching within their curriculum and in all States, up to one hour per 
day could be devoted to voluntary religious education by the various denominations 
(Austin 1961: 172-175).
After the cessation of government funding in the 1870s, many non-government schools 
stayed open and the Australian private school sector remained relatively large in its size 
and scale (Marginson 1993: 206)1. Most of the non-government schools were Roman 
Catholic. The Protestant Churches reduced their services to a small group of socially 
and academically selective schools focussed on secondary education while the Catholic 
Church remained a provider of mass education at the primary level. By decentralising 
its schools to Diocesan control and utilising the labour of religious orders, the Catholic 
Church managed to maintain a large network of schools for most of the next hundred 
years without direct government assistance (Austin 1961: 210-211). In 1965, when 
twenty-four per cent of children were enrolled in private schools, eighty-two per cent of 
these students were in Catholic schools (ABS Cat. No. 4221.0).
Maintaining a large scale, low fee school system dependent on private resources became 
a serious burden for the Catholic parishes after the Second World War. By the 1960s, 
the effect of the post-war baby boom, increasing rates of secondary school participation 
and a decline in the educational contribution of religious orders meant that most 
Catholic non-government schools were struggling to provide education services to the 
standard of government schools (Smart 1978, Praetz 1982). Non-government schools 
received various types of indirect support from governments in the form of transport 
subsidies, interest rate subsidies, scholarships and bursaries, exemptions from rates and 
payroll tax, textbook allowances, discounts on library and school supplies, and income 
tax concessions for school fees. But by the 1960s, indirect subsidies were insufficient to 
alleviate the funding problems in Catholic schools and the Catholic sector began to lose 
enrolment share to the government system. The Catholic sector’s share of total 
enrolments declined from 19.5 per cent in 1965 to 17 per cent in 1973.
1 In the United States of America, the private sector’s enrolment share has remained under 15 per cent, in 
the United Kingdom and Canada it is less than 10 per cent, whereas in Australia, it has always hovered 
around 20 per cent (UNESCO 1989).
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The post-war school participation boom also placed strains on the government school 
system. Traditionally, a disproportionate share of senior secondary school students had 
enrolled in private schools and the remainder attended the relatively few government 
secondary schools . As school participation rates rose, the demand for new places in 
government secondary schools increased. Declining enrolments in Catholic schools also 
placed pressure on the State school system. Many State governments felt ill-equipped to 
meet the demand for secondary schooling and wanted to encourage the private school 
sector to take more secondary school students (Spaull 1987: 59). State and Federal 
governments were also responding to the political pressure created by the Catholic 
campaign for state aid. During the 1960s, the power of the Democratic Labour Party to 
direct its preferences during elections, made it difficult for the major political parties at 
the State and Federal level to resist DLP demands for the introduction of direct funding 
for non-government schools (Freudenberg 1977, Smart 1978: 69)
Figure 4.1 Expenditure per student on private schools, by level of government, 
1961-2 to 1994-5 (constant in 1994-5 prices)
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Notes: The data exclude expenditure on preschools and capital works, and includes expenditure on special 
education, targeted programs and joint programs. Commonwealth expenditure on joint programs is 
attributed to government schools. The data are drawn from all Australian States excluding the Australian 
Capital Territory and the Northern Territory. Expenditure is in constant prices deflated by GNFP(e).
Sources: Commonwealth Budget Papers; ABS Cat. No. 4221.0 Schools Australia', ABS Cat. No. 5510.0 
Expenditure on Education , Australia', ABS (1996) “Expenditure on Schools” Unpublished Data.
In 1964 with a small pool of capital grants, the Commonwealth government introduced 
the first program of direct financial assistance to non-government schools in the 20th 
Century. In 1967, the governments of Victoria and New South Wales introduced 
financial assistance to non-government schools for recurrent purposes and in 1969, 
recurrent grants for non-government schools were introduced by all remaining States
2 Non-Catholic independent schools have always captured a disproportionate share of secondary school 
enrolments. For example, in 1996, this group attracted 13% of total secondary school students, compared 
to only 7% of total primary school enrolments (ABS Cat. No. 4221.0)
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and the Commonwealth (Praetz 1982:13, ABS 1996). In 1974, a major new scheme of 
Commonwealth funding was introduced following the Karmel (1973) report.
With the implementation of the Karmel report, all non-government schools received
' j
significant increases in their subsidies from both levels of government . State 
governments made steady increases in their contributions to non-government schools, 
but they did not match the rapid increases in per capita funding provided by the Federal 
government, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. The introduction of Federal and State funding 
did not stop the drift away from non-government schools immediately, but by 1977 the 
trend had reversed and enrolments in private schools began to recover, and have been 
climbing steadily ever since.
1.2 The effect of needs-based funding
Non-government schools operate within an environment of limited market competition. 
With minimal regulation from State governments, private schools have been free to 
establish anywhere and to compete both with other non-government schools and schools 
in the government sector. The commercial viability of any private school depends on its 
ability to attract and to retain students. In the beginning, the “product” offered by non­
government schools was a strong religious element in their educational programs and 
they attracted students on the basis of religious affiliation. For the majority of Catholic 
primary schools, religious affiliation is still a criterion for enrolment.
Since the Second World War, as religion has become less significant in the definition of 
cultural identity, non-government schools have marketed their education services in 
terms of school quality3 4. At the secondary level, where the non-government sector is 
strongest (see Table 4.2), school quality has been marketed in terms of positional goods 
often expressed in terms of academic achievement, discipline, resources and school- 
parent relations (Marginson 1997: 157). The merit-based competition for university 
entry provided private schools with a means of differentiating their educational products 
from competing schools in both the government and private sectors. As university entry 
is a competitive system, schools and their students are involved in a competitive 
process, particularly at the senior secondary level. In metropolitan areas, where urban 
transport systems enable students to travel outside their locality, enrolments in non- 
Catholic private schools have increased markedly since the mid-1970s (Marginson 
1997: 154).
When the non-government sector’s competitive position vis a vis government schools 
deteriorated during the 1960s, the government decided to provide a form of industry 
assistance to keep the sector afloat and to improve its relative standing. The provision 
of government subsidies changed the nature of competition within the private school 
sector and between government and non-government schools.
3 In implementing the Karmel report, the Federal government obtained the agreement of State and 
Territory governments to contribute around 20 per cent of the costs of a non-government school place.
4An exception to this was the rise of fundamentalist Christian schools in the 1970s and 1980s, which still 
attract students on the basis of religion. These schools now account for about six per cent of non­
government school enrolments.
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With its “needs-based” funding scheme5, the Commonwealth Schools Commission 
ignored the existence of competition in education. It introduced a system of differential 
per capita grants according to the assessed financial needs of the school or system. 
Financial need is determined by the school’s access to private income (mainly school 
fees) measured by an Education Resources Index (ERI). On the basis of their assessed 
financial need, schools are placed in one of several funding categories and the level of 
per capita grant differs according to the funding category of the school. The Catholic 
school system is assessed as having a high level of need, and therefore receives higher 
levels of per student funding. Schools in the higher funding categories receive per 
capita grants at about four times the rate paid to schools in the lower funding 
categories6. Seventy per cent of all non-government schools -  including the Catholic 
systems -  are now in the highest funding quartile.
Although the financial needs of schools are inversely related to the financial capacity of 
their clients, the ability of parents to afford the fees at their chosen school was not taken 
into account. For example a high-income family attending a Catholic systemic 
secondary school in South Australia (funded at Category 10) would attract a 
Commonwealth government subsidy that is 3.5 times the grant that they would attract if 
their child attended a Category 1 school (DEET 1996: 212). The capacity of the family 
to pay is the same, yet their entitlement to a grant differs depending on the funding 
category of the school. Likewise, low-income families receive less government 
assistance if they choose to send their child to a school in Categories 1-3. The levels of 
grants under the Commonwealth General Recurrent Grants Program are provided in 
Appendix Four.
The Education Resources Index is defined as an indicator of “the capacity of a school to 
generate funds on its own behalf’. (KPMG 1996). However, an independent evaluation 
of the General Recurrent Grants Program, concluded that the ERI was a poor indicator 
of the financial needs of schools. It noted that schools with very different socio­
economic circumstances could have the same ERI; some schools with large asset bases 
were in high funding categories; and that the ERI worked against the needs of 
established schools (KPMG 1996).
In the twenty-five years since the scheme began, the problems associated with funding 
schools according to their financial “needs” have become increasingly difficult to 
resolve. The main problem is that all non-government schools would like to be in the 
higher funding categories because they would be in a more advantageous competitive 
position. When providing information to the Commonwealth about their resource 
levels, schools have a strong incentive to manipulate the data to maintain a more 
favourable ERI rating. This can be done by employing accountants to minimise 
declared income, assets and expenditure or by linking a school’s accounts to other 
bodies, such as a church or religious order. In the case of systems, where funds are paid 
to a central authority, rather than individual schools, authorities have some capacity to 
direct resources to expansion instead of raising standards in existing schools.
5 The “needs-based” funding scheme is described in more detail in Appendix Four.
6 Although it was intended that the wealthiest private schools would receive no funding, the Whitlam 
government was forced to accept the compromise that all schools received some funding as a condition to 
get the legislation passed in the Senate.
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As the Commonwealth became aware of these techniques, it tightened its assessment 
criteria and introduced new criteria to make it very difficult for schools to change their 
funding category7 8. In the post-1996 funding reassessment, only five of the thirty-eight 
schools whose ERI indicated a change to a more favourable funding category were 
allowed to change category. On the other hand, twenty-two of the forty-two schools 
whose ERI indicated a less favourable funding category were moved down. The KPMG 
Management Consultants concluded that “the additional ERI requirements tend to -  at 
best -  lock (schools) into an existing funding category or -  more commonly -  put the 
school into a lower funding category” (KPMG 1996)
Over time, the basis for calculating the ERI has become so complex that it is difficult to 
understand exactly how assessments are obtained. The KPMG evaluation ran some 
simulations to assess the effect of changed circumstances on a school’s ERI, using the 
financial data from 12 different schools. The result was that the ERI was sensitive to the 
changes in some schools but not in others. The evaluators concluded, “for these 12 
schools, changes in the ERI were more likely to be caused by the structure of the ERI 
than a change in the school’s circumstances” (KPMG 1996).
A second problem for existing non-government schools was the provision of 
government funding to new entrants into the non-government schools market. As the 
Karmel scheme aimed to reverse the drift of enrolments away from government schools, 
there was no reason to discourage the growth of non-government schools (Marginson 
1993: 208). Funding under the Karmel model was open-ended, and new entrants could 
receive funding once they were registered by State governments. However, the funding 
scheme treated new entrants more favourably than it treated older established schools. 
New non-government schools were able to determine their funding category by 
providing data on projected income and enrolments, whereas existing non-government 
schools were assessed on the basis of past expenditure.
While the ERI system effectively “locked” an existing school within a funding category 
and gave it no scope to change its clientele, or its fee structure. New non-government 
schools were free to structure their operations in order to minimise their ERI and 
therefore attract higher levels of government funding. The influx of new entrants 
increased the competitive pressure on existing schools, particularly those locked into the
o
lower funding categories . The non-government schools in the lower funding categories 
declined compared to other non-government schools. Between 1989 and 1994, the total 
number of enrolments in Category 1-3 schools declined by 2,588 students. Over the 
same period, enrolments in Category 4-12 schools increased by 49,094 students 
(McKinnon 1995a: 12).
7The regulations governing reviews include a “maintenance of effort” and “private income test” that make 
it difficult for a school to improve its funding position (see KPMG 1996).
8The open-ended model also made it difficult for the Federal government to restrain its outlays on non­
government schools when the balance between government and non-government enrolments was restored.
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In 1996, the Coalition government removed some of the restrictions designed to stop 
manipulation of the ERI9 and implemented an election promise to review it. The 
outcome of the review had not been announced before the next Federal election in 
October 1998. Yet during the election campaign, the Government and the Opposition 
promised to re-categorise the Catholic school system to Category 11, with no mention of 
changes to the funding categories of any other schools (see Chapter Two).
The competitive position of all non-government schools has been influenced by the 
provision of government subsidies. By funding schools on the basis of their present 
financial needs (ie. current fee levels), the funding scheme dictated how those schools 
would operate in the future. High-fee schools were locked into a low funding category 
which forced them to continue to charge high fees and thereby limit the type of students 
they could attract. The placement of low-fee schools in higher funding categories meant 
that they could continue to charge low fees while raising their educational standards.
The scheme gave all non-government schools a strong incentive to obtain a higher 
funding category in order to compete as low-fee schools.
Although one-third of non-government schools were disadvantaged by the needs-based 
funding formula, the provision of Commonwealth funding improved the competitive 
position of all non-govemment schools relative to government schools. The Federal 
government did not pursue any changes to the regulatory environment to equalise 
competition between the public and private sector. Private schools continued to enjoy 
the freedom to select and to reject students. In contrast, all but a few government 
schools were required to accept students under open enrolment policies. The non- 
govemment schools’ autonomy over student selection gave them the power to 
differentiate themselves from government schools in terms of the characteristics of their 
student populations. Given the importance of student characteristics in achieving 
educational outcomes, autonomy over student selection afforded non-govemment 
schools a significant competitive advantage over government schools.
In its early years, the Schools Commission explored alternative models of funding for 
non-govemment schools that would have changed this aspect of the Karmel model. In 
its first triennial report in 1976, the Commission raised the idea of “supported non- 
govemment schools.” Under this proposal, non-govemment schools would have two 
choices: to remain a partially subsidised school, with about two-thirds of its resources 
provided by government, or to be a “supported school” with one hundred per cent of 
resources provided by government. Schools choosing to be fully “supported” by 
government would have less autonomy over student selection. “Conditions relating to 
public accountability, access to students, openness, and public representation on 
government bodies were to be attached to such a level of funding, although the 
Commission was at pains to stress that the identity or characteristic features and 
philosophies of the schools would not be prejudiced” (Schools Commission 1978: 47). 
The Commission assumed that two-thirds of non-govemment schools (ie. those 
receiving higher levels of funding) would opt for “supported school” status if the 
program was introduced (Schools Commission 1978: 47). However, the concept of
9With the abolition of the New Schools Policy, it is now possible for a non-systemic school to join a 
system at the system’s level of funding, not at the school’s current level of funding. It is also possible for 
a school to close down and legally re-open as a new school the next day with a new funding category.
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supported schools was never implemented10. Instead, the Karmel model of differential 
vouchers without any service obligations on the part of schools was entrenched as the 
preferred basis for funding non-government schools.
Competition between schools was intensified by the provision of government funding, 
which increased the incentives for non-government schools to manipulate the “needs” 
assessment criteria. The government’s failure to set any limits to the growth of new 
entrants also increased competition between schools, yet the funding scheme ensured 
that non-government schools did not compete for students on an equal basis. Under the 
Karmel plan, non-government schools had a competitive advantage over government 
schools in that they remained free to select their students. The anomalies created by the 
needs-based funding scheme grew as the size of the non-government sector increased.
2 Achievement of fiscal policy goals
One way to understand the funding of school education in Australia is in terms of three 
-  often competing -  government policy priorities. These three priorities are to ensure 
that: (1) all students complete a minimum level of schooling; (2) at an acceptable 
standard1 and (3) at least cost to government. Patterns of government expenditure on 
schools reflect a trade-off between these priorities, particularly between the third 
consideration of cost against the first two priorities of mass participation and minimum 
standards of provision. The main policy instrument for exercising this trade-off has 
been the existence of a private school sector which has enabled governments to avoid 
responsibility for the full cost of provision. For nearly a century in Australia, at least 
twenty per cent of school students have been educated outside of the government-funded 
systems -  saving governments up to one-fifth of the total cost of schooling .
In the 1960s, the cost of education provision became too high for the private sector to 
maintain standards relative to government schools, and it did not have the financial 
capacity to expand to meet increased demand. As the private sector’s enrolment share 
declined, State governments introduced subsidies to ensure that private providers 
remained viable. The Federal government supported this policy in response to political 
pressure for Federal involvement in schooling. An economic rationale for State 
government intervention to keep the private schools sector afloat was to relieve the cost
10Given the funding arrangements that were in place, it is not surprising that the “supported schools” 
concept was not adopted. For the Federal government it would have meant increased expenditure and for 
the Catholic system it implied that funding would be linked to increased regulation -  a situation which 
they had rejected a hundred years earlier.
11 This implies an acceptable standard of provision (inputs) which is a pre-requisite for an acceptable 
standard of performance (outputs).
12 The cost of the enrolment trend was highlighted by a Catholic school strike in Goulburn in 1962 where 
Catholic schools closed their doors for a week and sent their children to local State schools to impress on 
government that it could not afford the demise of the Catholic system. It is not completely accurate to 
compare average costs per student because the unit cost of an additional place in a private school may not 
be the same as the marginal cost of an additional place in the public system. Estimating average costs per 
student place is the norm in most studies of costs such as Mathews (1972), and in statistical reports 
produced by the CSC, DEETYA and the AEC. The calculation of marginal costs is beyond the scope of 
this thesis.
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1 Tburden of providing places for students in government schools . The Federal 
government’s policy rationale was couched in terms of meeting the resource needs of 
non-government schools. Overall, the joint policy goal of both Federal and State 
governments in restoring direct funding to non-government schools was to reverse the 
drift of students away from private schools. To achieve this goal, the funding scheme 
aimed to raise the standards of provision in the non-government sector, thus improving 
the relative quality of non-government schools compared to government schools.
2.1 Shifting costs to the private sector
As illustrated in Table 4.1, the Karmel funding system succeeded in reversing the drift 
of enrolments away from non-government schools. In 1977, the non-government 
sector’s share of total student enrolments reached a trough of 21 per cent. From this 
point on, the proportion of total students attending non-government schools increased 
steadily. Within eight years of the commencement of the Karmel scheme, the drift away 
from non-government schools had been reversed. By 1983, the non-government 
sector’s enrolment share was restored to 24 per cent. Between 1975 and 1995, the 
number of students enrolled in non-government schools increased by 45 per cent, while 
enrolments in government schools declined by 3.6 per cent (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics Cat. No. 4221.0). In 1996, 29.3 per cent of students were enrolled in non­
government schools.
Table 4.1 Proportion of students enrolled in non-government schools, 
Australia 1966 to 1995
Year % Year % Year % Year % Year % Year %
1966 23.3 1971 21.8 1976 21.2 1981 23.0 1986 26.4 1991 27.9
1967 23.0 1972 21.5 1977 21.1 1982 23.8 1987 26.9 1992 27.9
1968 22.6 1973 21.5 1978 21.3 1983 24.4 1988 27.3 1993 28.1
1969 22.2 1974 21.5 1979 21.8 1984 25.1 1989 27.6 1994 28.5
1970 22.0 1975 21.3 1980 22.3 1984 25.8 1990 27.9 1995 29.0
Source: ABS Cat. No. 4221.0. Schools Australia, various years.
The non-government sector expanded most at the secondary level. During the 1980s, 
non-government secondary school enrolments increased at a higher rate than at the 
primary level and between 1984 and 1996, the gap between the non-government sector’s 
enrolment shares of primary and secondary education grew wider. As shown in Table 
4.2, between 1972 and 1984, the enrolment share of non-government secondary schools 
increased by 4 percentage points compared to 3 percentage points in primary schools. 
Between 1984 and 1996, the non-government sector’s share of secondary school 
enrolments increased by almost 6 percentage points, while in primary schools, it 
increased by just over 3 percentage points. While the total number of secondary students 
increased by 41,392 over the period, over 80,000 additional students enrolled in private 
secondary schools.
‘^ Debating the relevant legislation in the Victorian Parliament, a government minister said that the 
assistance would help non-government schools cope with increasing enrolments and “prevent the state 
system from being overburdened to the point of possible embarrassment” (Rossiter 1967: 306).
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Table 4.2 Enrolment shares of private sector, by level of schooling, selected 
years (%)
1963 1972 1984 1996
Primary 22.7 20.0 22.9 26.0
Secondary 26.9 24.2 28.2 34.0
Source: ABS Cat. No. 4221.0. Schools Australia, various years.
With thirty per cent of students in private schools, governments provide on average, 
three-quarters of the cost of every private school place. If all students in private schools 
were fully funded, it would cost governments an additional $1.1 billion a year -  a 
budget increase of nine per cent. This is how much the government now saves from 
subsidising private schools -  and how much it would cost if all private school students 
entered the State system14. But Australia always had a large unfunded non-government 
sector, catering for around 20 per cent of students. Prior to 1967, governments saved 
one-fifth of their potential total expenditure on student places. By providing a subsidy 
to every private school student, governments sacrificed the savings they enjoyed when 
one-fifth of all students received no funding. If the private school sector had remained 
unfunded, and had declined to 15 per cent of enrolments, governments would be saving 
$1.8 billion a year. Even if the unfunded private sector declined to 10 per cent of total 
enrolments -  the size it has remained in countries where private schools receive no 
government funding -  Australian governments would save $1.2 billion a year. An 
unfunded private school sector would need to shrink to eight per cent of enrolments 
before the governments’ policy of subsidising private education could be judged a fiscal 
success.
The net savings to government from each private school place has declined over the past 
two decades because the level of subvention in non-government schools has increased. 
As indicated in Appendix Two, income from government has become an increasing 
proportion of non-government schools’ total income since 1974. Government subsidies 
have been substituted for private income and contributed services in non-government 
schools so that Commonwealth and State funding now comprises, on average, 70 per 
cent of non-government schools’ running costs. In Catholic primary schools, for 
example, the level of subvention has increased from 64 per cent in 1976 to 78 per cent 
in 1994. In other primary schools, government funding has increased from 35 per cent 
of costs in 1976 to 54 per cent today. In secondary schools, on the other hand, the level 
of government subvention has not increased as significantly, and private income remains 
a substantial proportion of total expenditure (30 per cent in Catholic schools and 61 per 
cent in independent schools).
The increasing level of subsidies paid to non-government schools and the subsequent 
reduction in the level of private contributions can be attributed in large part to 
Commonwealth involvement in schooling. The Commonwealth is the major funding 
provider for non-government schools whereas States bear funding responsibility for a
14 This is based on the average cost per student, not the marginal costs of additional student places, which 
would produce a lower figure.
98
much larger government school system. It has been relatively easy in budgetary terms 
for the Federal government to increase its per capita outlays on non-government schools 
to an extent that State governments would have found crippling if similar funding 
increases had been awarded to government schools, supported from State budgets.
The fact that the private school sector received most of its funding from the 
Commonwealth, provided State governments with a strong incentive to encourage the 
transfer of students to non-government schools. Until 1996, two-thirds of the cost of a 
non-government school place was paid by the Federal government. This meant that the 
States saved approximately $3,600 for every student who transferred to the non­
government sector. In 1996, the Federal government introduced the Enrolment 
Benchmark Adjustment, which ensured that the full budgetary cost of all future growth 
in non-government schools would be borne by State and Territory governments (see 
Appendix Four). As a consequence, State governments now save only $1200 per 
student from each enrolment in the non-government sector.
The reason for Commonwealth involvement in schools funding was less to achieve 
fiscal policy goals than to improve the standards of provision in under-resourced private 
schools (Hogan 1984, Smart 1978). Unfortunately, Commonwealth funding policy for 
non-government schools has been determined in isolation from policy considerations 
about funding levels for government schools. Without the funding burden of providing 
for government schools, the Commonwealth found it relatively easy to award funding 
increases to the non-government sector. Federal involvement therefore contributed to 
the high level of subvention in private schools’ running costs and may have facilitated 
the expansion of the private school sector.
2.2 Reducing the real private price of private schooling
The provision of Commonwealth funding enabled non-government schools to raise their 
standard of education provision while maintaining fees at reasonable levels. Although 
there was some substitution of government grants for private income, after 1975 when 
average private school fee levels increased, the same fee “bought” a higher standard of 
schooling than before. In 1985, and 1992, Ross Williams examined the extent to which 
this reduction in the “real private prices” of private schooling was responsible for 
increasing enrolments in the non-government sector (Williams 1985, Ruby, Wells and 
Wildemuth 1992: 22).
Williams recognised that as school fees purchased a given level of quality, if the service 
quality improved as a result of government grants, a given level of fees would purchase 
a higher quality service. He calculated the real private price of schooling as not just the 
level of average school fees, but the cost per unit of service, or the price of a given level 
of school quality. As a proxy for school quality, Williams used student-staff ratios.
Having incorporated school quality into his price index, Williams found that the real 
private price of private schooling had risen during the 1960s but fell after 1969, 
following the introduction of government grants to private schools. Even though the 
average real fees for private schools increased between 1970 and 1983, the real private 
price of private schooling fell because government grants were used to improve the
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quality of non-government schools (as measured by staff-student ratios). In other 
words, the same level of fees purchased a higher quality of service due to the 
government’s contribution to the non-government schools operating costs. Between 
1970 and 1980, a 23 per cent increase in real average fees “bought” a 40 per cent 
increase in school quality as measured by staff-student ratios.
By improving the quality of non-government schools while keeping the fees at a 
constant level, governments assisted the sector to recover its former enrolment share.
As illustrated in Figure 4.2, as the real private price of private schooling began to 
decline between 1970 and 1983, the enrolment share of government schools declined 
from 1977. Williams suggested the lag of seven years between the initial fall in the real 
private price and the reversal of the trend in enrolment share was due to the tendency of 
students to complete one phase of their schooling in the same sector. Williams 
concluded that the main source of the enrolment shift was the effect of government 
grants, estimating that every $100 increase in government grants per student accounted 
for a 1.4 per cent increase in non-government school enrolments (1985: 626).
Figure 4.2 Real Private Price of Private schooling (79-80 =100) and government 
schools’ enrolment share, Australia 1961-62 to 1994-1995
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Sources: Real Private Price is drawn from Ross Williams’ calculations in: Williams, R. A. (1985) “The 
Economic Determinants of Private Schooling in Australia”, Economic Record, September, pp. 622-628; 
and Ruby, A., Wells, L., and Wildemuth, C. (1992). Choice Theory and Education. Occasional Paper No. 
19. Canberra: The Australian College of Education. Enrolment shares are from ABS Cat. No. 4221.0, 
Schools Australia, various years.
Government funding after 1974 increased the affordability of non-government schools. 
However, the government’s policy to encourage more students to enrol in the non­
government sector could not be achieved simply by lowering the costs of private 
schooling. The relative quality of private schooling also had to improve if parents were 
to be persuaded to transfer out of the government school sector. After 1983, the link
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Williams observed between the real private price of private schooling and the private 
schools’ enrolment share ceased to exist. From 1983, the real private price of private 
schooling increased, yet the government sector’s enrolment share continued to fall, as 
shown in Figure 4.2. After 1983, increasing numbers of students enrolled in private 
schools and their parents were prepared to pay a higher real private price for private 
schooling.
Although parents choose private schools for reasons other than cost (Anderson 1991:
150, Marginson 1997: 157), capacity to pay is a significant constraint on their options 
regarding choice of school. Acknowledging the complexity of motivations governing 
school choice, the issue of cost is very closely related to the issue of perceived quality, 
in terms of value for money. The Karmel funding model did not address the issue of 
relative school quality between the sectors, yet the importance of school quality to 
demand for private schools became apparent when the government tried to restrain 
outlays on non-government schools in the 1980s.
2.3 Attempts to restrain outlays on non-government schools
In the early 1980s, the Federal government tried to restrain the rising costs of the 
Karmel funding scheme in keeping with its broader agenda of budgetary restraint 
(Considine and Painter 1997: 5). In 1983, the Federal Minister for Schools, Senator 
Susan Ryan unsuccessfully sought to phase out recurrent funding to the wealthier 
private schools (see Chapter Two). In a settlement negotiated by Prime Minister 
Hawke’s office in 1984, all non-government schools were guaranteed maintained 
funding levels with real increases for the low-fee schools, for the next eight years 
(Ashenden 1989). In the wake of its failed attempt to restrain growth in outlays on 
existing private schools, the government’s focus shifted to restricting the growth of new 
private schools. To achieve this objective, in 1985, the Commonwealth Schools 
Commission developed a set of guidelines governing the approval processes for new 
non-govemment schools seeking Commonwealth financial assistance, known as the 
“New Schools Policy” (Watson 1997: 75).
Prior to 1985, funding for new non-govemment school places had been largely un­
restricted, as any non-govemment school registered by a State or Territory government 
was eligible to receive assistance15. Under the New Schools Policy guidelines, new non- 
govemment schools were required to enrol a minimum number of students and funding 
was provided up to a maximum enrolment level. In 1988, the Federal government 
introduced an additional restriction limiting the funding of new independent non- 
govemment schools to the lower funding levels, Categories 1 to 6 (Department of 
Employment, Education and Training 1989:14). The guidelines explicitly sought to 
promote the principle of “planned educational provision” to maximise the use of 
resources and to discourage the duplication of school services. The main effect of the 
guidelines was to ensure that most new non-govemment schools were established in 
regions of population growth (such as new suburban centres) rather than in areas of 
population decline.
15 Spaull notes that State Education Ministers raised concerns in the Ministerial Council in the early 1980s 
about the rapid expansion of Federally funded non-government schools and their negative impact on “the 
attraction and the economic viability of existing State secondary schools” (Spaull 1987: 265-266).
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The New Schools Policy was not particularly onerous to the larger non-government 
school systems, who followed similar principles in their own planning processes and 
continued to have access to higher funding levels (Vassarotti 1996, Bromilow 1996). 
However the guidelines were effective in curbing some of the growth of smaller non­
government schools that were established to foster particular religious and cultural 
beliefs or educational philosophies (Crimmins 1996, Layden 1996). The groups seeking 
government funding for these schools were often thwarted by the New Schools Policy 
guidelines that refused them funding on demographic grounds. Even when funding was 
approved, these “non-systemic” schools were restricted to funding Categories 1-6, 
which meant that they were obliged to charge higher fees than the Catholic school 
system in order to provide a comparable standard of service. The New Schools Policy 
was moderately effective in placing restraint on the growth of the non-government 
sector. Between 1985 and 1995, the proportion of total students enrolled in non­
government schools increased by an average of 0.32 percentage points per year, 
compared with an annual average increase of 0.69 percentage points in the years before 
the New Schools Policy was introduced (see Table 4.1).
Table 4.3 Impact of factors on enrolments in non-government schools
F a c to r
E x p e c te d  e f fe c t  o n  
n o n -g o v e r n m e n t  sc h o o l  
e n r o lm e n ts
C h a n g e , 1 9 8 2 -8 3  
to  1 9 9 2 -9 3
(%)
1. Cost of teaching - 58.7
2. Real per student grants to non-government schools + 16.1
3. Total outlays per student in government schools - 13.4
4. Student-staff ratio in non-government schools + 13.2
5. Student-staff ratio in government schools - 7.4
Notes: Cost of Teaching is based on the Schools Price Index (Wages) which from 1988 excluded second- 
tier wage increases. Student-staff ratio refers to full-time equivalent units of teaching staff.
Sources: AEC (1994) National Report on Schooling in Australia, Statistical Annex, 1993', CSC (1984b) 
Funding Policies for Australian Schools', Commonwealth Budget Papers, various years; ABS (1996) 
“Expenditure on Education” Unpublished Data; ABS Cat No. 4221.0. Schools Australia.
The real private price of private schools also increased after 1983 but this did not deter 
parents from enrolling their children in non-government schools (see Figure 4.2)16. 
Contrary to the assumption arising from Williams’ 1985 study that an increase in the 
real private price of private schooling would result in a decline in non-government 
school enrolments, demand for non-government schools continued to grow in the 1980s. 
The expected enrolment impact of factors influencing to the real private price of private 
schooling are detailed in Table 4.3. The main cause of the increase in the real private 
price was an increase in the cost of teaching. Between 1982 and 1992 the average cost 
of teaching increased by 58.7 per cent while government grants increased by only 16 per 
cent. Student-staff ratios in non-government schools improved by 13.3 percent,
16 The New Schools Policy may have contributed to the rise in the real private price of non-government 
schooling in the 1980s. By restricting supply at a time of high demand, the guidelines may have produced 
a scarcity of non-government school places that could be offered at a higher price.
102
indicating that school quality was not allowed to decline. Instead, the cost of increased 
teachers’ salaries and the continuing improvement in staff-student ratios was met by 
parents paying a higher real private price for private schooling.
Several factors may have influenced parents’ willingness to pay a higher price for non­
government schools in the 1980s. An increase in the number of dual income households 
may have enabled more families to afford non-government school fees. The type of 
non-government schooling might also have been a factor in families’ willingness to pay 
for private schooling. During the 1980s, the fastest growing area of non-government 
school enrolments was schools established by religious groups, cultural minorities and
. 1 7 .adherents of particular educational philosophies . The clients of these schools might be 
less sensitive to price than parents seeking more mainstream provision. Nevertheless, 
these schools cater for only a small proportion of total non-government school 
enrolments and do not explain why the majority of families are now willing to pay a 
higher real price for non-government schools.
While price is significant in the decision to choose a non-government school, it is 
closely related to perceptions of school quality. As the quality of schools is usually 
judged in comparison with other schools, any changes in the relative quality of 
government secondary schools could have precipitated the transfer of students to non­
government schools in the 1980s, in spite of an increase in the real private price of 
private schooling.
3 The relative quality of public and private schools
Although government funding policy was based on the assumption that a decline in the 
relative quality of private schools had affected the sector’s enrolment share, the funding 
model only addressed the issue of school quality in terms of financial resources, or 
inputs. School quality can only be judged in terms of the educational outcomes 
achieved by students. It would be largely on this basis that parents would make the 
decision to transfer their children from public to private schools.
Schooling is a service designed to produce particular outcomes such as literacy and 
numeracy, vocational and social skills and academic achievements. Students bring their 
own abilities and resources to the education process, and the school provides further 
inputs that build on the students’ initial educational “endowment” from ability and 
family background. The success of a school in delivering its services depends on its 
ability to maximise the outcomes of its students. As discussed in the previous chapter, a 
high quality school is one which adds the most “value” to its students in terms of their 
educational outcomes.
When a student’s social background is taken into account, non-government secondary 
schools in Australia give students a small but statistically significant academic 
advantage over students from government schools. Using longitudinal data on 
Australian students, Williams and Carpenter (1990) compared student outcomes
17 Between 1986 and 1995, of the 100,000 additional students who enrolled in non-government schools, 
over 80,000 were in non-Catholic schools independent of the major school systems (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics Cat. No. 4221.0).
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between the sectors in four areas: literacy and numeracy achievement at 14 years of age; 
Year 12 completion; entry to higher education; and completion of a degree. Whereas 
the non-government school made only a slight difference to students’ literacy 
achievements at 14 years of age , Williams and Carpenter found significant differences 
in outcomes between the sectors on the rate of completion of Year 12, shown in Table 
4.4.
Table 4.4 Observed and Adjusted proportions and conditional probabilities of 
Year 12 completion, transition to university, and completion of 
degree for two cohorts, by sector
Class of ‘78 Class of ‘82
Govt. Cath. Indep. Govt. Cath. Indep.
Year 12 completion
O bserved  proportion 0.295 0.438 0.875 0.316 0.476 0.874
A djusted  p roportion 0.325 0.378 0.642 0.351 0.430 0.617
Conditional probability 0.314 0.447 0.450 0.297 0.441 0.539
Higher Education entry
O bserved  proportion 0.454 0.523 0.641 0.416 0.483 0.663
A djusted  proportion 0.480 0.502 0.556 0.442 0.492 0.545
Conditional probability 0.486 0.520 0.568 0.483 0.577 0.623
Completion of Degree
O bserved proportion 0.659 0.579 0.664 n.a n.a n.a
A djusted  proportion 0.675 0.606 0.588 n.a n.a n.a
Conditional probability 0.692 0.666 0.703 n.a n.a n.a
Source: Williams and Carpenter (1990) “Private schooling and public achievement” Australian Journal of 
Education 34(1): 16.
After adjusting for student background, the Year 12 completion rates for Catholic 
schools were 5-10 per cent higher than government schools, and in non-Catholic 
independent schools were 20 per cent higher than government schools. In terms of entry 
to higher education courses, the data consistently favoured non-government schools 
after adjustment for social background. Catholic schools’ transition rate to higher 
education was 4-5 per cent higher than government schools and the rate for non- 
Catholic independent schools was 8-10 per cent higher than government schools.
The academic advantage conferred by a private school education appears to cease at the 
point of university entrance. Once the students had enrolled in higher education, the 
rates at which students from each sector complete their degrees were reversed. After 
adjusting for social background, the authors found that 67 per cent of government 
school students completed their degree, compared to 61 per cent of students from 
Catholic schools and 59 per cent of students from Independent schools (Williams and
18 On the achievement measure (literacy and numeracy tests at 14 years of age) there was a very small but 
significant difference in learning outcomes between the sectors, after the data were adjusted for social 
background. The authors concluded cautiously, “..while there is evidence of net between-sector 
differences in learning that one might attribute to between-sector differences in schooling, most of the 
observed public/private differences in achievement are due to aggregate public/private sector differences 
in student attributes” (Williams and Carpenter 1990: 18).
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Carpenter 1990:20). This was consistent with findings from other research into 
achievement among first year university students (Dunn 1982 and West 1985).
Social background is not a perfect proxy for educational endowment as the students 
from lower socio-economic backgrounds in non-government schools may have been 
selected because their attitude and motivation differs from the norm for their social 
group. Williams and Carpenter therefore analysed the results for a specific group with 
common socio-economic characteristics, family expectations, and self-concept of 
ability, thus strengthening the basis for comparison between the sectors (Williams and 
Carpenter 1990:16-17)19. Table 4.4 shows the probability of students with similar 
characteristics achieving each of the attainment measures. On the basis of this analysis, 
the authors concluded that students in the same cohort who have similar abilities, 
background and expectations have a probability of completing Year 12 of 0.297 if they 
attend government schools, 0.441 if they attend Catholic schools and 0.563 if they 
attend Independent schools. The probability of entering higher education also increased 
in a non-government school, from 0.483 for government school students, to 0.577 for 
Catholic schools students and 0.623 for Independent school students. In other words, 
when secondary students decide to transfer from a government school to a non­
government school, they could reasonably expect to increase their chances of 
completing Year 12 and of gaining entrance to university, even though every individual 
would not automatically improve his or her prospects by making the transfer.
In summary, Williams and Carpenter demonstrate that a private school education 
delivers superior outcomes for students in terms of completing Year 12 and gaining 
entrance to university, but does not confer any advantages in terms of completing a 
university degree. The strengths of private schools appear to be in motivating students to 
complete Year 12 and in assisting them to maximise their university entrance scores. 
Although non-government schools tend to attract students with above-average 
expectations, when this is taken into account, students from the same social background 
who have the same expectations still have a higher probability of educational success if 
they attend a non-government school.
In the 1970s, government policy aimed to encourage students to transfer to non­
government schools, but it was not the government’s policy intention in the 1980s, once 
enrolments had been restored to previous levels. Yet in spite of the Federal 
government’s attempt to restrict the expansion of non-government school places, and 
the disincentive of a higher real private price for private schooling, an increasing 
number of students transferred to non-government secondary schools in the 1980s. The 
fact that Year 12 student outcomes in private schools are superior to Year 12 outcomes 
in government secondary schools, could be the reason why increasing numbers of 
students transferred to non-government secondary schools during the 1980s. The 
important question to consider is why there is a difference between the quality of 
educational outcomes between government and non-government schools.
19 Specifically, the group was males living in New South Wales with fathers born in Australia, with 
families of origin lying between the 25th and 75th percentile of the wealth distribution who were at the 
mean with regard to father’s occupation, parental education, family size, rurality, the expectations of all 
three significant others, self-concept of ability and achievement (Williams and Carpenter 1990: 17).
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4 Factors that influence school quality
While many factors influence school quality, the following analysis will be confined to 
factors that can be compared on a sectoral basis, and which are widely believed to be 
fundamental to the provision of quality schooling.
4.1 Resource-use in government and non-government schools
When the Karmel funding plan was introduced, the Federal government’s educational 
objectives were broad and expressed entirely in financial terms. Although the 
government’s educational goal was to improve the relative quality of non-government 
schools, school quality was defined in terms of resource-use. Funding was intended to 
raise the level of resource-use in non-government schools in order to improve school 
quality.
Table 4.5 Expenditure per student by type of school and level of schooling, 
1993-94 ($)
Independent Catholic Non-government Government
Primary 4,308 3,193 3,297 4,408
Secondary 7,580 5,270 5,533 5,876
Combined 7,021 5,177 6,566 n.a
Total 6,753 4,146 4,972 4,452
Notes: Expenditure for government schools refers to the 1993-94 financial year, while expenditure for 
non-government schools refers to the 1994 calendar year.
Sources: MCEETYA (1996): National Report on Schooling in Australia 1994, Statistical Annex, Carlton, 
Victoria: Curriculum Corporation: 36.
By 1993-94, Catholic non-government schools were still spending slightly less per 
student than government schools and significantly fewer resources than independent 
schools (see Table 4.5). In terms of the Federal government’s policy, Catholic schools 
would appear to be at a lower standard than government schools because they spend less 
per student than government schools. However, in terms of educational outcomes, 
Williams and Carpenter (1990) have suggested that this is not so.
Ross Williams points out that the level of resources available to government schools is 
relevant to any explanation of the transfer of enrolments between the sectors (Williams 
1985). He suggested that if government funding of government schools increased at the 
same rate as government grants to non-govemment schools, there would be a small net 
drift of students to government schools (Williams 1985: 626). Average government 
outlays per student in government schools increased by an average of 1.3 per cent per 
year between 1983 and 1993 while government grants to non-govemment schools’ 
students increased by an average of 1.6 per year (see Table 4.3). While the different 
rates of increase in funding could influence the relative quality of government and non- 
govemment schools, it does not explain why Catholic schools appear to produce better 
quality educational outcomes on fewer resources than the government school system.
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4.2 School-based inputs to school quality
Although Williams and Carpenter (1990) demonstrate that non-government secondary 
schools produce better educational outcomes at the senior secondary level than 
government schools, they are not sure why this occurs. Williams and Carpenter 
conclude “For whatever the reason, the private sector appears to engender a level of 
commitment to educational attainments (and perhaps to education itself) that is 
independent of achievement” (Williams and Carpenter 1990: 21). Williams and 
Carpenter speculate whether factors such as resources, curriculum, teacher quality, 
pastoral care, discipline, and freedom from bureaucratic control are responsible for the 
differences in outcomes. They also emphasise that their results are suggestive rather 
than definitive, and that factors other than the quality of schooling could account for the 
between-sector differences (1990:17).
The Williams and Carpenter study confirms similar results obtained in analyses by 
James Coleman using the “High School and Beyond” data in the United States of 
America. “High School and Beyond” is a large longitudinal study of students in public 
and private schools funded by the US Federal government. In an analysis of the first 
wave of data from the study in 1982, Coleman, Hoffer and Kilgore (1982) found a small 
but significant superiority in scholastic performance by students in private over 
government schools. Like Williams and Carpenter, Coleman’s team found that a 
student who moved from a government school to a non-government school would 
increase his or her chances of educational success by a small but significant amount.
This led Coleman to suggest that private schools’ policies in areas such as “homework, 
curriculum and disciplinary practices” made them educationally superior to government 
schools (Coleman, et al. 1982: 207). Coleman’s findings have been used in support of 
subsequent campaigns for increasing choice in American schooling (Chubb and Moe 
1990, Coleman 1990, Rouse 1998).
In spite of the reference by Coleman and Williams and Carpenter to factors such as 
“discipline”, “homework” or “leadership”, it is difficult to investigate the role of these 
inputs in the production of superior educational outcomes for a school sector. Although 
such factors may be important in producing educational outcomes, we must rely on 
input data that can be compared on a sectoral basis.
School-based inputs which appear to have a significant effect on student achievement, 
and which can be measured on a sectoral basis are teacher quality, class sizes and the 
characteristics of a children’s peers (Glass et al. 1982, Larkin and Keeves 1984, 
Newbold 1977, Summers and Wolfe 1977). The education production function for 
comparing inter-sectoral quality can therefore be illustrated as:
A = F (GSES, TQ, CS, PG)
Educational achievement (A) is a function of a student’s genetic ability and socio­
economic status (GSES) interacting with school-based inputs such as teacher quality 
(TQ), class sizes (CS) and peer group characteristics (PG). Although we cannot provide 
specific values for each of these factors in the education production function, each of the
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school-based inputs can be measured. Class sizes (CS) are measured by student-staff 
ratios, teacher quality (TQ) can be indicated by years of experience and qualifications, 
and peer group characteristics (PG) can be captured by the average ability of students or 
the average socio-economic status of the student population.
4.2.1 Teacher Quality
Of all the significant school-based inputs, it is most difficult to quantify teacher quality. 
Although qualifications and years of experience are usually associated with teacher 
quality, the evidence is complex and occasionally contradictory. It is likely that 
different types of teachers produce better outcomes for different types of students. 
Goldhaber and Bruer (1997) found that teacher qualifications in maths were a 
significant influence on students’ Year 10 math test scores. Summers and Wolfe (1977) 
said that recently graduated teachers produced higher quality learning among low ability 
students, while those with more experience produced better outcomes with high ability 
students.
Although we cannot quantify the impact of differences in teacher quality in Australia, 
we can identify differences in characteristics of the teaching force between the sectors.
A 1989 survey of teachers in Australian schools identified significant differences in the 
characteristics of the teaching work force between the independent schools on the one 
hand, and the Catholic and government schools on the other (Logan et al. 1990). 
Independent schools had the highest proportion of teachers with 4-5 years of initial 
training, and teachers in both Independent and Catholic schools recorded longer periods 
of service in the same school. Overall, teachers in the Independent schools sector were 
distinctively different on many characteristics, compared to teachers in Catholic and 
government schools. The authors summarised the survey findings in the following 
terms.
. . . staff (in independent schools) held higher qualifications, had longer 
periods of service in the same school, indicated lower intention to transfer, 
occupied more positions which had some responsibility beyond their class 
room, were less inclined to belong to a union, adopted flexible employment 
patterns, were more active in professional and subject associations and made 
more use of tertiary institutions for in-service education. Both Catholic and 
government employing authorities shared these characteristics with the other 
non-government schools, but in lesser degree” (Logan et al. 1990: 45).
There are not many distinctive differences between the teacher profiles of Catholic and 
government schools however, the teacher profile of the Independent school sector is 
different in many important respects. Such differences in characteristics do not 
necessarily denote differences in teacher quality, but it is reasonable to assume that 
teacher morale in Independent schools appears higher than elsewhere, in light of their 
longer periods of employment in the same school. Until more definitive indicators of 
teacher quality are produced, we cannot draw any conclusions other than that teachers in 
independent schools are different in terms of qualifications and professional 
development, and they appear to be more satisfied with their jobs, than teachers in the 
other sectors. These differences in the teachers’ characteristics may contribute to 
improved school quality and therefore be a factor in achieving the superior learning
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outcomes observed in students from independent schools. However, with the possible 
exception of good morale, teacher characteristics cannot be held responsible for the 
superior educational outcomes in Catholic schools where the teaching profile is similar 
to the government system.
4.2.2 Class size
Although parents and teachers place considerable importance on the relationship 
between class size and school quality, the benefits of smaller classes are still contested 
(Marginson 1993: 90-101). Recent studies have also found that the benefits of smaller 
classes differ between groups of students. Whereas smaller classes deliver significant 
improvements in outcomes for low ability students, class size appears to be less 
important for high ability students (Word et al. 1990).
To the extent that small classes are conducive to better learning, their effectiveness is 
highly dependent on teacher quality. In a comprehensive review of class size research, 
Glass et al. concluded that smaller class sizes “provide an opportunity for improvements 
in classroom processes” (1982: 67). Such improvements include improved levels of 
student attention, producing more “time-on-task” per student, as well as more contact 
between students and teachers, resulting in higher student motivation. In general, 
students in smaller classes have more opportunities to participate in learning activities, 
more interactions with the teacher, and are likely to be monitored more closely. The 
beneficial effect of smaller class sizes is therefore dependent on the quality of the 
teacher. If the teacher doesn’t maximise the opportunities presented by smaller classes, 
the potential for improved learning will be wasted (CSC 1984a: par 5.37).
Table 4.6 Average student-teaching staff ratio by level of education, category 
of school, 1986 and 1996
Government Catholic Independent All non­
government
1986 1996 1986 1996 1986 1996 1986 1996
Primary 18.2 17.8 21.1 20.0 17.2 16.1 20.2 18.8
Secondary 12.3 12.7 14.4 13.7 13.1 11.7 13.9 12.8
Source: ABS Cat. No. 4221.0 Schools Australia 1986, 1996.
Whereas the independent school sector has a lower student-staff ratio, the average 
student-staff ratio in Catholic schools is higher than government schools. At the time of 
the Williams and Carpenter study, the differences were greater than they are today, as 
shown in Table 4.6. Between 1986 and 1996, the average student-staff ratio in non­
government secondary schools improved whereas in government secondary schools it 
deteriorated slightly. It is possible that the performance of Independent schools could be 
the product of its smaller classes, but it is not possible to draw such a conclusion for the 
Catholic sector. It is possible that the Catholic system could have a different way of 
managing class sizes internally such as placing high ability students in bigger classes 
and low ability students in smaller classes. However, given the similarity between 
industrial awards for teachers, it is not likely that the Catholic system’s class size
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management practices would be significantly different to those of the government 
system.
4.2.3 Peer group characteristics
A third significant school-based input is the peer group characteristics of the student 
population. North American studies argue that peer group characteristics are a 
significant factor in school quality because peer group attitudes have a strong effect on 
individual students’ motivation to study (Adler et al. 1989, Coleman et al. 1966, 
Henderson et al. 1978, McDill and Rigsby 1973, Mumane 1990).
The peer group characteristics of a school are the aggregate of individual students’ 
ability, motivation and aspirations, which collectively produce the dominant ethos 
among students towards learning (McDill and Rigsby 1973). For example, a high 
average level of student ability would be more likely to produce a peer group culture 
focused on school completion and progression to higher education. A low average level 
of student ability would be more likely to produce a peer group culture that is dominated 
by non-academic interests, poor motivation to study, and few expectations of proceeding 
to further education. Peer groups influence student achievement at many levels, from 
groupings within the classroom, to whole school effects (Fuchs et al. 1998, Summers 
and Wolfe 1977)20.
The most well-known study on peer group effects was the Coleman report in 1966 
which argued that black students would benefit from attending white schools simply due 
to the influence of their peers. Summers and Wolfe (1977) found that all students (both 
black and non-black) benefited in terms of the largest growth in achievement scores, 
when in schools with a 40-60 per cent black student body, rather than in more racially 
segregated schools. However, the significance of peer group characteristics is not 
confined to race. Summers and Wolfe found that both race and ability were the most 
significant peer group characteristics in terms of their effect on individual student’s 
performance21.
The peer group characteristics of a school are often represented by the average socio­
economic status of the student population because of the significant relationship 
between socio-economic status and educational achievement. The impact of peer group 
characteristics as measured by the average socio-economic status of students should not 
be confused with the impact of the socio-economic status of the individual student on 
his or her learning outcomes. The social background of the student is an individual 
characteristic that influences a student’s educational performance. The average socio­
economic status of the student’s peer group is a school-based characteristic that 
influences each student’s achievement.
20 As for any school input, peer group characteristics do not offer a complete explanation of differences in 
school quality. Evidence that schools with almost identical socio-economic profiles can have vastly 
different educational outcomes (see Lamb 1997) suggests that other inputs must also play a significant 
role in school performance.
21 Peer group characteristics found to be not significant included the percentage of students getting free 
lunches, student mobility, the median income of the feeder areas, the change in income of the area, and 
average daily attendance levels (Summers and Wolfe 1977:647).
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Table 4.7 Proportion of parents in professional and clerical occupations by 
school type, Australia 1980.
Sector Proportion of
Students (%)
Government schools 42
Catholic schools 58
Independent schools______________ 82_____
Source: Anderson (1992) “The interaction of public and private school systems”. Australian Journal o f 
Education, 36(3): 213-236.
Using the occupational status of parents to measure peer group effects in Australian 
schools, Table 4.7 indicates that students from lower SES backgrounds are the dominant 
peer group in government schools while students from higher socio-economic 
backgrounds are dominant in Independent schools. Catholic schools have a higher 
proportion of high SES students than government schools but less than Independent 
schools. These data are drawn from the same survey that Williams and Carpenter 
(1990) used when comparing government and non-government school performance.
The proportion of parents in professional and clerical occupations in government 
schools was 42 per cent, compared to 58 per cent in Catholic schools and 82 per cent in 
Independent schools. Peer group effects might explain part of the difference in 
performance between students in Catholic schools and government schools, in spite of 
the lower average level of resource-use and larger class sizes in the Catholic system.
Neither Williams and Carpenter (1990) in Australia, nor Coleman, Hoffer and Kilgore 
(1982) in the USA took into account peer group characteristics in their comparison of 
public and private school performance. An American economist, Richard Mumane, re­
analysed the data used in the Coleman et al. study, to take into account differences in 
student composition, and the significant association between school type and student 
performance disappeared (Mumane 1986). Mumane argued that a large part of the 
observed difference in school quality between the public and private sector was due to 
differences in the social composition of the student population within each sector.
While the original study had controlled for students’ social background, it had not taken 
into account the average socio-economic status of the school population. Mumane’s 
analysis indicated that if a government school student moved into a non-government 
school and took his or her classmates along, the educational advantage associated with 
attending a non-government school ceased to exist (Mumane 1986: 145).
Given the absence of other explanations, at least part of the difference in outcomes 
between government and Catholic schools observed by Williams and Carpenter could be 
attributed to differences in peer group characteristics. The superior educational 
outcomes of Independent schools can probably be attributed to higher resource levels, 
differences in teacher characteristics, smaller class sizes and peer group effects.
However from the above analysis of factors that influence school quality, the one area in 
which the Catholic system differs from government schools is in the peer group 
characteristics of its student population.
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4.2.4 Changes in the social composition of the student population
We have observed that the relative quality of non-government schools is higher than 
government schools (in terms of Year 12 outcomes). We also know that peer group 
effects contribute to the relative quality of learning outcomes in schooling. It may be 
useful to consider the possible impact of recent changes in the peer group characteristics 
of the student population on the relative quality of public and private schools.
The peer group characteristics of the whole secondary student population changed 
significantly during the 1980s, due to a government policy to increase Year 12 retention 
rates. Year 12 retention rates increased from 36 per cent in 1982 to over 70 per cent in 
the 1990s. The expansion of senior secondary enrolments in the early 1980s produced 
an increase in the proportion of students from lower socio-economic backgrounds at the 
senior secondary level. As shown in Figure 4.3, the proportion of students from the 
lowest SES deciles completing Year 12 increased from 39 per cent in 1985 to 63 per 
cent in 1994. The students attempting Year 12 in the 1980s possessed different socio­
economic characteristics to the senior secondary students of previous decades.
Figure 4.3 Estimated Year 12 completion rate by socio-economic status, 1985 to 
1994
High SES
60 - >
Low SES
Notes: Socio-economic status is determined by the ABS Index of Education and occupation, on the basis 
of Year 12 students’ home address. ‘Low SES’ refers to the average of the lowest three deciles and ‘High 
SES’ is the average of the top three SES deciles.
Source: AEC (1990) and MCEETYA (1996) National Report on Schooling in Australia Statistical Annex.
These changes in the secondary school student population would have altered the peer 
group characteristics of all senior secondary students. Given that government schools 
cater for the highest proportion of low SES students, the government school sector 
would have been the most affected by changes in overall student composition. Non­
government schools enrol a higher proportion of high SES students not only because 
they charge fees but because they are able to select students on other criteria, including 
ability, ambition and motivation to study. Therefore the average level of ability and the
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social background of non-government school students would not have changed to the 
same extent as in the government school system.
Peer group characteristics influence educational outcomes in different ways for different 
groups of students. Summers and Wolfe found that low-achieving students (those who 
tested at grade level or lower) appeared to receive the most benefit from being in a 
school with high-achieving students. The high-achieving students, on the other hand, 
were not particularly affected by the average level of ability of their peers.
High achievers are relatively unaffected by variations in the percentage of top 
achievers. But, for the low achievers, the intellectual composition associated 
with the other characteristics of the student body has a direct impact on 
learning (Summers and Wolfe 1977: 647).
To the extent that peer group characteristics influence school quality, the changes in 
secondary student participation in the 1980s would have affected the quality of 
government schools. Such changes would be likely to cause students to transfer out of 
government secondary schools to the non-govemment system, in spite of an increase in 
the real private price of private schooling. The power to select students, and therefore to 
determine peer group composition gives schools the opportunity to differentiate their 
student body in a way that will enhance school quality. Schools with more power over 
student selection -  or school location -  will have a competitive advantage over schools 
which are not as well placed to select their students.
Whereas the benefits of peer group composition can be obtained through student 
selection, other inputs to school quality come at a cost. While schools affected by 
changes in their student populations could maintain quality by providing smaller class 
sizes or better teachers, they would have to purchase these inputs. Favourable peer 
group characteristics can be obtained at no cost through selective enrolment. Increased 
resources were not provided to government schools in the 1980s to compensate for 
changes in student social composition. Funding for government schools increased at a 
lower rate than for non-govemment schools.
An issue for policy is that the advantages of peer group selection in terms of school 
quality can only be obtained by a limited number of schools at any one time. It is 
impossible for all schools to improve their peer group characteristics simultaneously. 
Improvements in the peer group characteristics of one school can only gained at the 
expense of another school. The benefits of a favourable peer group composition in one 
school cannot be replicated by another school, unless all the students transfer from one 
school to another. The critical fallacy of composition is that while individual students 
may be able to improve their education by moving to a school attended by students of 
above-average ability or socio-economic status, it is impossible for all students to attend 
such schools . In other words, the aggregate of individuals’ investment decisions (ie. 
each acting to maximise self-interest) does not translate to better schooling for all. This 
poses a dilemma for governments aiming to improve school quality for all. If the 
quality of some schools is only gained at the expense of other schools through peer
22 Murnane (1986: 142) argues that if all students moved from the government to the non-government 
sector, the superior performance of non-government schools would probably disappear.
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group composition, additional policy instruments are needed to ensure quality in all 
schools.
4.3 Summary
Independent (ie. non-Catholic private) schools spend on average fifty per cent more 
resources per student than other schools, have a different profile of teacher 
characteristics, have smaller class sizes and are distinctly different in terms of the 
characteristics of their student populations. All these factors probably contribute to the 
higher quality of Independent schools as measured by students’ academic outcomes in 
Year 12.
Catholic schools, on the other hand, spend slightly less per student than government 
schools, have similar teacher profiles and slightly larger average class sizes than the 
government system. The only input in which Catholic schools are better off than 
government schools is the peer group characteristics of their student populations.
Within the limitations of this comparison, the peer group characteristics of Catholic 
schools could contribute in part to the slightly higher school quality demonstrated by the 
Catholic sector. However we cannot assume that peer group characteristics alone 
account for the quality of Catholic schools compared to other schools .
It is also likely that changes in social composition affected the quality of government 
secondary schools compared to non-government schools during the 1980s. If the quality 
of the public school system is not maintained relative to the private school sector, 
students can be expected to transfer to private schools, just as they transferred to the 
government system when the reverse was occurring in the 1960s. In the 1980s, the 
effect of changes in peer group composition together with the rapidly improving 
resource base of non-government schools could have provided sufficient cause for 
students to transfer to the private sector, in spite of the increased real private price of 
private schools.
Given that peer group characteristics influence school quality, the social composition of 
school populations should be acknowledged in any schools funding framework. A 
further implication of the role of peer group characteristics in determining school quality 
is that competition and school choice alone are not sufficient to improve educational 
outcomes for all students (Adler et al. 1989: 208)24.
23There are variations within sectors that are beyond the scope of this comparison of outcomes between 
sectors.
24 This Scottish study found that while individual parents who exercised choice tended to boost their 
children’s attainment, the accumulated effects of individual choosing were to increase educational 
inequalities between schools and social polarisation among student populations.
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5 Competition and school education policy
Schooling is not a race, its major objective is not to identify winners and losers 
but to give maximum assistance to all young people growing up. It should be 
seen as intervention designed to widen the options, possibilities and experience 
open to all children, and particularly to those whose options were more limited.
Schools Commission (1975) Report for the Triennium 1976-78, Canberra.
AGPS. p. 7.
Competition has always existed in schooling, because of education’s function as a 
gatekeeper to careers and well-paid employment (Marginson 1997). Education has an 
important function in fostering a child’s intellectual, social and emotional development, 
but its material purpose has a major impact on an individual’s life-long earnings and job 
prospects. Although the Schools Commission tried to emphasise the multiple roles of 
schooling, it was unrealistic for Federal policy makers to deny the importance of 
competition in education. The provision of government funding fundamentally changed 
the nature of competition between all schools in Australia and has had an impact on the 
lifetime opportunities of millions of school children.
There are three main ways in which competition is important to schooling. The first 
competitive arena is for access to higher education. In Australia’s merit-based system, 
access to universities is determined by competition between students in Year 12. The 
preparation for this competition begins thirteen years earlier, and increases as students 
approach Year 12 assessment. Success in the race for university entrance delivers 
significant material rewards in terms of life-time earnings for individuals. In this arena 
of individual competition, students can gain a competitive advantage through natural 
ability, hard work, and the purchase of a higher quality education (Marginson 1997:
133).
The second arena of competition is between schools -  mainly private or selective 
schools -  for students. When parents decide to invest time and/or money in their child’s 
education, they seek the educational environment most likely to deliver educational 
success. They judge schools on the basis of academic results as well as other factors. 
Schools therefore compete with each other for potential clients. (Edwards and Whitty 
1992). Peer group characteristics are an important aspect of school quality in the 
education market. To enhance the quality of their learning environment, (and thereby 
improve their market position) schools can offer scholarships to able students as well as 
rejecting students whom they consider undesirable. Success in the competition between 
schools goes to those which offer the highest quality learning environment at an 
affordable price. Success tends to breed success, because the school which achieves the 
best Year 12 results attracts more potential clients from which to select its future 
students. In this arena of competition, schools can obtain a competitive advantage by 
being as selective as possible in choosing their students.
A third arena of competition in education has been introduced by governments in an 
effort to improve school quality. Through the abolition of zoning in government 
schools, and the relaxation of restrictions on new non-government schools, parents have
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been given more power to select the school of their choice (Caldwell and Hayward 
1998). Competition policy in schooling aims to improve school quality through 
widening consumer choice, thereby hoping that only the effective schools will survive 
under competition (Chubb and Moe 1990). It is argued that public schools react to 
competition by upgrading their provision and respond to parents’ demands for more 
demanding curricula and a more structured classroom environment (Hoxby 1998).
The argument that competition between schools will improve educational efficiency was 
developed by Milton Friedman in 1962. Friedman did not advocate the privatisation of 
schooling, but he questioned the government’s role in providing school education 
services as opposed to simply funding them (Friedman 1962: 85-98). Friedman argued 
that the legitimacy of government provision of schooling rested on three key 
assumptions: first, that governments should establish and monitor education standards; 
second, that governments should finance school education to ensure universal access; 
and third, that governments were the most efficient and effective providers of school 
education services. Friedman recognised the existence of “neighbourhood effects” or 
externalities from universal school education of a high standard. He therefore accepted 
that there is a role for governments in setting educational standards and in financing 
school education to a certain level.
Friedman challenged the third assumption that a system of government-run schools is 
the most efficient and effective way to provide education services (Friedman 1962: 89) 
and proposed that government funding should be provided to parents in the form of a 
voucher redeemable for a specified maximum sum per child per year if spent on 
‘approved’ educational services. “Parents would then be free to spend this sum and any 
additional sum they themselves provided on purchasing educational services from an 
‘approved’ educational institution of their own choice” (Friedman 1962: 89). 
Friedman’s choice model was subsequently developed to incorporate the idea that 
vouchers could be “weighted” according to the financial means of the child’s family, to 
enable children from lower income families to gain access to better schools (Center for 
Study of Public Policy 1970, Friedman and Friedman 1980, Levin 1968, Jencks 1966, 
Sizer and Whitten 1968).
As funding for Australian schools is allocated on the basis of the number of students 
enrolled each year, all schools -  both government and non-government -  are funded on 
a quasi-voucher system. Although the link between the government and the schools is 
not removed entirely -  as Friedman’s model implies -  the mobility of the subsidy to 
facilitate parental choice is a key feature of the voucher system. In most States, a 
portion of the per capita funding for government schools is calculated on the basis of 
student characteristics, thus resembling “weighted” vouchers (Caldwell and Hayward 
1998). In the non-government sector, however, the vouchers are “weighted” according 
to the purported financial needs of the schools.
For the voucher model to achieve its objective, two elements had to be in place. First, 
all schools -  public and private -  had to compete for vouchers on an equal basis; 
second, the vouchers had to be of equal value to all students, except where they were 
weighted to compensate for social disadvantages. In the United States, whenever 
governments have attempted to implement the voucher model, it has never been
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possible to obtain the consent of all schools25. In Australia, both government and non­
government schools are funded on a quasi-voucher system, but the vouchers are not of 
equal value and the basis for determining grant levels varies between schools and 
sectors. Although the efficacy of the voucher model has never been fully tested, 
Australian schools are closer to the voucher model than schools in the USA. The main 
obstacles to its full implementation in Australia are: 1) that government and non­
government schools operate under different voucher systems; and 2) that the vouchers 
for non-government schools are not weighted according to student characteristics. It 
will be difficult to resolve these problems as long as both Federal and State governments 
provide funding to government and non-government schools26.
In its June 1996 report, Stocktake of Progress in Micro-economic reforms, the 
Productivity Commission noted that it was time for a wide-ranging assessment of the 
nature of public involvement in education, health and community services. In regard to 
education, the Commission commented that the current regime for funding and 
delivering education services does not sit well with the principles of increased client 
choice and competition in service delivery. In the view of the Productivity Commission,
Funding, charging and regulatory arrangements (for education):
• limit students’ institutional and course choices;
• provide few signals to suppliers about students’ preferences and restrict their 
ability to respond to those preferences; and
• do little to encourage accountability for performance at either the institutional 
or teacher level
(Productivity Commission 1996).
The current Federal government policy is to encourage competition between all schools 
(Kemp 1997d). In 1996 the Federal Minister for Schools, Dr David Kemp abolished the 
New Schools Policy guidelines, arguing that increasing the level of competition between 
schools would improve the quality of education provision (Kemp 1996a).
Responsibility for determining the eligibility of new non-government schools for 
Commonwealth funding was returned to State and Territory governments. However, the 
abolition of the New Schools Policy has not removed the anomalies in Australian 
schools funding arrangements. Choice of schooling will continue to be affected by the 
fact that vouchers for non-government schools are not weighted on the basis of student 
characteristics and that levels of grants differ between States, and between government 
and non-government schools.
Until government and non-government schools are funded on the same basis, any 
benefits of increased competition can not be realised in Australian schooling. The 
competitive environment between schools remains distorted by the differences in the 
Federal and State funding schemes for government and non-government schools.
25 Murnane (1986: 148-149) lists several small-scale attempts to implement vouchers in the USA, all of 
which were severely compromised in implementation.
26Under the Federal scheme are paid to non-government schools (up to $2,600 per student) while the 
smallest subsidies are paid to government schools ($336-$500 per student). State governments operate 
parallel funding systems where the relative weight of the subsidies is reversed. States provide on average 
$4,500 per student in government schools and between $200-$2,000 per student in private schools 
(MCEETYA 1996: 36-38).
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Seventy per cent of non-government schools will still have a price advantage over the 
remaining non-government schools through higher levels of government funding. Non­
government schools retain the power to select and reject students to a greater extent than 
government schools. The only vouchers covering the full cost of education provision 
are in the government school system. Competition between government schools 
remains restricted as most government schools are bound by open enrolment policies. 
Although the abolition of the New Schools Policy removes a barrier to competition 
between schools, the existing funding schemes would need to be changed radically for 
the Howard government to claim it has created an education market that will improve 
school performance.
Conclusion
Governments have never provided sufficient resources to fund a mass education system 
in Australia, always relying on the private sector to bear a proportion of the costs. This 
may have compromised the achievement of policy objectives such as mass participation 
and high standards of education provision. Although governments took over schools for 
the purpose of making education universal, they only achieved this at the primary school 
level. For most of this century, the completion of secondary schooling and access to 
university has remained primarily a private investment. This situation began to change 
after the Second World War when secondary participation rates increased and the 
provision of teaching scholarships broadened access to universities. But when the cost 
of the post-war participation boom placed too much pressure on public budgets, 
governments opted to assist private providers to bear some of the cost. However, the 
fiscal benefits of providing subsidies to expand private school enrolments have declined 
as the level of subvention in non-government schools funding has increased.
The Commonwealth’s involvement has strengthened the role of the private sector in 
school education provision, particularly at the secondary level. While the Karmel model 
for schools funding achieved its objective of reversing the drift of enrolments away from 
non-government schools, once this objective was achieved, the scheme facilitated the 
continuing expansion of the non-govemment sector. In spite of Commonwealth 
attempts to restrain private school growth on non-govemment schools through the New 
Schools Policy, the non-govemment schools sector continued to expand. In the 1980s, 
when school education experienced a participation boom at the senior secondary level, 
the quality of government schools declined in comparison to non-govemment schools. 
The changing quality of government secondary schools, coupled with a continuing 
improvement in the quality of non-govemment schools, provided incentives for students 
to transfer to non-govemment schools, particularly at the secondary level.
The basis for the Karmel funding scheme was the Australian Labor Party’s platform that 
stated that all non-govemment schools should be funded “on the basis of need”. The 
Federal government chose to interpret this policy in terms of the financial needs of 
schools (Karmel 1973). If the Labor Party’s policy had been interpreted in terms of the 
needs of students, the nature and purpose of the funding scheme would have been 
different. A subsidy weighted according to the financial needs of families rather than 
the financial needs of schools, would have been more consistent with the Friedman 
model of weighted vouchers. Such a scheme would have enlarged parental choice and
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enabled schools to compete for a wider range of students. Instead, the Federal 
government provided funding to non-government schools on the basis of the financial 
needs of the schools, rather than the students within them. This arrangement distorted 
the competition between service providers (both government and non-government) and 
created inequalities in the competition between schools.
Commonwealth government policy now aims to promote competition between all 
schools, in both the government and private sectors. As the quality of schools and 
sectors is influenced by the resources available, government funding remains a defining 
influence on the development of the private schools sector, and its relationship to public 
schools. Although competition between schools has the potential to improve efficiency 
in service provision, the Federal government’s funding framework distorts competition 
between Australian schools. Non-government schools are unequal in terms of the level 
of funding they receive from government. Government schools have less power over 
student selection than non-government schools. The subsidies for private schools are 
not weighted according to student characteristics or parents’ capacity to pay. Policies to 
promote competition between schools in Australia are compromised by the different 
funding arrangements for each sector and the division of funding responsibilities 
between two levels of government. Competition and choice cannot be effective policy 
instruments until the funding system for public and private schools is determined within 
a single policy framework. It is unlikely that such a framework could be devised when 
the funding responsibilities for public and private schools remain split between two 
levels of government.
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Chapter 5
Reasons for the Commonwealth to withdraw from schools 
funding
Introduction
Although the Commonwealth government has been involved in schools funding for 
thirty years, this chapter questions whether Federal intervention was necessary to 
improve the quality of Australian schooling. Although the provision of Federal funding 
improved the quality of non-govemment schools, Commonwealth involvement has been 
a barrier to the development of a consistent funding policy for all schools. The previous 
four chapters have highlighted the anomalies created by Federal involvement in 
schooling and the difficulties in achieving accountability for Commonwealth 
expenditure. In this chapter, I will present an argument for the Federal government to 
withdraw from schools funding, as well as discussing the obstacles to such a reform. 
While current SPPs could be transferred to untied Financial Assistance Grants without 
diminishing the Commonwealth’s role in national schools policy, the main obstacle to 
reform would be the possible financial impact of such a transfer on non-govemment 
schools.
1 Federal financial relations in Australia
On a general level, the argument for reducing the level of total Specific Purpose 
Payments is to grant the States more flexibility in the management of their budgets. 
School education is a clear case of Commonwealth intervention in an area that remains 
the Constitutional policy responsibility of State and Territory governments. It is only 
possible for the Commonwealth to intervene in schooling because the Australian 
Federal government raises more money than it spends on its own policies and programs 
while the States raise insufficient resources for their own needs. The Commonwealth 
therefore returns some forty per cent of its revenue from taxation to the States and 
Territories in the form of financial assistance. Section 96 of the Constitution provides 
the legal basis for these transfers by enabling the Commonwealth to “grant financial 
assistance to any State on such terms and conditions as the Parliament thinks fit”. The 
Commonwealth provides financial assistance to State and Territory governments via 
two principal funding mechanisms: General Revenue Assistance and Specific Purpose 
Payments (SPPs).
1.1 General Revenue Assistance and Specific Purpose Payments (SPPs)
General Revenue Assistance -  consisting primarily of Financial Assistance Grants 
(FAGs) -  is provided by the Federal Treasurer to State Treasuries to be used as States’ 
own-purpose outlays. Financial Assistance Grants are called “untied grants” because the 
States are free to allocate the money as they wish. The amount that each State receives 
through FAGs is determined by a fiscal equalisation formula developed by the
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Commonwealth Grants Commission every five years. The purpose of fiscal equalisation 
is to compensate States which would have difficulty raising sufficient revenue from 
their own sources to provide the same standard of service as other States in the 
Commonwealth. In 1997-98, a total of $16.8 billion will be provided as General 
Revenue Assistance, of which $16.1 billion is Financial Assistance Grants 
{Commonwealth Budget Paper No. 3, 1997-98: 24)1.
Specific Purpose Payments (SPPs) are allocated by Commonwealth portfolio Ministers 
and represent Commonwealth intervention in policy areas that are the Constitutional 
responsibility of the States. As the Commonwealth specifies how these grants will be 
spent by the States, SPPs are called “tied grants”. In 1997-98, a total of $18.1 billion 
will be allocated to the States under SPPs. The education and health portfolios account 
for the bulk of Specific Purpose Payments. Over $7 billion is spent on Education, $5.5 
billion on Health, and approximately $1 billion each on Housing, Social Security, 
Transport, and Local government. Within the Education budget, $3 billion is spent on 
Higher Education and Research, and $3.6 billion is spent on schools {Commonwealth 
Budget Paper 1997-98 No 3: 40-85).
Figure 5.1 Escalation of current outlays on General Revenue Assistance, 
Financial Assistance Grants and Specific Purpose Payments for 
Schools, 1987-88 to 1997-98.
—♦ —Schools SPFfe 
FAGs(net) 
—♦ —Total QPA
100% - -
60% -
Notes: Schools data include current expenditure on recurrent grants, targeted programs and aboriginal 
education. Capital funding is excluded from all categories because the data are not comparable. The GRA 
and FAGs totals are net of the States’ fiscal contributions in 1996-97 and 1997-98.
Sources: Commonwealth Budget Papers various years; Department of Finance (1997) Catalogue of 
Specific Purpose Payments to the States and Territories 1996-97.
The total level of Specific Purpose Payments has risen steadily in recent years, from 
$16.6 billion in 1993-94 to $18 billion in 1997-98. Over the past twenty years, SPPs 
have increased as a percentage of total Commonwealth payments to the States by around 
seven percentage points. Federal Treasury attributes this, in part, to the “relatively 
generous escalation arrangements which have applied to SPPs compared to general
1 Excluding State and Territory fiscal contributions.
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purpose payments”(C6>mme>nw<?tf/r/z Budget Papers 1997-98 No. 3: 39). For example, 
total current SPPs for schools have increased by 124 per cent over the past ten years, 
while total current general revenue assistance has increased by only 18 per cent, and 
Financial Assistance Grants have increased by 32 per cent, as illustrated in Figure 5.1.
The Commonwealth must use Section 96 to fund schools because education is a residual 
State power. In a 1946 referendum the Federal government won the right to make 
provision for “benefits to students” under Section 51(23A) of the Constitution. This 
amendment provided a basis for the introduction of Commonwealth financial assistance 
schemes, and could potentially enable the Commonwealth to provide direct funding to 
higher education institutions and non-government schools. However, if the “benefits to 
students” power were ever used to fund government schools directly, it would probably 
be challenged in the High Court (Birch 1975). Commonwealth funding to both 
government and non-government schools is therefore paid to the States under Section 96 
of the Constitution in recognition of the States’ right to deliver schooling.
1.2 SPPs to and through the States
The conditions attached to SPPs vary in both degree and form and tied grants can be 
classified into two categories: SPPs to the States; and SPPs through the States. SPPs to 
the States are less tightly “tied” because the States are given operational responsibility 
for spending the grant, provided that they pursue the Commonwealth’s specified policy 
objectives. Sixty per cent of all SPPs are paid to the States. Within the education 
portfolio, Commonwealth grants for government schools ($1.5 billion) are the only 
SPPs paid to the States.
When a Specific Purpose Payment is paid through the States, the grant is passed on to 
another body and the State government plays no policy role in distributing the money. 
State treasuries are simply used as “post-offices” through which the Commonwealth 
directs payments to another agency. SPPs through the States “are essentially 
Commonwealth own-purpose outlays with the States acting as the Commonwealth’s 
agent” (Commonwealth Budget Paper 1997-98, No.3: 38). However, they have to be 
paid as Section 96 grants because the expenditure does not fall within the 
Commonwealth’s constitutional jurisdiction. SPPs through the States are a rising 
proportion of total gross payments to the States from the Commonwealth. While the 
SPPs to the States have remained a constant proportion of total Commonwealth grants, 
SPPs through the States have increased from 14 per cent of total outlays to 20 per cent 
over the past two decades. With the exception of a relatively small allocation to local 
government, all SPPs through the States are within the Education portfolio. 
Commonwealth grants worth $3.8 billion for higher education and university research, 
and $2.1 billion for non-government schools are paid as SPPs through the States 
annually (Commonwealth Budget Paper 1997-98, No. 3: 39, 81-85).
1.3 The case for reducing Specific Purpose Payments (SPPs)
If the States had the capacity to raise sufficient income to meet their outlays, the Federal 
government would not need to return any income to the States, nor would it have the 
capacity to intervene in State affairs using Section 96 grants. Galligan argues that the
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Commonwealth’s revenue surplus makes it susceptible to pursuing ‘good ideas’ and to 
responding to interest group pressures for new policy initiatives in areas that are the 
responsibility of the States. “Its monopoly over income taxes gives the Commonwealth 
both the means and the inclination, because of the realities of politics and interest 
groups, to intrude into key policy areas that would otherwise be solely under State 
jurisdiction” (Galligan 1995: 31).
A high level of SPPs is undesirable because it interferes with the efficient delivery of 
State government services and creates confusion in accountability for public 
expenditure. The Federal government’s National Commission of Audit cited the benefits 
of reducing the range of activities funded through Specific Purpose Payments as: 
clarifying the roles and responsibilities between levels of government; reducing the 
costs of unnecessary duplication in administration, consultation, negotiation and 
reporting between different levels of government; and removing avenues for cost- 
shifting between levels of government (Officer, 1996, p. x). This view is shared by the 
Productivity Commission which states “the high degree of Commonwealth control over 
taxation revenue enables it to extend its influence to State areas of responsibility, 
especially through tied grants. Among other things, this has contributed to confusion 
and duplication in roles and responsibilities” (1996: 176).
From a States’ perspective, the high level of Commonwealth SPPs is at best 
unnecessary, and at worst intrusive and inefficient. The cost of duplication of 
administration and coordination in the payment of all SPPs is estimated to be at least 
$50 million a year -  resources which might otherwise be spent on services (Noon 1991: 
36). In terms of States’ budgets, SPPs for government schools are irrelevant because 
they are included in the Commonwealth Grants Commission’s fiscal equalisation 
formula for distributing untied grants. This means that “if a State gets relatively less 
assistance through Specific Purpose Payments, it receives relatively more general 
revenue assistance” (Noon 1991: 25). The exception is SPPs paid through the States, 
such as non-government schools funding, which produces a different fiscal outcome for 
non-government schools. Funding for non-government schools is effectively excluded 
from the fiscal equalisation calculations, so the amount States’ receive through FAGs is 
not adjusted to recognise Commonwealth specific purpose payments to non-government 
schools.
As discussed in Chapter Four, the dual funding system for government and non­
government schools impedes the process of rational policy development at the State 
level. For example, central issues in State education policy today relate to the 
promotion of diversity, autonomy, choice and competition in schools provision. As 
more government schools are given budgetary autonomy and are expected to raise an 
increasing proportion of their income from private sources, the division between public 
and private schooling has become increasingly blurred. State governments are 
implementing competition policies for schools which increase parents’ choice (Caldwell 
and Hayward 1998). The Productivity Commission (1996) points out that the current 
regime for funding and delivering eduction services does not sit well with the principles 
of increased client choice and competition in service delivery. The role of the 
Commonwealth as the main funding provider to non-government schools reduces the 
scope of schools funding initiatives by State governments. While States are in theory
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responsible for all schools, in practice, more than thirty per cent of students are in non­
government schools which are funded on a different basis by the Federal government.
In the context these arguments, the Productivity Commission recommended that the 
Federal government should “reduce the significance of tied grants by broadbanding 
specific purpose payments and/or absorbing them into financial assistance grants”
(1996: 177). In regard to schools, the National Commission of Audit recommended that 
funding for primary and secondary education should be the sole responsibility of State 
governments and that Commonwealth Specific Purpose Payments for schools should be 
transferred to untied Financial Assistance Grants (Officer, 1996: xii)2.
2 Commonwealth funding for schools
It is understandable why auditors and independent agencies would recommend a 
reduction in SPPs because such a reform would be defensible on efficiency grounds 
alone. However the withdrawal of Federal involvement in schools funding should also 
be consistent with the achievement of Commonwealth policy goals. The following 
section will discuss Commonwealth interests in school education and the fiscal impact 
of Commonwealth involvement on government and non-government schools.
2.1 National policy objectives
The first goal of the Common and Agreed National Goals for Schooling is “to provide 
an excellent education for all young people, being one that develops their talents and 
capacities to full potential, and is relevant to the social, cultural and economic needs of 
the nation” (Australian Education Council 1989). In developing these goals, State and 
Territory governments agreed on the importance of education to the nation’s social and 
economic development. There is a high degree of national uniformity in key policy 
areas such as compulsory school ages, curriculum, teacher qualifications, staff-student 
ratios and other issues relating to service standards and quality of provision. While the 
Commonwealth has a role in ensuring that the outcomes of schooling are in the national 
interest, this can be pursued with a few SPPs targeted to specific policy goals.
For most of this century, Federal involvement in Australian schooling was limited to a 
number of ad hoc initiatives to achieve national policy goals (Tannock 1969). This 
changed in 1969 when the Federal government commenced direct recurrent funding for 
schools. On the advice of the Karmel Committee, in 1974 the Federal government 
introduced a major funding initiative based around three components: current, capital 
and targeted grants.
General recurrent funding is the largest of all the Federal SPPs for schools but it does 
not seek to achieve any particular national educational objective. As it was introduced 
simply to raise the resource standards of schools, the policy goals of the program are 
deliberately broad (See Appendix Three). Recurrent SPPs are pooled with State 
resources in the funding of both government and non-government schools and form part 
of the basic operating expenditure of both sectors. This makes it impossible to monitor
2 This recommendation was rejected by the Federal government (Kemp 1996b).
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the use of the funds and the Auditor-General is prevented from conducting efficiency 
audits of Commonwealth expenditure. As discussed in Chapter Three, the capacity to 
monitor educational outcomes for recurrent expenditure is weaker than for other types of 
tied grants because of the lack of specific policy goals. States are simply required to 
provide information on student outcomes within an agreed information framework in 
the National Report on Schooling. As the Commonwealth recurrent grants program for 
government and non-government schools does not serve any specific national policy 
goal, and the grants are subsumed into schools’ general operating budgets, recurrent 
SPPs for schools could be transferred to FAGs without undermining the national 
interest.
Commonwealth capital assistance for schools began in the early 1950s, when the 
Menzies government introduced tax concessions for private school buildings, followed 
by capital grants for science laboratories and school libraries in 1964 and 1968 
respectively . Capital grants are provided to systems and non-government school 
authorities as block grants and are occasionally linked to specific national priorities. 
However capital investment remains a useful policy instrument for promoting economic 
growth, and additional capital funding was provided for school buildings under the 
Federal government’s One Nation economic statement in 1992 (Commonwealth Budget 
Papers 1992-93). Because capital funding has the potential to be used to pursue 
national policy goals, it should be retained as a Commonwealth SPP.
National goals are pursued most directly through Commonwealth targeted programs, 
which allocate resources to specific policy areas. To ensure that the grants are spent on 
Commonwealth policy goals, many targeted programs have been administered 
separately from State education programs for most of the past twenty-five years3 4. After 
the abolition of the Schools Commission, as State policies and Commonwealth policies 
became more consistent, targeted program funds were frequently combined with State 
government funding for the same purpose. In 1994, most of the older targeted programs 
were broadbanded into a National Equity Program, as an outcome of the Federal/State 
negotiations on fiscal reform. However, under the Broadbanded program, the Federal 
government established separate block grants for government and non-government 
schools, which completely excluded State and Territory governments from a policy role 
in distributing funds to non-govemment schools (DEET 1994).
Broadbanding means that the money for a group of programs is paid as one large SPP, 
under which the targeted programs assume the status of elements. The only difference 
to the previous menu of targeted programs is that the grant recipient has the freedom to 
move the resources between the program elements. While broadbanding has been 
suggested as a compromise solution by the Productivity Commission, it does not 
overcome the major problem associated with Federal involvement in schooling. The 
intrusive policy impact of Federal schools funding is not caused by overly prescriptive
3 The rationale for providing capital grants for science laboratories in 1964 was partly in response to the 
successful Russian launch of Sputnik 1 in 1957 which led to widespread criticism of the quality of science 
education by academics, science teachers and members of the business community (Smart 1978, Ch.3).
4 The Disadvantaged Schools Program, for example, was administered by regional committees of 
stakeholders such as parents, teachers and community members. Although the State Education 
Departments established the Committees, they only had one representative on them.
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funding conditions, but rather the anomalies created by the different funding policies for 
each sector. Recurrent SPPs for government and non-government schools are already 
“broadbanded” in the sense that the recipients have the freedom to distribute the 
resources as they choose between schools. However this does not remove the 
undesirable policy impact of Commonwealth SPPs for schools, arising from the split in 
funding between government and non-government schools. Unless broadbanding gave 
the States flexibility to move resources between government and non-government 
schools, the policy would not remove the contradictions of the existing funding 
arrangements. As long as the Commonwealth retains the power to determine the 
resource levels for the non-government sector, the Federal government is preventing 
States from implementing common funding policies for all schools.
In 1994, at least a dozen targeted schools programs were not included in the 
broadbanded National Equity Program5. The retained programs focused on recent 
policy initiatives which the Federal Labor Minister was not prepared to hand over to the 
States and Territories. In 1997, the Federal Coalition Minister abolished the National 
Equity Program and re-grouped the targeted elements into five priority areas within a 
broadbanded framework6. Like his predecessor, the Federal Education Minister kept a 
number of recent initiatives -  such as the National English Literacy Survey -  under 
direct Commonwealth control.
The Commonwealth government has used broadbanding to withdraw from direct 
involvement in old policy initiatives which are too politically sensitive to abolish 
outright. However the targeted program remains a favoured policy instrument among 
Federal Education Ministers for the pursuit of national policy goals. Successive Federal 
Education Ministers have maintained the Commonwealth’s tradition of ad hoc 
involvement in schools policy by keeping a small number of targeted programs within 
their control. As the handful of targeted programs are valued by Commonwealth 
Ministers, and their fiscal impact is relatively insignificant, it would be feasible to 
maintain Commonwealth involvement in targeted programs.
The Commonwealth has a mechanism in addition to targeted programs with which to 
pursue policy goals of national significance in education. In 1988, the Commonwealth 
government began to pursue national policy goals on a more cooperative basis, through 
the Australian Education Council. Collaborative policy development through the 
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) has been a hallmark of Australian 
Federalism during the 1990s (Painter 1998), but it has not been a successful vehicle for 
the reform of Commonwealth/State financial relations (see Chapter 2, Section 4). 
Although the cooperative approach has limitations in terms of monitoring performance
5 eg. School Languages, Education Centres, Projects of National Significance, Curriculum Development 
Projects, Gender Equity in Curriculum, Gender and Violence Project, Vocational Education in Schools, 
Australian Students Prize, Quality Schooling Program, National Professional Development Program for 
Teachers, Aboriginal Education Strategic Initiatives. Key Competencies (DEET 1994 Commonwealth 
Programs for Schools 1994, Administrative Guidelines).
6 The five areas were Literacy, Languages, Special Learning Needs, School to Work and Quality 
Outcomes. The first three policy areas (Literacy, Languages and Special Learning Needs) were to be 
“included in one agreement for each of the three education sectors in each State and Territory” while the 
remaining two areas were “to be subject to separate contracts with funding recipients” (DEETYA 1997a: 
2.80).
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(see Chapter Three) the Ministerial forum has become accustomed to addressing 
national policy concerns raised by both Federal and State Education Ministers. In using 
the Ministerial forum for policy development, the Commonwealth has moved away 
from its previous methods of “purchasing” State cooperation through targeted programs. 
The co-operative approach is not reliant on the provision of Commonwealth funding, 
and it would continue to be a means of addressing national policy issues if the Federal 
government withdrew its direct involvement in schools funding.
The Federal government has always played a limited role in schools funding, in 
recognition of the constitutional right of the States to provide schooling. National 
priorities have been pursued through targeted and capital programs, and more recently 
through cooperative initiatives under the auspices of the joint Ministerial Council. As 
general recurrent funding does not achieve any specific national policy goals, the $2.9 
billion of recurrent SPPs could be transferred to FAGs without affecting national policy 
outcomes. As targeted programs and capital programs remain useful in the pursuit of 
national policy objectives, the Federal government should retain the $700 million spent 
on targeted and capital programs as Commonwealth SPPs.
2.2 Trends in Federal outlays on schools
Specific Purpose expenditure on schooling is expected to increase to $3.9 billion by 
2000-01 -  a growth of 11 per cent since 1997-98. As indicated in Table 5.1, 
Commonwealth funding for government and non-government schools will increase at 
different rates. Funding for government schools is projected to increase by 6 per cent per 
student while funding for non-government schools will increase by 16 per cent per 
student.
The increase in per student outlays for non-govemment schools is mainly due to the 
Federal government’s decision to abolish its New Schools Policy from January 1997 
(Watson 1997). This decision removed restrictions on new non-govemment schools 
from accessing higher levels of Commonwealth funding. Previously, new non- 
govemment schools were restricted to Funding Categories 1-6, which provided 
assistance at a lower level per student than the higher categories (ie. 10, 11 and 12).
With the abolition of the New Schools Policy, new non-govemment schools will have 
access to the higher funding categories and existing schools will be given opportunities 
for a funding re-categorisation. The increase in student outlays in non-govemment 
schools therefore reflects the larger number of schools expected to receive funding at 
Category 10 or higher .
The slower rate of increase in funding for students in government schools (6 per cent) is 
due to the Enrolment Benchmark Adjustment, introduced in the 1996-97 Federal 
budget. Through this offsetting mechanism, every new place in a non-govemment 
school will be funded by a cut of $1,712 from Commonwealth General Recurrent Grants 
to government schools the following year. In addition, the increased rate of transfer of 
students to non-govemment schools following the abolition of the New Schools Policy 
will also deliver savings from Federal General Recurrent Grants of about $406 per (non-
7 The increase in non-government schools per capita outlays may also reflect real increases in the level of 
per capita funding for schools in Categories 10 to 12.
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government) student. Both the Enrolment Benchmark Adjustment and the increased 
rate of student transfer will gradually erode the funding base of General Recurrent
o
Grants for government schools . The slower rate of growth in Federal current outlays on 
government school students is therefore to be expected.
Table 5.1 Commonwealth Specific Purpose Payments for schools 1996-97 to
2000- 0 1 .
1996-97 1997-98(e) 1998-99(e) 1999-00(e) 2000-01(e) Increase
Government Schools ($)
Current 949m 960m 968m 970m 997m
Capital 217m 218m 227m 234m 239m
Targeted 248m 266m 243m 244m 245m
Total 1,414m 1,444m 1,438m 1,449m 1,482m
No. o f Students 2,221,475 2,205,194 2,196,104 2,192,032 2,187,649
Outlay per student 636 655 655 661 677 6%
Non-government Schools ($)
Current 1,772m 1,919m 2,056m 2,194m 2,292m
Capital 109m 87m 91m 89m 94m
Targeted 104m 106m 104m 108m 111m
Total 1,985m 2,112m 2,251m 2,391m 2,487m
No. o f Students 921,458 940589 963758 989437 992000
Outlay per student 2,154 2,245 2,336 2,417 2,507 16%
Note: inconsistencies in totals due to rounding.
Sources: Commonwealth Budget Paper 1997-98 No. 3; ABS Cat. No. 4221.0 Schools Australia;
Hollway, D. A. (1996) “Submission on behalf of the Department of Employment, Education, Training and 
Youth Affairs (No. 102)” to Senate Legislation Committee review of the States Grants (Primary and 
Secondary Education Assistance) Bill 1996, Vol 3:19-30.
2.3 “Total Commonwealth-sourced funding” for schools
The different rates of projected Federal expenditure for government and non­
government schools in the Federal Budget Papers (and reproduced in Table 5.1) are not 
consistent with the claims of the Federal Minister for Schools. In his 1997 Budget press 
releases, Dr David Kemp stated that:
Over the next four years, total Commonwealth-sourced funding (specific 
purpose payments and financial assistance grants) is projected to increase by 17 
per cent per government school student and 14 per cent per non-govemment 
school student.
Kemp (1997a) “Funding Boost for Schools”, Budget Press Statement, K22/97,
May 13.
8 According to the government’s estimates, $178 million will be cut from General Recurrent Grants over 
the next four years under the Enrolment Benchmark Adjustment (Hollway 1996: 16). In addition, the 
Federal government will make a saving of $42 million against its forward estimates of expenditure on 
general Recurrent Grants because of higher levels of student enrolments in the non-government sector. In 
total, Federal outlays on General Recurrent Grants were expected to be reduced by $220 million over the 
next four years (Watson 1997).
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Although Financial Assistance Grants are “untied grants”, and are therefore not 
allocated to any specific purpose, the Federal Minister for Schools has included FAGs 
payments in his estimates of Commonwealth expenditure on schooling, implying that a 
fixed proportion of FAGs will be spent on schools. The Commonwealth has not 
earmarked any proportion of FAGs to be spent on schools and FAGs continue to be 
reported as untied grants in the Commonwealth Budget Papers9. Dr Kemp’s rationale 
for including a proportion of Financial Assistance Grants in his estimates of 
Commonwealth outlays is based on the following reasoning: Commonwealth Financial 
Assistance Grants account for about 26 per cent of States’ total revenue; therefore 26 
per cent of what the States spend on schools can be attributed to the Commonwealth. On 
this reasoning, Dr Kemp doubled the amount of schools expenditure sourced from the 
Commonwealth (ie. $3.6 billion in SPPs plus $4 billion from FAGs).
As 24 per cent of State revenue is allocated to government schools, and 2 per cent is 
allocated to non-government schools, the Minister assumes that the allocation of the 
Commonwealth’s attributed FAGs will be 24 per cent to government schools and 2 per 
cent to non-government schools (Hollway 1996: 9). To reach his conclusion about the 
increase in “total Commonwealth-sourced funding” over the next four years, Minister 
Kemp said that the attributed FAGs per student in government schools will increase by 
20 per cent while the attributed FAGs per student in non-government schools will 
increase by only 8 per cent, as indicated in Table 5.210. These trends “balance out” the 
effect of Federal SPPs, to create the illusion of more generous Commonwealth spending 
on government schools.
As State outlays per student in non-government schools are allocated on a per capita 
basis, the expected increase in non-government school enrolments should cause State 
outlays on non-government schools to increase. It is therefore likely that State 
expenditure on non-government schools will be higher than the 2 per cent of outlays that 
it was in the past. By holding the proportion of attributed FAGs constant at 2 per cent 
for non-government schools and 24 per cent for government schools, Dr Kemp did not 
allow for any change in the distribution of State outlays as enrolments in government 
schools decrease and non-government schools increase. The difference in the expected 
increase in attributed FAGs for government and non-government schools is simply the 
product of dividing a constant level of funding by a changed distribution of the student 
population.
For the Minister’s assumptions to be correct, States would have to increase their outlays 
at the same rate as the attributed FAGs contribution -  20 per cent for government school 
students and 8 per cent for non-government school students. It is most unlikely that the 
States would allocate their resources in this manner. In recent years, the trend in State 
expenditure on government and non-government schools has been in the opposite
9 Any Commonwealth intention to “earmark” a proportion of Financial Assistance Grants for schooling 
would invoke considerable protest from State Premiers.
10 The final outcome for “total Commonwealth-sourced” funding for non-government schools differs by 
one percentage point from the Minister’s projections because Dr Kemp’s estimates are based on calendar 
years.
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direction. State outlays on non-government schools have increased at a higher rate than 
State outlays on government schools as shown in Table 5.3 (see page 137).
Table 5.2 Projections of “total Commonwealth-sourced funding (specific
purpose payments and financial assistance grants)”, per student in 
government and non-government schools 1996-97 to 2000-01
1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 Change
Government Schools
24 per cen t o f  FAGs 3 ,704 ,544 ,000 3 ,874 ,560 ,000  4 ,0 41 ,166 ,080 4,214,936 ,221 4 ,396 ,178 ,479 19  %
No. o f Students 2,221,475 2,205,194 2,196,104 2,192,032 2,187,649 -1.5 %
Attributed FAGs 1668
$ per student
1757 1840 1923 2010 20 %
Commonwealth SPPs 636 655 655 661 677 6 %
Total ‘commonwealth- 
sourced, funding 2304 2412 2495 2584 2687 17 %
Non-government Schools
2 p er cen t o f  FAGs 308 ,712 ,000 322 ,880 ,000  336 ,763 ,840 351 ,244 ,685 366 ,348 ,207 19  %
No. o f Students 921,458 940589 963758 989437 1,015,351 10.1%
Attributed FAGs 335
$ per student
343 349 355 361 8 %
Commonwealth SPPs 2,154 2,245 2,336 2,417 2,507 16 %
Total “commonwealth- 
sourced” funding 2,489 2,589 2,685 2,772 2,868 15 %
Notes: These tables do not take into account the impact of the fiscal contributions that States agreed to 
return to the Commonwealth as a contribution to its deficit reduction program. These payments will be 
$619m in 1996-97, $640m in 1997-98, and $300m in 1998-99.
Sources: Commonwealth Budget Paper 1997-98 No. 3; ABS Cat. No. 4221.0 Schools Australia;
Hollway, D. A. (1996) “Submission on behalf of the Department of Employment, Education, Training and 
Youth Affairs (No. 102)” to Senate Legislation Committee review of the States Grants (Primary and 
Secondary Education Assistance) Bill 1996, Vol 3:19-30; MCEETYA (1996) National Report on 
Schooling in Australia, Statistical Annex, Carlton, Victoria: Curriculum Corporation.
For the Federal Education Minister to count a proportion of FAGs as Commonwealth 
outlays on schools does not accurately portray the fiscal impact of Federal policies for 
government and non-government schools. The only accurate estimate of Commonwealth 
outlays on schooling is the amount provided as a Specific Purpose Payment in the 
Commonwealth Budget Papers. These data demonstrate that over the next four years, 
Commonwealth expenditure on government schools will increase by 6 per cent per 
student while expenditure on non-government schools will increase by 16 per cent per 
student. The different funding outcomes for each sector reflect the Federal government’s 
recent policy decisions.
The myth of “total Commonwealth-sourced funding” exploited the confusion created by 
the division of funding responsibilities between the Federal government and the States. 
Minister Kemp used the complexity of the funding arrangements to claim that the 
Commonwealth would be spending double what it is actually spending on schools and 
that the impact of its policies would be the opposite to the Federal government’s 
intentions. These distortions add weight to the argument for schools to be funded by 
one level of government.
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3 Impact of Commonwealth current SPPs on schools
From the ratio of State expenditure to Specific Purpose Payments, Noon concludes 
“there is no evidence to suggest that States’ expenditure in these program areas would 
fall below the levels demanded by the community if funding was via unconditional 
grants rather than Specific Purpose Payments” (Noon 1991: 29). This statement will be 
examined in regard to schooling.
3.1 Government schools
In 1963, State Premiers and Education Ministers demanded Commonwealth assistance 
of $42 million in recurrent funding and $196 million in capital funding over the next 
four years to meet minimal teaching and building standards (Spaull 1987)11. The policy 
rationale for this request was to alleviate a perceived funding crisis in government and 
non-government schools -  which was attributed in part to the effect of vertical fiscal 
imbalance. It was believed that changes in the States’ revenue-raising capability during 
and after World War 2 had hampered their capacity to meet the financial needs of 
schools.
Australian fiscal federalism throughout the 1950s and 1960s was . . . 
characterised by chronic vertical fiscal imbalance between the Commonwealth 
and the States, one consequence of which was that most state functions could 
only be performed adequately if they were the subject of additional 
Commonwealth financial assistance in the form of specific purpose grants 
(Mathews, 1983, p. 139).
Although Federal recurrent funding for government schools did not eventuate for 
another five years12, between 1963-64 and 1971-72, States’ recurrent outlays on 
government schooling increased by an average of 8.1 per cent per year, in real terms -  
more than double what the State education Ministers had said they needed from the 
Commonwealth (Karmel 1973: 4.30). In the 1970s, after the Commonwealth began 
funding schools, State expenditure continued to increase at a higher rate than expected. 
On the basis of data provided by State and Territory Education departments, the Karmel 
Committee recommended a level of funding that would improve the resource-base of 
government primary and secondary schools by 40 per cent and 35 per cent respectively 
by the target year of 197913. Due to unexpectedly high inputs by State governments, the 
resource targets were achieved in most States by 1976. Between 1971 and 1981, State 
outlays per student increased by an average of 5 per cent per annum in real terms (ABS 
1996).
11 The need for resources was attributed to the pressure of post-war baby boom enrolments and the rising 
rate of secondary school participation. Between 1952 and 1962, enrolments in government primary 
schools increased by 37 per cent and in secondary schools by 139 per cent. (Mathews 1983: 137).
12 While the Commonwealth provided capital assistance to government schools between 1964 and 1968 it 
amounted to less than $30 million over the four years (Commonwealth Budget Papers 1972-73: 52-53).
13 The Committee had circulated a detailed financial questionnaire to the Education Departments and non­
government school authorities which was “the main source of statistical information for the assessment of 
school needs” (Karmel 1973: 1.13).
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During the 1980s, the rate of increase in State expenditure per student slowed down and 
the Federal government exercised restraint in the payment of Financial Assistance 
Grants (FAGs). The low rate of increase in State outlays parallelled fiscal restraint at 
the Federal level, and schools no longer received windfall funding increases from either 
level of government. The total per capita resources of government schools increased by 
an average of 1.3 per cent per year between 1981 and 1991. These trends are illustrated 
in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2 Outlays per student in public schools by source, 1961-62 to 1994-95 
(constant prices)
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Notes: The data excludes expenditure on preschools, and includes expenditure on special education, 
targeted programs and joint programs. Commonwealth expenditure on joint programs is attributed to 
government schools. The data are drawn from all Australian States excluding the Australian Capital 
Territory and the Northern Territory. Expenditure is expressed in constant price deflated by GNFP(e).
Sources: Commonwealth Budget Papers, ABS Cat. No. 4221.0 Schools Australia; ABS Cat. No. 5510.0 
Expenditure on Education , Australia; ABS (1996) “Expenditure on Schools” Unpublished Data.
State governments do not appear to need Federal assistance to meet their responsibilities 
to government schools. Over the past three decades of rapid enrolment growth, States 
have demonstrated their capacity to finance the continued expansion in government 
schools. With the benefit of hindsight, there appears to have been little justification for 
the States’ historical claim that a financial crisis in government schools warranted 
Federal government intervention.
In providing recurrent grants, the Federal government also aimed to reduce the variation 
in the level of resource use on government schools between States. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, in 1973, the Karmel Committee recommended differential funding for 
secondary schools on the basis of significant differences in resource-use. Karmel 
recommended that States with lower resource-use indices for secondary school systems 
be allocated larger grants as a short term measure to overcome the inequalities in
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resource use (Karmel, 1973: 6.13, 6.35). Over the next twenty years, the Federal 
government was not successful in reducing the level of inequality in resource use 
between States. The Commonwealth’s involvement has had no apparent impact on the 
variations in resource use14.
The Commonwealth Grants Commission makes recommendations to the Federal 
government concerning the distribution of general revenue assistance to the states on the 
basis of a fiscal equalisation formula that assesses the relative “disabilities” endured by 
each State that might affect the State’s capacity to provide a uniform standard of 
services15. In determining its per capita relativities for the distribution of untied grants, 
the Commission takes into account the provision of most current SPPs. Commonwealth 
SPPs for government schools are “included” in the Commission’s assessment of State 
expenditure needs16. This means that money received through SPPs for government 
schools are treated as no different from the provision of general revenue assistance. In 
other words, the Financial Assistance Grant is adjusted to take into account SPPs 
received for government schools. Thus while Federal SPPs for government schools are 
paid on a uniform per capita basis, the Grants Commission’s “inclusion” method 
overrides any intentions by the Commonwealth portfolio Minister and ensures that the 
States receive differential funding (Commonwealth Budget Papers 1997-98 No. 3: 19).
The neutralising impact of the Grants’ Commission’s equalisation processes is viewed 
rather optimistically by the Federal Treasury:
In any event, it is not necessarily the case that the C om m onwealth’s policy  
objectives will be foregone where an SPP’s distribution may be overridden 
over time in a financial sense. The objective o f an SPP may be achieved by the 
fulfilm ent of the related conditions which the Comm onwealth has agreed with 
the State receiving the payment (Commonwealth Budget Papers 1997-98, No.
3: 20).
In Commonwealth schools funding, there are no specific conditions attached to the 
payment of General Recurrent Grants. The primary objective of Commonwealth 
recurrent grants is to “help government schools with the recurrent costs of school 
education” (Appendix Three). The fact that States receive a financial outcome that is no 
different to what they would receive if the money were paid through FAGs means that 
even the most basic of Commonwealth policy goals (ie. the provision of “financial 
assistance”) may not be achieved.
The impact of the Federal government’s recurrent funding on total resources for 
government schools has not been significant. The Commonwealth remains a minor
14 By 1976, the range of values for secondary systems had increased to 22 points (compared to 19 in 
1972) and the range for primary schools had increased to 19 points from only 6 points in 1972. The 
Commonwealth Schools Commission therefore abandoned the differential funding model to introduce a 
uniform per capita grants system in its next triennium. By 1994, the range for secondary schools had 
increased to 27 points and the range for primary schools remained almost the same at 22 points, (see 
Chapter Two, Section 3.1)
15 In 1997-98, 7.4 per cent of the pool of general revenue payments will be redistributed as a result of the 
application of the Commission’s relativities, compared to an equal per capita distribution (Budget Paper 
No. 3: 17).
16 SPPs for government schools and non-government schools are treated in different ways.
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funding partner and its financial objectives are neutralised by the Grants Commission’s 
fiscal equalisation formula. The effect of the Enrolment Benchmark Adjustment -  which 
will finance growth in the non-government sector from reductions in government school 
recurrent grants -  will gradually erode the Federal government’s financial contribution 
to government schools. Due to the efforts of State governments, Federal recurrent 
funding of government schools today amounts to less than fifteen per cent of total 
outlays on government schools. The overall financial position of government schools 
would not be very different today if the Federal government had never become involved 
in the recurrent funding of Australian schools.
3.2 Non-government schools
The provision of Federal funding to non-government schools was in response to a 
funding crisis in the non-government sector. The effect of the post-war baby boom, 
increasing rates of secondary school participation and a decline in the role of religious 
orders meant that most non-government schools were struggling to provide education 
services at a standard comparable to government schools in the 1960s (Smart 1978).
The non-government sector’s share of total school enrolments declined steadily 
throughout the decade to reach a low of 21 per cent in 1976. Following the introduction 
of Federal and State government funding in 1975, the non-government sector’s 
enrolment share increased to reach 29.7 per cent in 1997. At least 300,000 additional 
students are now attending non-government schools (ABS Cat. No. 4221.0).
The proportion of non-government schools’ total income sourced from government has 
increased significantly over the past twenty-five years. In Catholic primary schools, 
which account for 73 per cent of total enrolments, the level of subvention has increased 
from 48 per cent in 1974 to 78 per cent in 1994 (see Appendix Two). The major source 
of the growth in resources to non-government schools has been the Commonwealth 
government. While State governments made steady increases in their contributions to 
non-government schools, they could not match the rapid increases in per capita funding 
provided by the Federal government, as illustrated in Figure 5.3.
Non-government schools may have been beneficiaries of vertical fiscal imbalance 
because their major source of funding was the Federal, rather than State government.
As the major funding provider for the smaller schools sector, the Commonwealth could 
more easily accommodate funding increases for non-government schools within its 
budget. Total Federal SPPs on schools are only three per cent of the Federal budget 
and the non-government sector receives the largest proportion of these outlays. The 
Commonwealth-funded expansion of the non-government sector did occur with the 
support of State education authorities. In the 1950s, many State Education Ministers 
supported the provision of subsidies for non-government schools . In 1967, State 
governments were the first to provide direct funding for non-government schools, under
17 State governments’ reluctance to provide direct funding to private schools was partly due to the fact that 
an earlier “State Aid” debate lingered in their institutional memory. Following the controversy of the 
1860s State governments had emerged as defenders of schools system that were “universal, secular and 
free”. Unravelling this legislative charter to provide funding for non-government schools would have 
opened a political Pandora’s box for State politicians and most State Education Ministers seemed keen to 
avoid it in the 1950s. The unwritten consensus seemed to be that the second “State Aid” debate should be 
an issue for the Federal government (Spaull 1987: 59-82).
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both Labor and Coalition governments. When higher levels of Federal recurrent 
assistance for private schools were introduced in 1974, State governments continued to 
contribute grants to non-government schools, equal to about half the level of 
Commonwealth assistance. There has never been any question about State 
governments’ support for the policy of providing funding for non-government schools.
Figure 5.3 Outlays per student in non-government schools by source, 1961-62 to 
1994-95
Notes: The data exclude expenditure on preschools, and includes expenditure on special education, 
targeted programs and joint programs. Commonwealth expenditure on joint programs is attributed to 
government schools. The data are drawn from all Australian States excluding the Australian Capital 
Territory and the Northern Territory. Expenditure is in constant prices deflated by GNFP(e).
Sources: Commonwealth Budget Papers, ABS Cat. No. 4221.0 Schools Australia', ABS Cat. No. 5510.0 
Expenditure on Education , Australia', ABS (1996) “Expenditure on Schools” Unpublished Data.
Administrative responsibility for non-government schools remains with State and 
Territory education authorities because only State governments have the power to 
register non-government schools. In 1985 State Ministers supported the introduction of 
the Commonwealth’s New Schools Policy guidelines that restrained the growth of new 
non-government schools (Spaull 1987: 266). In 1997, States did not oppose the Federal 
government’s decision to abolish the New Schools Policy guidelines. State registration 
requirements have always imposed fewer restraints on the growth of non-government 
schools than the Federal government’s New Schools Policy. Although most States have 
reviewed their registration requirements since the abolition of the New Schools Policy, 
their arrangements are not as restrictive as the former Federal guidelines (McKinnon 
1995a).
If the funding that the Federal government allocates to non-government schools through 
SPPs had been provided to the States through General Revenue Assistance, it is
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impossible to say definitively whether the funding situation of non-government schools 
would be different today. On the one hand, State governments have always supported 
the Federal government’s policies towards non-government schools with their own- 
source financial contributions. As illustrated in Table 5.3, State governments have 
increased their own-source outlays on non-government schools at a higher rate than 
outlays on government schools since 198518. A State government (Victoria) was the first 
to provide recurrent support for non-government schools in 1967 and State registration 
policies for non-government schools have been more lenient than the Federal 
government’s guidelines under the New Schools Policy. In recent times, State 
governments’ policies about increased competition have strengthened their commitment 
to private school provision (see Calwell and Hayward 1998).
On the other hand, private schools have clearly benefited from the split in funding 
responsibilities between the Federal and State governments. Non-government schools 
have received most of their financial assistance from a level of government which is not 
responsible for mass education provision. State governments’ lenient registration 
requirements and supplementary funding policies for non-government schools could 
have been motivated solely by cost-shifting. If so, their commitment to expanding non­
government provision may lessen now that the potential for further cost-shifting has 
been removed by the Enrolment Benchmark Adjustment. Under the Commonwealth 
funding arrangements the bulk of private school funding is quarantined from State 
government budgetary processes. If States were responsible for funding all schools, the 
claims of non-government schools would be considered against the claims of 
government schools in the same policy forum. The sheer size and influence of the 
government school sector at the State level would provide a strong counterbalance to the 
influence of non-govemment schools. It is unlikely -  though not inconceivable -that 
recurrent grants for private schools would have increased to the same extent, if the 
funding policy for both public and private schools had been determined at the same 
level of government.
The impact of Federal intervention in schooling has been different for private schools 
than for government schools. Non-govemment schools have received increasing levels 
of funding which have been quarantined from State education policy because SPPs for 
non-govemment schools have been paid through the States. While government schools 
have barely noticed the impact of Federal intervention, non-govemment schools are 
dependent on high levels of Federal SPPs. Nevertheless, Federal funding for non- 
govemment schools occurred with the active support of State and Territory 
governments. Commonwealth involvement has clearly had a marked effect on the 
financial status of non-govemment schools, however the outcome could have been 
similar -  albeit of a lesser magnitude -  if private schools’ funding had remained the 
responsibility of the States.
18 Although it is an unlikely scenario, if the States had provided increases in non-government school per 
capita grants at the same dollar value as annual increases to State schools funding since 1969, State 
funding for non-government schools would be higher today than Federal funding for non-government 
schools
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4 The transfer of current SPPs for schools to untied grants
As the impact of current SPPs for schools has been quite different for government and 
non-government schools, the implications of abolishing current SPPs for schools are 
different for each sector. Although the transfer of current SPPs to FAGs would restore 
State government authority over schools funding policy, State governments would 
continue to support the role of the private sector in schools provision. In the short term, 
however, the immediate fiscal impact of moving to the Grants Commission’s 
distribution formula for untied grants would make it harder for the two largest States to 
maintain current funding levels for non-government schools.
4.1 Policy implications
In 1936, the establishment of the national Ministerial Council indicated the interest of 
State and Territory Ministers of Education in working together on common issues 
without direct Commonwealth involvement19. Although the Council’s agenda has been 
diverted by changes in membership, political opportunism and unexpected actions by 
the Commonwealth government, it has remained focused on issues of national policy or 
common interests (Spaull 1987). The level of uniformity in State education policies 
today implies a commonality of purpose that is stronger than the minor policy 
differences between jurisdictions. None of this uniformity has been “purchased” by the 
Federal government through tied grants. The level of State and Territory participation in 
national policy forums and Ministerial Councils would therefore not diminish if the 
Federal government abolished its recurrent funding program for schools.
Table 5.3 States’ own-source outlays per student in government and non­
government schools, 1985-86 to 1994-95 (constant prices)
$ 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989- 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Increase
-86 -87 -88 -89 90 -91 -92 -93 -94 -95
Government 3456 3474 3344 3392 3381 3528 3573 3548 3587 3543 87
schools 2 .5 %
Non-government 858 848 790 769 791 788 913 956 972 949 91
schools 10.6 %
Ratio 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.4 4.2 4.5 3.9 3.7 3.6 3.7
Notes: The data exclude expenditure on preschools, and includes expenditure on special education, 
targeted programs and joint programs. Commonwealth expenditure on joint programs is attributed to 
government schools. The data are drawn from all Australian States excluding the Australian Capital 
Territory and the Northern Territory. Expenditure is in constant prices deflated by GNFP(e).
Sources: Commonwealth Budget Papers, ABS Cat. No. 4221.0 Schools Australia; ABS Cat. No. 5510.0 
Expenditure on Education , Australia; ABS (1996) “Expenditure on Schools” Unpublished Data.
If current SPPs for non-government schools were returned to the States, it is unlikely 
that State education authorities would use their new responsibilities to undermine the 
funding position of the non-government schools sector. State policies regarding non­
government schools have reflected and supported the Federal government’s policies for 
over thirty years. While State governments have been unable to match the size of
19 The Commonwealth government did not join the AEC until 1972.
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Federal increases in non-govemment schools funding, the States have consistently 
supported the non-govemment sector with steady increases in State funding. Over the 
past decade, on average, State governments have provided increases in per student 
funding for both the government and non-govemment sectors at roughly equal dollar 
amounts, which has resulted in a higher rate of increase in State grants for non- 
govemment schools compared to government schools, shown in Table 5.3.
As a non-govemment school subsidy costs around twenty-five per cent less than a place 
in a government school, there are financial benefits for the States in maintaining a viable 
non-govemment schools sector. If schools funding were transferred to FAGs, States 
would continue to enjoy some savings from non-govemment school enrolments. With 
the introduction of the Enrolment Benchmark Adjustment (EBA) in the 1996-97 Federal 
Budget, funding for new non-govemment schools is now the financial responsibility of 
State governments. Under the Enrolment Benchmark Adjustment, Commonwealth 
funding for new enrolments in non-govemment schools will continue to be paid as an 
SPP through the States. However the Commonwealth’s subsidy to new non-govemment 
schools will be fully offset by reductions in Commonwealth current grants for 
government schools. State governments now bear the financial responsibility for new 
non-govemment schools. Yet the Commonwealth retains control over funding policy 
for non-govemment schools. The transfer of Commonwealth recurrent funding to FAGs 
would give the States and Territories both funding and policy responsibility for non- 
govemment schooling.
4.2 Fiscal implications
The main impact of the transfer of non-govemment schools funding to FAGs would be 
that the resources allocated to the States would vary according to the Grants 
Commission’s fiscal equalisation formula. Commonwealth SPPs for all schools are paid 
on a uniform per capita basis. Although the effect of tied grants to government schools 
is overridden by the Grants Commission, this is not the case with respect to non- 
govemment schools. Tied grants for non-govemment schools are paid through the 
States, so non-govemment schools in each funding category receive predictable levels of 
Commonwealth funding under the existing arrangements. While there is some variation 
in the level of grants paid by the States to non-govemment schools, it is smaller than 
that created by the Grants Commission’s per capita relativities.
The data in Table 5.4 illustrate the impact of the transfer of current SPPs to FAGs on 
schools in Funding Category 10 -  which encompasses 70 per cent of all non- 
govemment schools. The impact of the transfer on per capita grants to schools would 
result in the majority of non-govemment schools in New South Wales and Victoria 
incurring funding cuts of eight per cent. Non-govemment schools in Western Australia, 
Tasmania and the Northern Territory would receive windfall funding increases if the 
money were passed on by State governments.
The calculations in Table 5.4 are based on the assumption that the total pool of current 
funding would be re-distributed on the basis of the Grants Commission’s relativities and 
that the fiscal outcome would be passed on to the schools. It is only a rough indication 
of what the fiscal outcome would be and does not take into account any compensatory
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measures that might be taken by State governments. Nor can we assume that the 
funding increases received by the smaller States would be passed on to their schools. 
Under the Grants Commission’s fiscal equalisation formula, there would be clear 
“winners” and “losers” among the States, which could disadvantage the sixty-one per 
cent of non-government school students located in New South Wales and Victoria if the 
funding shortfall was passed on by the State governments.
Table 5.4 Impact of the transfer of current SPPs to FAGs on non-government 
schools in Funding Category 10, by State ($ per student)
NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS ACT NT
State grant
P rim ary 709 623 679 698 698 654 749 957
S eco n d a ry 1101 975 1099 1185 1156 1079 1095 1140
Commonwealth grant paid as SPPs th ro u g h  the States
P rim ary 1620 1620 1620 1620 1620 1620 1620 1620
S eco n d a ry 2367 2367 2367 2367 2 367 2 367 2367 2367
Com monwealth grant if paid to the States as FAGs
Relativities 0.87819 0.87835 1.03737 0.99589 1.191 1.54974 0.88435 4.89353
P rim ary 1423 1423 1681 1613 1929 2511 1433 7928
S eco n d a ry 2 079 2079 2455 2 357 2 8 1 9 3668 2093 11583
Total grant to Primary schools
P rese n t 2 329 2243 2299 2 318 2 318 2 2 7 4 2 369 2577
A fte r tra n s fe r 2 1 3 2 2046 2359 2311 2 627 3165 2 1 8 2 8885
Difference -197 -197 +61 -7 +309 +891 -187 +6307
Total grant to Secondary schools
P rese n t 3468 3342 3466 3 5 5 2 3523 3 446 3 462 3507
A fte r tra n s fe r 3 180 3054 3555 3543 3975 4 7 4 7 3188 12723
Difference -288 -288 +88 -10 +452 +1301 -274 +9216
Notes: The Queensland and South Australian grant levels are derived from estimates. The grant levels are 
based on funding in 1994, the latest year for which published State data are available.
Sources: MCEETYA(1996) Annual National Report on Schooling 1994, Statistical Annex', 
Commonwealth Budget Papers 1997-98 No. 3.
5 Prospects for reform
Reducing the level of Commonwealth Specific Purpose Payments (SPPs) to the States 
has been raised in COAG as a means of increasing the budgetary flexibility of State and 
Territory governments. A reduction in the level of SPPs has been identified by the 
Productivity Commission and various government auditors as an important step in 
improving efficiency and accountability for government services provision. Yet in spite 
of the commitment among Heads of Government to fiscal reform, no agreement has 
ever been reached on how to reduce the level of Specific Purpose Payments to the 
States. While Commonwealth expenditure on school education is an obvious target for 
reform, it has been politically difficult for governments to consider the transfer of SPPs 
for schools to Financial Assistance Grants (FAGs) in any area other than government 
schools.
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Given the financial problems in moving SPPs to FAGs, it has been suggested that 
current funding for government schools should be transferred to untied grants while 
non-government schools funding be retained as a Specific Purpose Payment . To retain 
non-government schools funding as a Commonwealth SPP would exacerbate the 
confusion that already exists in the allocation of resources to schools. The separation of 
government and non-government schools by funding source would make it even more 
difficult for States to manage policy issues such as competition and choice with regard 
to both sectors and would further diminish accountability for Commonwealth schools 
funding.
COAG could consider the fall-back option of broadbanding the existing Commonwealth 
schools funding programs. However, broadbanding of existing funding programs would 
simply entrench the existing arrangements unless the funding for government and non­
government schools was combined in the one broadbanded program. If the allocations 
for each sector are kept separate, it would be scarcely different to the existing 
arrangements and would not remove the undesirable consequences of vertical fiscal 
imbalance. The policy responsibility for deciding resource levels would remain with the 
Commonwealth. The Commonwealth would also be under constant pressure to split the 
grant between the sectors either formally or informally, thus denying States any real 
budgetary flexibility or policy responsibility in regard to non-government schools.
As described in Chapter Two, when a serious attempt was made to transfer SPPs for 
schools to FAGs in the early 1990s, the political power of the non-government school 
stakeholders ensured that SPPs for non-government schools were exempt from 
consideration. State and Territory Education Ministers were also reluctant to pass up 
the degree of independence that Commonwealth SPPs gave them from State budgetary 
processes. The transfer of recurrent funding for schools to untied grants would improve 
the prospects for consistent policy development across both sectors at the State and 
Territory level of government. While States would ensure the continued viability of 
private schools, their funding would be determined in the same budget context as 
government schools. It is likely that private schools funding would be subject to the 
same funding restraints that have applied to the State school sector.
If the present arrangements continue, SPPs for schools will become an increasing 
proportion of total Federal grants to the States and the prospects for fiscal reform will 
become even more remote. It must be recognised that the Grants Commission’s fiscal 
equalisation formula creates problems for any agency seeking to convert SPPs into 
untied Financial Assistance Grants. If Heads of government were to transfer current 
SPPs for schools to FAGs, the most practical approach would be a phased transfer that 
saw current SPPs for schools gradually merged with FAGs over an agreed period of 
time. This would soften the fiscal impact of the decision on State budgets and on non­
government schools in Victoria and New South Wales.
20 In their November 1991 Communique, Premiers and Chief Ministers adopted a proposal from the 
AEC’s Schools Working Party that SPPs for government schools should be transferred to FAGs and that a 
tied grant should be retained to fund non-government schools (Communique 1991, Nov: 18-19). In the 
same document, however, the Heads of Government reiterated that schools were the responsibility of State 
governments. The decision to transfer government schools funding to FAGs did not proceed, although it 
remained on the COAG negotiating table (see Chapter Two).
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Conclusion
The Commonwealth could increase the budgetary flexibility of State governments by 
converting $3 billion in current SPPs for schools to untied Financial Assistance Grants, 
which would reduce the level of Commonwealth SPPs by sixteen per cent. The transfer 
of current schools funding to FAGs would result in greater clarity and accountability in 
the funding of both government and non-government schools. Government Ministers 
would no longer be able to pass responsibility for outcomes to another level of 
government, nor to double their own-source outlays on the basis of fictional funding 
scenarios. States would obtain both policy and funding responsibility for all schools. 
Schools would benefit from more coherent policy development, particularly as 
education policy and funding issues could be discussed with reference to both the 
government and non-government sector.
To the extent that national policy interests warrant Commonwealth involvement, 
national objectives can be pursued through the retention of $700 million of capital and 
targeted programs as Specific Purpose Payments. National goals can also be pursued 
through co-operative Ministerial forums where State Education Ministers have 
demonstrated their willingness to consider national policy issues.
The clients most affected by the transfer of current SPPs to FAGs would be the non­
government schools sector, which has benefited from generous levels of Federal 
financial assistance under SPPs paid through the States on a uniform per capita basis. 
While States would continue to safeguard to the viability of the non-government sector, 
the immediate fiscal impact of the Commonwealth’s withdrawal might involve an eight 
per cent reduction in grant levels to almost two-thirds of non-government schools. 
Although a phase-in arrangement may mitigate the financial impact of the reform in the 
short-term, the non-government schools sector can be expected to oppose the 
withdrawal of Federal government involvement in recurrent schools funding.
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Chapter Six
Improving public accountability for expenditure on 
Australian schooling
Introduction
In this concluding chapter I will discuss why it is important for the Commonwealth to 
be accountable for its expenditure on school education. Drawing on the previous 
chapters, I argue that accountability for public expenditure on schooling would improve 
if the Commonwealth withdrew from the recurrent funding of Australian schools.
1 Public accountability and schools funding
As more and more emphasis is placed on a results-oriented and client-sensitive 
culture and on devolution, and as the environment of public sector management 
becomes more diverse and complex, the importance of effective accountability 
becomes correspondingly greater (OECD 1995: 37).
Public accountability is about "giving an answer for the way in which one has spent 
money, exercised power and control, mediated rights and used discretions vested by law 
in the public interest" (Waterford 1991). Traditionally, Ministers were responsible to 
parliament for the impact of their policies, and bureaucrats were accountable for the way 
in which they implemented them. With the advent of “new managerialism” in the public 
service, the concept and practices of public accountability have changed (Uhr 1991:
290). The roles of policy and administration are not so clearly separate and decision­
making power is increasingly devolved to public sector managers. In return for 
increased autonomy, public sector managers are expected to be more accountable to the 
community for the results of the programs they manage (Uhr 1998: 164-66). Public 
accountability is now concerned with “ the obligations of persons and authorities 
entrusted with public resources to report on the management of such resources and be 
answerable for the fiscal, managerial and program responsibilities that are conferred” 
{Tokyo Declaration of Guidelines on Public Accountability 1986).
During the 1990s, the Australian public sector has been characterised by an increase in 
the level of collaboration between Commonwealth and State governments on policy 
issues. Propelled by the issue of micro-economic reform, “collaborative executive 
federalism” has gained ascendancy over adversarial and competitive elements of 
parliamentary federalism (Carroll and Painter 1995: 15). Yet inter-governmental forums 
have been criticised for being less accountable than individual Ministers or 
governments. Ministerial Councils exercise a form of power and authority that is cut off 
from conventional accountability mechanisms such as parliamentary scrutiny (Pendal 
1995). “The decisions made in Ministerial Councils blur the lines of responsibility of 
individual ministers and participating governments to their parliaments” (Saunders 
1985: 11). Saunders observes that the information provided to parliament about inter-
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governmental affairs is less adequate and less systematically scrutinised than normal 
government activities (1985: 13).
Since Federation, there has been a steady increase in the level of financial transfers from 
the Commonwealth to the States in terms of both untied grants and specific purpose 
payments (Galligan 1995: 227). It is more difficult to pursue public accountability for 
expenditure when funds are transferred between levels of government within a Federal 
system (Saunders 1985, 1986, Else-Mitchell 1986). Commonwealth transfers are not 
appropriated by State parliaments, and often by-pass normal parliamentary procedures 
of scrutiny and review. Tied and untied grants are paid through a variety of 
mechanisms, most of which fall outside the State budget process. “The result is that 
transfers do not fit neatly into the cabinet system, the budget process, or any other 
established financial procedures” (Saunders 1986: 17). As “almost all our rules of 
public law and political practice have been devised for a unitary system of government 
operating within a single jurisdiction”, accountability mechanisms are weaker in respect 
of inter-governmental grants (Saunders 1985: 7).
For all types of inter-governmental transfers, State and Territory governments are less 
accountable to their parliaments for the expenditure of money transferred from the 
Federal government through SPPs than they are for untied grants -  which are paid to 
State Treasuries (Saunders 1986: 17). As Section 96 grants are paid through a variety of 
mechanisms, it is difficult for Parliament or parliamentary committees to monitor 
program expenditure (Else-Mitchell 1986: 7). State and Territory portfolio Ministers 
are granted a degree of independence from State budgetary processes by the payment of 
specific purpose grants from the Commonwealth.
Saunders identifies three types of accountability which apply to inter-governmental 
transfers:
1. the ability to dictate and scrutinise expenditure in detail, in a way that 
theoretically is possible when taxation and expenditure take place at 
the same level of government;
2. the ability to monitor the extent to which the broad purposes for which 
the funds are provided are met; and
3. the extent to which governments are answerable to parliaments and 
electorates for implementation of policy and management of the 
public sector generally during their terms of office (Saunders 1985:
15).
In terms of the first form of accountability, it is difficult for the Federal government to 
monitor the expenditure of its specific purpose payments other than by attaching 
detailed conditions to its Section 96 grants. Even then, the Commonwealth is not 
legally permitted to scrutinise the expenditure of specific purpose payments by State and 
Territory governments (Spedding 1993). With respect to schools expenditure, it is not 
possible for the Commonwealth to either dictate or scrutinise States’ expenditure of 
Commonwealth funding because the money is pooled with States’ and Territories’ own- 
source outlays. The only way for the Federal government to supervise its expenditure 
on schooling would be to pay schools directly under its Section 51(23A) “benefits to
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students” power, which would carry the threat of a legal challenge in the High Court 
(Birch 1975). Given the Commonwealth’s status as a minor partner in schools funding, 
its policy influence would not be greatly increased by a more direct involvement in 
funding schools.
The most realistic way for the Commonwealth to improve accountability for schools 
funding would be through the second path of monitoring the extent to which the broad 
purposes for which its funds are provided are met. Answerability to parliament depends 
to a large extent on the quality of the performance information provided by 
governments. Although improved performance reporting is an essential counterbalance 
to the freedom of devolved public sector management, government agencies have been 
generally reluctant to provide meaningful performance information in meeting public 
accountability obligations (Clark 1994, MAB-MIAC Task Force 1992). Over the thirty 
years of its involvement in schooling, the Federal government has not met the most 
basic accountability requirements for specific purpose program expenditure (ANAO 
1995). After examining both the financial and educational accountability arrangements 
for Commonwealth SPPs for schools, a parliamentary inquiry into accountability in 
Commonwealth-State funding arrangements in education concluded:
Ninety per cent of Commonwealth education funding to the States is allocated to 
General Recurrent Funding and Capital Grants Funding. The Committee 
considers that the accountability requirements which attach to these particular 
funds are minimal, especially in relation to the magnitude of the funds involved 
(SEETRC 1995: 130).
In return for more freedom in the management of resources (inputs), governments are 
now expected to report reliably on the effectiveness (outcomes) of their policies and 
programs. This requires a clear identification of government policy objectives and the 
collection and publication of information on outcomes. The concept of accountable 
management assumes that “objectives can be determined and achieved, that inputs and 
outputs can be measured, and that relevant performance indicators can be constructed 
for all public sector activities” (Guthrie and Parker 1990: 456).
The Federal government is unable to report on the outcomes of its expenditure on 
schools because the policy objectives of most of its programs are not defined in 
educational terms. As discussed in Chapter Three, with respect to General Recurrent 
Grants (GRG), the Commonwealth ignores the fundamental principle that program goals 
should be defined in operational terms and program impact should be measured in terms 
of educational outcomes (ANAO 1995). The program objectives of GRG are defined in 
terms of inputs which are subsequently pooled with the inputs of State and Territory 
governments. Therefore it is impossible to measure the outcomes of Federal 
expenditure in either financial or educational terms.
In 1973, the Karmel report emphasised the importance of educational outcomes in 
determining the resource needs of schools. In 1995, the Senate Committee 
recommended the collection of data on educational outcomes “linked to the specific 
objectives of the program concerned” (SEETRC 1995: viii). But the Commonwealth 
continues to link its recurrent funding policies to financial objectives and refuses to 
measure its performance in terms of educational outcomes. Commonwealth funding
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priorities for GRG are supposed to be determined by the resource “needs” (or inputs) of 
government and non-government schools. As a result, Commonwealth recurrent funds 
for schools have increased significantly since the Karmel report but there is no 
mechanism for evaluating the effectiveness of this expenditure. The General Recurrent 
Grants Program now accounts for eighty-two per cent of total Commonwealth 
expenditure on schooling. As funding under the General Recurrent Grants Program is 
not linked to the achievement of educational goals, the Federal government remains 
unable to assess the effectiveness of its major program of expenditure on schools.
The annual National Report on Schooling is the Commonwealth’s main accountability 
instrument for its school education expenditure. But the National Report on Schooling 
has failed to deliver on its promise to provide meaningful information on educational 
outcomes. Its contents are predominantly focused on inputs and its outcome measures 
are too simple or too highly aggregated to shed light on school and system performance. 
The less than comprehensive information provided in the National Report means that 
the Commonwealth government is unable to report on either the performance of its own 
programs or on the outcomes of school education throughout Australia. The National 
Report on Schooling was a first step towards enhancing accountability for school 
education expenditure, but it should be possible to further improve the quality of 
performance information on schooling. In Chapter Three, I identified the policy goals of 
Australian schooling and illustrated the way in which educational outcomes could be 
measured. Such information is necessary to inform the public about the effectiveness of 
all public expenditure on schooling. But in order to improve the content of performance 
information on schooling, the process by which it is collected must change.
The Federal government’s efforts to monitor school performance have been obstructed 
by its reliance on State and Territory governments to provide information on educational 
outcomes. As they are major stakeholders in the provision of education services, it is 
not in the interests of State or Territory governments to provide information which may 
reflect adversely on their own performance. To improve monitoring of the impact of 
both Commonwealth and State education policies, the Federal government should 
commission an independent agency such as the Australian Bureau of Statistics to 
measure educational outcomes. The data produced by such an agency would enhance the 
capacity of parliaments at both the State and Federal level to hold an accountability 
dialogue with agencies responsible for public expenditure on schooling.
2 The impact of Commonwealth involvement in schools
As Commonwealth recurrent funding is pooled with State and Territory expenditure and 
the outcomes cannot be reliably measured, one might assume that the Federal 
government has had no impact on schooling in Australia. But although Commonwealth 
schools funding has not produced identifiable program outcomes, Commonwealth 
involvement in schooling has had an impact on the structure of school education 
provision and on school education policy. First, by assisting private schools to improve 
the quality of their education services, Commonwealth funding has supported the 
expansion of the private school sector. Second, as funding levels for non-government 
schools are determined by the Commonwealth, its involvement has led to high levels of 
subvention in average non-government schools’ running costs. As a result, the net fiscal
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benefit to governments from private schooling has diminished. Third, the 
Commonwealth’s “needs-based” funding policy for non-government schools affects the 
competitive position of individual schools in the market for educational services. The 
different funding levels of non-government and government schools have prevented the 
development of consistent funding policies for all schools.
The capacity of State and Territory governments to address these issues is hampered by 
the Commonwealth’s continuing financial involvement in schooling. For example, 
policies to promote client choice can only be implemented effectively if all schools -  
both government and non-government -  are funded within a common policy framework. 
The payment of Federal specific purpose payments for non-government schools through 
the States prevents State and Territory governments from making any changes to this 
area of funding policy. Since the introduction of the Enrolment Benchmark Adjustment 
in 1996, State education systems have borne full financial responsibility for new non­
government schools. The Commonwealth therefore determines funding policy for the 
non-government sector while States bear the financial responsibility for new non­
government schools. The existence of a separate Commonwealth funding system for 
non-government schools creates policy anomalies which can only be addressed by 
returning the responsibility for all schools to one level of government.
3 Towards the reform of Commonwealth schools funding
Any attempt to rationalise the extent of overlapping and duplication between 
levels of government in the Australian federal system will confront a number of 
hindrances: institutional, attitudinal, and political (Wiltshire 1990: 1).
If the Commonwealth withdrew from the recurrent funding of schools, States would 
have responsibility for both education policy and funding policy in respect of 
government and non-government schools. For the first time since 1969, States would be 
free to develop policies for both government and non-government schools within a 
common funding framework. The capacity for policy development in respect of both 
public and private schools would improve. Commonwealth withdrawal from recurrent 
schools funding would also reduce the size of total specific purpose payments to the 
States and Territories, thus achieving one of COAG’s objectives for the reform of 
Federal financial relations. The Commonwealth would still be able to pursue national 
policy objectives through its capital and targeted programs of financial assistance.
As the Federal government allocates $3 billion per year to schools’ recurrent funding, 
the transfer of these funds to untied Financial Assistance Grants would leave $700 
million a year in capital and targeted programs that could be directed to national policy 
goals. The retention of Commonwealth control over capital and targeted programs 
would be consistent with the historical patterns of Commonwealth involvement in 
schooling. Prior to 1969, the Federal government was reluctant to become involved in 
schools funding because school education was the policy responsibility of State and 
Territory governments. Since Federation, the pattern of Commonwealth intervention in 
schooling was to pursue selected national policy objectives with the consent of State and 
Territory education authorities. The unique circumstances of the post-war years led to 
demands for Commonwealth financial assistance to alleviate the funding burden faced
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by government and non-government schools. Although the Federal government 
introduced a specific purpose program of recurrent funding for schools in response to 
these demands, its financial objectives could have been achieved if the additional 
Commonwealth assistance had been paid through untied Financial Assistance Grants 
(FAGs).
For the Commonwealth’s withdrawal from recurrent schools funding to be successful, 
State governments would need to accept the Federal government’s continuing policy 
role in schooling and its right to pursue national educational objectives. While State 
governments are well placed to pursue the major social policy goals of school education, 
the Federal government has a role in ensuring that schooling contributes to national 
social and economic development. In the 1960s, human capital theory strengthened the 
economic rationale for national involvement in schools policy. Since 1985, the Federal 
government has identified economic policy goals as a basis for its involvement in 
schooling (Karmel 1985) and has developed new targeted programs to pursue economic 
policy objectives.
In the past, the efficacy of Commonwealth involvement has been undermined by poor 
definition of policy objectives, inadequate performance monitoring and its focus on 
inputs in determining funding priorities. In the future, the Federal government should 
ensure that its targeted programs are linked to specific national policy goals yet do not 
impede the State government’s capacity to manage their education systems. It could 
look to early programs such as the Soldiers’ Children Education Scheme for models of 
policy initiatives which were delivered effectively by the States on the Commonwealth’s 
behalf. The Commonwealth should also improve its capacity to monitor the 
effectiveness of school expenditure by commissioning an independent agency to 
monitor school performance. The States’ agreement to the establishment of such an 
agency under a protocol that guarantees it regular access to schools, should be a 
condition attached to the Commonwealth’s withdrawal from the recurrent funding of 
schools.
The Commonwealth’s targeted and capital programs should remain the key policy 
instruments for pursuing a national schools agenda. Although the Ministerial Council 
has made an important contribution to the development of national policies for schools, 
it would be unrealistic to expect all national policy issues to be addressed through 
collaboration. National education policy is not the major priority of State and Territory 
governments and the Ministerial Council is less accountable for its policies than the 
Commonwealth government. Although the Ministerial Council remains an important 
forum for reaching agreement on national policy issues, the Commonwealth will always 
require funding instruments to enable it to pursue national policy objectives.
In negotiating the transfer of Commonwealth recurrent schools funding to untied grants, 
governments should try to minimise the impact of the change on the funding status of 
non-government schools. Non-government schools in Victoria and New South Wales 
would be particularly disadvantaged if the distributive impact of the Grants’ 
Commission’s fiscal equalisation formula is passed on to schools. The impact of the 
reform could be alleviated through the negotiation of phase-in arrangements with the 
Commonwealth Grants Commission. As the non-government sector caters for one-third
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of all students, State governments can be expected to continue to support non­
government schools. Nevertheless, funding for non-government schools would be 
subject to the same budgetary restraints as government schools if it was returned to the 
States.
Conclusion
The Federal government has made a significant financial contribution to Australian 
schooling and has successfully pursued national policy goals. But the past thirty years 
of Commonwealth specific purpose payments to schools has compromised the policy 
making capacity of State and Territory governments. The anomalies created by the 
Commonwealth’s involvement in schooling cannot be addressed until the recurrent 
funding of both public and private schools is returned to one level of government. As 
school education remains the Constitutional responsibility of the States, the 
Commonwealth should transfer its recurrent schools funding to untied Financial 
Assistance Grants (FAGs). By transferring its general recurrent funding to FAGs, the 
Federal government would return policy and funding responsibility for all schools to one 
level of government. While this may cause some changes in the funding position of 
private schools, public policy for schools can only improve if funding and policy issues 
are the responsibility of one level of government.
The Commonwealth has a legitimate role in pursuing national educational policies and 
should continue to do so through its programs of capital and targeted assistance, and in 
the Ministerial Council. The information on school and system performance remains 
inadequate to meet public accountability at both the State and the Federal level. Public 
accountability for education expenditure would improve if the Commonwealth 
government commissioned an independent agency to monitor school performance.
Such an agency would enable both governments and the public to make informed 
judgements about the effectiveness of Australian schooling. The Federal government 
should continue to pursue issues of national policy and public accountability for schools 
funding, but there is no policy justification for the continuation of Federal involvement 
in the recurrent funding of Australian schools.
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Appendix One
Common and Agreed Goals For Schooling in Australia
1. To provide an excellent education for all young people, being one which develops their 
talents and capacities to full potential, and is relevant to the social, cultural and economic 
needs of the nation.
2. To enable all students to achieve high standards of learning and to develop self-confidence, 
optimism, high self-esteem, respect for others, and achievement of personal excellence.
3. To promote equality of education opportunities, and to provide for groups with special 
learning requirements.
4. To respond to the current and emerging economic and social needs of the nation, and to 
provide those skills which will allow students maximum flexibility and adaptability in their 
future employment and other aspects of life.
5. To provide a foundation for further education and training, in terms of knowledge and 
skills, respect for learning and positive attitudes for life-long education.
6 . To develop in students:
• the skills of English literacy, including skills in listening, speaking, reading and 
writing;
• skills of numeracy, and other mathematical skills;
• skills of analysis and problem solving;
• skills of information processing and computing;
• an understanding of the role of science and technology in society, together with 
scientific and technological skills;
• a knowledge and appreciation of Australia's historical and geographic context;
• a knowledge of languages other than English;
• an appreciation and understanding of, and confidence to participate in, the 
creative arts;
• an understanding of, and concern for, balanced development and the global 
environment;
• a capacity to exercise judgement in matters of morality, ethics and social 
justice.
1. To develop knowledge, skills, attitudes and values which will enable students to participate 
as active and informed citizens in our democratic Australian society within an international 
context.
2. To provide students with an understanding and respect for our cultural heritage including 
the particular cultural background of Aboriginal and ethnic groups.
3. To provide for the physical development and personal health and fitness of students, and 
for the creative use of leisure time.
4. To provide appropriate career education and knowledge of the world of work, including an 
understanding of the nature and place of work in our society.________________________
Source: Australian Education Council (1989) "Common and Agreed National Goals for Schooling in 
Australia" cited in AEC (1992) National Report on Schooling in Australia 1991 p. 17.
149
Appendix Two
Income of non-government schools, by source and type of school, 
several years
In com e S ource by 1974 1976 1977 1979 1981 1986 1991 1992 1994
T ype o f  School
% % % % % % % % %
C ath o lic  P rim ary
Private 51 35 36 32 27 21 23 22 22
Commonwealth 29 43 43 45 48 55 53 54 56
State 18 21 21 23 24 25 24 24 22
O th er P rim ary
Private 75 65 65 62 57 47 50 47 46
Commonwealth 12 19 19 22 24 35 32 36 37
State 12 16 16 16 18 18 19 18 17
C ath o lic  S econ d ary
Private 60 37 35 35 29 25 29 29 30
Commonwealth 25 41 41 41 45 51 47 47 49
State 15 23 24 25 25 24 24 23 21
O th er S econ d ary
Private 79 67 68 62 56 56 58 59 61
Commonwealth 11 16 16 19 25 27 25 25 25
State 9 15 16 18 19 17 16 16 14
Sources: CSC (1984a) Options for Commonwealth Funding o f General Recurrent Resources for 
Australian Schools, Canberra, February; CSC (1984b) Funding Policies for Australian Schools. 
MCCETYA (1996) National Report on Schooling in Australia 1994, Statistical Annex, Carlton, Victoria: 
Curriculum Corporation; SC (1978) Some Aspects o f School Finance in Australia, a Discussion Paper, 
Canberra, October.
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Appendix Three
Policy Objectives of General Recurrent Grants Program
Objectives
The specific objective for the General Recurrent Grants Program is to help 
government schools with the recurrent costs of school education so that they 
can offer students educational programmes directed towards the achievement of 
the Commonwealth’s priorities for schooling. Those priorities ares aimed at 
ensuring that all students are allowed to realise their full potential, so that they 
leave school with the knowledge, skills and attitudes appropriate to their post­
school destinations, and they have a sound foundation for undertaking further 
education and training, participating successfully in the workforce, and 
contributing to and benefiting from Australian society. Those priorities also 
include support for the principles of access, choice, equity and excellence in 
schooling by encouraging the provision of a strong, viable and diverse selection 
of schools from which parents can choose what is best for their children.
Source: DEETYA (1997), Commonwealth Programmes for Schools, Quadrennial 
Administrative Guidelines 1997-2000: 2.4
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Appendix Four
Commonwealth Programs for Schools: a summary
Commonwealth Programs for schools have changed little since the Karmel (1973) 
report. While the configuration of Targeted Programs changed in the 1990s, the basic 
program structures of the General Recurrent Grants (GRG) and Capital Grants have 
remained the same. This appendix provides a summary of technical aspects of 
Commonwealth schools programs under the following headings:
A. General Recurrent Grants
B. Targeted Grants
C. Capital Grants
D. Education Resources Index (ERI)
E. The New Schools Policy
F. The adjustment mechanism
G. The Enrolment Benchmark Adjustment (EBA)
A. General Recurrent Grants
The General Recurrent Grants Program provides funding for all students in government 
and non-government schools on a per capita basis. Every student enrolled in an eligible 
school receives funding. All students in government schools attract the same level of 
per capita grant. In the non-government sector, the level of per capita grant differs 
between students on the basis of the funding category of the school. The funding 
category of the school is determined by its relative need for assistance, based on its level 
of resource use, or private income. As most of the private income of private schools is 
determined by school fees, funding categories reflect school fee levels. Since 1984, 
schools have been allocated to one of twelve categories, as shown in the table below.
Seventy per cent of schools are in Categories 10-12. The Catholic school systems are all 
funded at Category 10, except for the Western Australian system, which is Category 11. 
The 30 per cent of schools in the lower funding categories have received no real 
increase in their level of per capita funding for over ten years, while those in the higher 
categories have received substantial increases in funding. The schools in Categories 1-3 
have gradually declined in numbers over the years. Between 1989 and 1994, the total 
number of enrolments in Category 1-3 schools declined by 2,588 students. Over the 
same period, enrolments in Category 4-12 schools increased by 49,094 students 
(McKinnon 1995: 12).
Grants from State and Territory governments differ from State to State. State and 
Territory governments provide grants to non-government schools worth, on average, 
half the value of the Commonwealth’s grants, but the size of their contributions differ 
considerably between schools and between States. In South Australia, for example, 
secondary schools in Category 1 receive total funding from Federal and State 
governments worth only 20 % of the average cost of a government school student (ie. 12
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% from the Commonwealth and 8 % from the South Australian government). In 
Queensland, by comparison, Category 1 secondary schools receive total per student 
funding worth 27 % of the average cost of educating a child in a government school (ie. 
12 % from the Commonwealth and 15 % from the Queensland government)1
Table Commonwealth recurrent grant per student in government and non­
government schools 1998
ERI Funding
Category
Primary
<$)
Secondary
<$)
Examples
N o n -g o v e r n m e n t  sc h o o ls
88+ 1 501 795 The King’s School, Parramatta, NSW
76-87 2 669 1,054 Mentone Girls Grammar, VIC
51-75 3 836 1,222 Brisbane Grammar School, QLD
46-50 4 1,018 1,603 Presbyterian Ladies’ College, Armidale
41-45 5 1,218 1,776 Caulfield Montessori School, VIC
36-40 6 1,347 1,965 Ipswich Girls’ Grammar School, QLD
31-35 7 1,478 2,157 Aquinas College, Manning WA
26-30 8 1,627 2,382 Special Schools for disabled students
21-25 9 1,814 2,655 John Calvin School, Albany WA
16-20 10 1,955 2,854 Catholic school systems, all States except WA
11-15 11 2,110 3,078 Catholic school system, WA
0-10 12 2,272 3,320 Boys Town, Engadine, NSW
G o v e r n m e n t  sc h o o ls
379 559 All government schools
Sources: DEETYA (1998) Commonwealth Programmes for Schools Quadrennial Administrative 
Guidelines 1998. Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No. P24, 11 September 1992
The highest funded non-government schools (eg. Category 12 in New South Wales) 
receive total grants worth 66 % of the average cost of educating a child in a government 
school -  taking into account the contributions from both the Commonwealth and the 
State governments. The Commonwealth’s grant to Category 12 schools is 
approximately 45 per cent of the average cost of a child in a government school and the 
remaining 21 per cent contributed by the New South Wales government. The highest 
funded Category 10 secondary schools -  in Western Australia -  receive total funding 
worth 60 per cent of average government school costs, consisting of 40 per cent from 
the Commonwealth and 20 per cent from the Western Australian government 
(MCEETYA 1996: 38).
B. Targeted Grants
Under the Karmel funding plan, it was intended that the Commonwealth’s educational 
policy objectives would be met through the implementation of targeted programs in
1 These estimates are based on 1994 data from MCEETYA (1996) National Report on Schooling in 
Australia 1994, Statistical Annex, pp. 37-39 using data on Federal and State per capita grants in 
1994, and the national average per capita expenditure on government schools for the 1993-94 
financial year. The difference between States reflect the different levels of State grants. For 
example, Category One secondary schools in Queensland received only $933 per student from 
the State government while the South Australian government paid only $482 per student to 
Category One secondary schools in 1994. Commonwealth grant levels are uniform throughout 
Australia.
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specific areas. While the Committee was of the opinion that the “major share” of 
funding should go towards “a general underpinning of recurrent resources in the 
schools” (Karmel 1973: 5.24), it also formulated a scheme of “special supplementary 
grants to schools having a high proportion of children who are likely to require a 
greater-than-average share of educational effort, and hence expenditure” (Karmel 1973: 
5.25). The government therefore earmarked about one-third of its total grants to 
Disadvantaged Schools ($50 million), Special Education ($43 million) and Teacher 
Development ($10 million). To ensure that the grants were spent on the pursuit of 
Commonwealth policy goals, the programs were administered separately from State 
education programs. The Disadvantaged Schools Program, for example, was 
administered by regional committees of stakeholders such as parents, teachers and 
community members. Although the State Education Departments established the 
Committees, they only had one representative on them. Eligible schools were declared 
disadvantaged on the basis of a socio-economic index, and once “declared”, they 
received a significant level of assistance per student each year. Committee-based 
administrative arrangements were also typical of the Special education program and the 
Country Areas Program, introduced a few years later.
Targeted Programs were the only avenue through which government schools could 
obtain Commonwealth assistance directly. The targeted programs represented real 
Commonwealth intervention in the processes of schooling. They were, however, minor 
programs focussed on achieving what were claimed to be national policy objectives. Of 
all Commonwealth SPPs, the targeted programs were the only area in which 
Commonwealth policy objectives were pursued with disregard for State policies. While 
outcomes data were not collected to enable us to assess the impact of the programs, in 
operational terms, they were the most authentic of “tied grants” in the sense that the 
money was spent on the purposes that the Commonwealth specified and could not be 
absorbed into State own-purpose outlays or re-directed to State policy priorities.
Although the programs provided significant levels of supplementary assistance to 
individual schools for specific purposes, over time, these funds were often combined 
with State government funding targeted to the same policy goal. This coalescence of 
policy objectives led to the eventual broadbanding of the major targeted programs in 
1994, where State governments were given more freedom to spend the resources under 
the new National Equity Program. While the older targeted programs were broadbanded 
in 1994, at least a dozen targeted programs were not included in the National Equity 
Program2. These programs all reflected recent policy initiatives which the 
Commonwealth was not prepared to entrust to State education authorities.
In 1997, the Federal government abolished the National Equity Program and re-grouped 
the targeted elements into five priority areas: Literacy, Languages, Special Learning 
Needs, School to Work and Quality Outcomes. The first three policy areas (Literacy, 
Languages and Special Learning Needs) were to be “included in one agreement for each
2 eg. School Languages, Education Centres, Projects of National Significance, Curriculum 
Development Projects, Gender Equity in Curriculum, Gender and Violence Project, Vocational 
Education in Schools, Australian Students Prize, Quality Schooling Program, National 
Professional Development Program for Teachers, Aboriginal Education Strategic Initiatives. Key 
Competencies (DEET 1994 Commonwealth Programs for Schools 1994, Administrative Guidelines).
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of the three education sectors in each State and Territory” while the remaining two areas 
were “to be subject to separate contracts with funding recipients” (DEETYA 1997a: 
2.80). Although the Disadvantaged Schools element was abolished, the remaining 
targeted elements still operate as they did under the National Equity Program, with 
different allocation formulae and different payment procedures. Meanwhile, a similar 
number of new policy priorities within the targeted and national priority programs 
remain under the control of the Commonwealth Minister. This is typical of past practice 
when if the Commonwealth wishes to achieve a specific policy objective, it introduces a 
new targeted program for the purpose.
C. Capital Grants
Commonwealth capital grants for school science laboratories were introduced in 1964. 
The justification for introducing these grants was concern about the educational 
adequacy of Australian schools, particularly in science. The impact of the successful 
Russian launch of Sputnik 1 in 1957 led to widespread criticism of the state of science 
education by academics, science teachers and members of the business community 
(Smart, 1978). The perception of a crisis in education was also fuelled by the rapid rise 
in secondary school participation from the impact of the post-war baby boom and 
increasing secondary school retention rates (Mathews, 1983: 137). The Menzies 
government responded by providing capital funding for science laboratories in 1964 and 
for school libraries in 1968, distributed between government and non-government 
schools on the basis of per capita secondary enrolments.
The capital program expanded after the Karmel report and the funding was allocated for 
general building requirements on a needs basis. In the early 1990s, the capital program 
received additional funding to assist with the policy goal of increasing Year 12 retention 
rates. The determination of recipients of capital grants is not decided by the 
Commonwealth government. Commonwealth capital grants for government schools are 
distributed by the State governments. In the 1980s, DEETYA devolved the allocation of 
grants to non-government schools to Block Grant Authorities (BGAs) which are 
comprised of representatives of the non-government sector. In general, there is a 
Catholic BGA and a non-Catholic BGA in each State, which are responsible for 
determining project priorities and allocating the resources on behalf of the Federal 
government. DEETYA establishes guidelines for the selection of capital projects which 
require the BGAs to distribute the resources on the basis of socio-economic need.
While the Federal Minister has final approval over the funding decisions of the BGA, 
they have rarely questioned the BGA’s recommendations.
Capital grants have remained approximately 10 per cent of total schools funding for 
many years, and provide a mechanism for the Commonwealth to supplement the efforts 
of State and non-government education authorities without intervening in the day-today 
operations of schools. Capital funding is also a mechanism through which the 
Commonwealth can pursue national policy objectives, in association with education 
authorities.
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D. Education Resources Index (ERI)
The Education Resources Index is a mechanism for assessing the financial capacity of 
non-government schools applying for assistance under the General Recurrent Grants 
Program. The first system of Commonwealth recurrent funding in 1969 was simply to 
provide the same level of assistance per student enrolled in all non-government schools, 
differentiated only by their level of education. During the Karmel inquiry, the needs of 
schools were assessed on the basis of financial information provided by schools and 
school systems. This information revealed considerable differences in the operating 
income of non-government schools. The Karmel Committee recommended that the 
government move away from the system of uniform per capita grants because of the 
wide disparities in resource use levels between non-government schools (par. 6.47).
The Karmel Committee recommended that schools be grouped into eight categories of 
need, which since 1984 has been 12 categories of need, and receive different levels of 
government funding.
The Commonwealth obtains information from non-government schools about their 
operating expenses through an annual financial questionnaire completed by private 
schools and school systems. This information is used to compile an Education 
Resources Index (ERI) which rates the school’s level of resources relative to other 
schools and determines its funding category. In the 25 years since the scheme began, 
the problems associated with ranking schools according to their levels of private income 
have become increasingly difficult to resolve. The main problem is that all non­
government schools would like to be in the higher funding categories because they 
would receive more money from government. Many of the schools ranked as well- 
resourced have hired professional accountants to apply tax minimisation techniques to 
reducing the level of the school’s assessable income. The financial questionnaire 
creates an opportunity for schools to seek loopholes in the wording of questions and to 
manipulate their data to maintain a more favourable ERI rating in convoluted and highly 
undesirable ways. It is also possible to omit assets and expenditure by linking a 
school’s accounts to other bodies, such as a parish church or religious order. Although 
the questionnaire attempts to find a common basis for gathering information from 
different school accounts it still fails to produce an accurate picture of a school’s 
capacity to raise private resources, because of the problems inherent in pursuing such an 
objective.
As the Commonwealth has become aware of these techniques, it has progressively 
tightened its assessment criteria and closed off loopholes in its financial questionnaire to 
the effect that very few schools are now able to change their funding category. In the 
post-1996 funding reassessment, only five out of the 38 schools whose ERI indicated a 
change to a more favourable funding category were allowed to change category due to 
the maintenance of effort and private income tests. On the other hand, 22 out of the 42 
schools whose ERI indicated a less favourable funding category subsequently changed 
category. An independent evaluation of the ERI by KPMG Management Consultants 
concluded that “the additional ERI requirements tend to -  at best -  lock (schools) into 
an existing funding category or -  more commonly -  put the school into a lower funding 
category”(KPMG 1996: 71).
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As the level of competition between non-government schools has increased, older well- 
resourced schools have felt particularly aggrieved by the needs-based assessment 
process. The funding category of new non-government schools is determined by 
projected income and enrolments, therefore new non-government schools are able to 
choose their funding category by setting their fees at a low level. As existing non­
government schools are assessed on the basis of past expenditure, the needs-assessment 
process “locks” an existing high-fee school within a high funding category and gives it 
no scope to change its clientele, its fee structure or its educational provision.
Their ERI assessment (ie. their level of government funding) now drives the direction of 
many schools’ educational policy and planning. In a routine evaluation of the operation 
of the General Recurrent Grants Program, KPMG Management Consulting pointed out 
that some schools wanted to receive data relating to their ERI calculation more promptly 
from DEETYA in order to “use the data to monitor their ERI and set budgets to reflect 
the direction in which to head or maintain their ERI” (KPMG 1996: 52)
Over time the basis for calculating the ERI has become so complex that it is difficult to 
understand exactly how assessments are obtained. The KPMG evaluation ran some 
simulations to assess the effect of changed circumstances on a school’s ERI, using the 
financial data from 12 different schools. The result was that the ERI was sensitive to the 
changes in some schools but not in others. The evaluators concluded, “for these 12 
schools, changes in the ERI were more likely to be caused by the structure of the ERI 
than a change in the school’s circumstances”(KPMG 1996:70).
Under the ERI system, the implicit level of subsidy received by families in educating 
their children is determined solely by the extent to which their chosen school has been 
successful in manipulating the ERI system. The capacity of parents to afford the fees at 
their chosen school is not taken into account. For example a high-income family 
attending a Catholic systemic secondary school attracts a Commonwealth government 
subsidy that is 3.5 times the grant that they would attract if their child attended a 
Category 1 school. The capacity of the family to pay is not taken into account as their 
entitlement depends on the funding category of the school. Low-income families 
receive less government assistance if they choose to send their child to a school in 
Categories 1-3. Yet Harrison claims that eighteen per cent of low-income families 
currently attend non-government schools (Harrison 1996: 14).
DEETYA defines the ERI as an indicator of “the capacity of a school to generate funds 
on its own behalf’. (KPMG 1996). In their evaluation, KPMG Management Consulting 
concluded that the ERI was a poor indicator of need. It noted that schools with very 
different socio-economic circumstances could have the same ERI; some schools with 
large asset bases were in high funding categories; and that the ERI worked against the 
needs of established schools.
In 1996, when the Coalition government abolished the New Schools Policy guidelines 
for non-government schools (discussed in chapter 4), this also removed some of the 
restrictions designed to stop manipulation of the ERI. At the same time, the Federal
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Minister for Schools, Dr David Kemp implemented an election promise to review the 
Education Resources Index (ERI).
E. The New Schools Policy
In 1985, the former Commonwealth Schools Commission developed a set of guidelines 
governing the approval processes for non-government schools seeking Commonwealth 
financial assistance that became known as the “New Schools Policy”. Under the 
guidelines, new non-government schools were required to enrol a minimum number of 
students and funding was provided up to a maximum enrolment level. In 1988, an 
additional restriction was introduced limiting the funding that new independent non­
government schools could receive to the lower funding levels between Category 1 and 6 
regardless of their assessed level of “need” as measured by the Education Resources 
Index (Department of Employment, Education and Training 1989: 14). This forced new 
non-government schools to charge higher fees than the majority of non-government 
schools in Category 10 which received 50 per cent more funding per student than 
schools in Category Six. (Minister for Employment, Education and Training 1988). In 
1988, the government also doubled the enrolment minima for new non-government 
schools.
The rationale for the guidelines was to uphold the principle of planned educational 
provision in opposition to competition in schooling. The policy aimed to ensure that 
new non-government schools would not have an adverse impact on existing government 
and non-government schools. The main effect of the guidelines was to ensure that most 
new non-government schools were established in regions of population growth (such as 
new suburban centres) rather than in areas of population decline.
The New Schools Policy was not particularly onerous to the Catholic school system or 
established independent schools. Most of the growth in the non-government sector 
during the 1980s was in small schools that were established to foster particular religious 
or cultural beliefs or educational philosophies. Of the 100,000 additional students in 
non-government schools between 1985 and 1995, 80,000 were in schools that were 
independent of the Catholic system or the established Independent schools. As these 
schools were not within a system, they were the most affected by the New Schools 
Policy.
The New Schools guidelines appeared to have the desired effect of restraining growth in 
the non-government sector. Between 1985 and 1995 the proportion of total students 
enrolled in non-government schools increased by an average of 0.32 percentage points 
per year, compared with an annual average increase of 0.69 percentage points per year 
between 1980 and 1985 (ABS Cat. No. 4221.0). By creating disincentives for the 
establishment of new schools and restricting funding levels to the lower six categories, 
the decisions of May 1988 had the effect of restraining average per capita outlays on 
new non-government schools. The New Schools Policy was abolished in 1996 to the 
effect that any school that received registration from a State or Territory government 
would be eligible for Commonwealth funding. This is likely to increase the number of 
non-government schools that are eligible for high levels of government funding, and
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increase competition for students between schools in the government and non­
government sectors.
F. The adjustment mechanism
In the early years, Commonwealth expenditure on schools was linked to movements in 
average government school recurrent costs. As these costs rose significantly, in the 
early 1980s, the Commonwealth Education Department introduced a Schools Prices 
index which reflected real changes in the cost of education services, such as equipment 
and materials, but primarily movements in teachers salaries. During the 1980s, as the 
Prices and Incomes Accord took effect, the Schools Prices Index fell behind the 
Consumer Prices Index and the Gross Non-farm Product Deflator. In its 1992 
negotiations with the non-government schools lobby, the Federal government agreed to 
change the adjustment mechanism from the Schools Prices Index (SPI) to Average 
Government School Recurrent Costs (AGSRC). Although the Schools Prices Index was 
the most accurate reflection of changes to school costs, the non-government schools 
lobby groups pressured the government to change to AGSRC. They also argued that the 
components of the AGSRC index should be changed to include costs specific to non­
government schools.
The government agreed to introduce AGSRC and to review its components in 
consultation with the non-government school lobby. The Department commissioned a 
consultant, Coopers and Lybrand Pty. Ltd. to review the AGSRC and their work was 
directed by a Steering Committee upon which all the non-government school interest 
groups were represented. The representatives of the non-government school sector 
supported the widest possible definition of Average Government School Recurrent 
Costs, arguing that expenditure such as redundancy payments should be included in the 
index. The Consultant’s report reflected the advice of its Steering Committee and when 
the Department introduced the AGSRC index in 1993, it included redundancy payments 
as a cost. In 1993, the new Victorian State government embarked on a major re­
structuring of its education system and offered thousands of redundancy packages to its 
teachers. As Victoria is the second largest education system in Australia, this major 
outlay had a significant impact on the AGSRC. In 1994, when the annual movement in 
the Consumer Prices Index was less than one per cent, the AGSRC moved by 5 
percentage points. This gave a windfall increase in funding to non-government schools 
through supplementation for increases in AGSRC in 1994. The Federal government 
subsequently removed redundancy payments from the AGSRC index, however the 
increases had already been paid into the funding base.
The average current expenditure per student in non-government schools between 1961-2 
and 1994-5 is shown in Figure 4.1. The data exclude capital funding but include 
expenditure on targeted programs. As General Recurrent Grants is the largest program, 
the funding trend reflects increases in GRG over the period. The expenditure is deflated 
by GNFP(e) which is not identical to the adjustment mechanisms used by the Federal 
government to adjust for cost increases in expenditure. The apparent stability in Federal 
funding during the 1980s, shown in Figure 4.1, is due in part to movements in the 
Schools Prices Index (SPI) falling behind the GNFP(e) as well as the government’s
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decision not to include a 4 per cent wage increase for teachers in the Schools Prices 
Index in 1988.
G. The Enrolment Benchmark Adjustment (EBA)
In its 1996 Budget, the Federal government announced a mechanism to ensure that the 
cost of all new places in non-government schools would be paid for by cuts to Federal 
expenditure on non-government schools. The mechanism to do this is called the 
Enrolment Benchmark Adjustment. Under the Enrolment Benchmark Adjustment, 
$1712.50 would be deducted from expenditure on State schools for every new student 
that enrolled in a non-government school from 1 January 1997. As non-government 
schools catered for 29.4% of total student enrolments in 1996, $1712.50 would be 
deducted from State schools for every student that enrols in a non-government school 
above the 29.4 % enrolment benchmark. (Department of Employment, Education and 
Training 1996). In addition to the cut of $1712.50 per student, the Federal government 
will save an average of $406 per student against its forward estimates of recurrent 
expenditure on government schools as that sector’s share of total student enrolments 
declines. The Enrolment Benchmark Adjustment of $1,700 plus the saving of $406 
against the forward estimates equals $2,106. This amount will fully offset the average 
expenditure of $1,900 per student that the Federal government currently allocates to 
non-government schools.
The total amount to be recovered under the Enrolment Benchmark Adjustment will be 
taken out of the $916 million per annum in recurrent funding allocated to State schools 
by the Federal government. According to the Federal government’s revised estimates in 
October 1996, the government expected to cut $178 million from State schools recurrent 
expenditure over the next four years under the Enrolment Benchmark Adjustment 
(Hollway 1996:16). In addition, the Federal government will make a saving of $42 
million against its forward estimates of expenditure on students in government schools. 
In total, this decrease of $220 million in Federal expenditure on State schools will fully 
offset the Federal government’s additional outlay of $206 million on new places in non­
government schools over the next four years.
Since January 1997, all new places in non-government schools have been fully offset in 
this way. The Enrolment Benchmark Adjustment is a permanent mechanism for 
funding future enrolment growth in the non-government sector from reductions in 
Federal expenditure on State schools. The Federal government justified the cut of 
$1712.50 per student with the argument that State governments “save” twice that 
amount each time a student moves from a government to a non-government school.
This argument suggested that the State schools will lose the same number of students as 
the non-government sector gains, which is not accurate. The size of the total student 
population is increasing, therefore State schools will not be “losing” any students, even 
though their enrolment share is declining. State school enrolments were projected to 
increase by 3,944 students between 1996 and 2000. Therefore State Education systems 
will not enjoy any real “savings” from the increase in enrolments in non-govemment 
schools but they will be required to bear one hundred per cent of the cost.
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